

The
American Historical Review

THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

MORE than one period in the constitutional history of England may rightly be called critical. The concluding years of the reign of Richard II., and the periods of the Yorkist, Tudor, and Stuart dynasties are all critical in one sense of the word. But in none of these was anything more than the form of the result really at stake. Its essential character was never involved. The attempt of Richard II. to reverse the course of things was very skilful and to a certain point successful, but it fell in a time of most rapid and vigorous constitutional growth, and if the accidental personal element in the case had not furnished a leader to the opposition one would have been found elsewhere. We have at least every reason to believe so from the consummate leadership that must in some form have directed the marvellous constitutional advance of the fourteenth century. The revolution of 1399 might have been postponed for a short time, but Richard could not have prevented it nor have defended himself against it.

The Tudors were the heirs of the Yorkist monarchy, and constitutionally, from the present point of view, the periods are to be considered one. While the will of the sovereign during this period was as supreme in the control of public affairs as under the early Angevin kings, and while a despotism was established theoretically full of the most insidious danger to the constitution, practically circumstances which were of the very nature of the situation compelled an amount of dependence upon Parliament or alliance with it which prevented any permanently disastrous result. Some years before the close of the period it became evident, not merely that the constitution had suffered no loss, but that the time was ripe for that new advance which was undoubtedly aided by the character of the first Stuart kings.

The whole Stuart period is usually considered one constitutionally, but from the present limited point of view it falls into two quite different divisions. The first age, to the accession of James I., not merely presents no danger to the constitution but is one of most decided constitutional development, not in the construction of machinery—except to a limited extent in the reign of Charles I.—but in the putting of machinery into operation. The peculiar character of the first Stuart period is given it less by an attempt of the kings to be rid of the constitution than by an attempt of Parliament to put the existing constitution into actual operation in spite of the preference and determination of the kings to continue the personal government which had up to that time been the rule. It is not a period of the slightest danger to the constitution. It is rather the age in which the constitution becomes conscious of itself, if we may say so, in which the attempt is made for the first time to operate the constitution in opposition to the sovereign, or, with regard to what resulted from it, to transfer the actual exercise of sovereignty from the king to Parliament. The reign of James II. presents a different case. His was an attempt to resist, not by insisting upon doing what earlier kings had done—it was now too late to hope for success in that way—but rather by preparing to undo the work of the makers of the constitution and to repeat the attempt of Richard II. The revolution of 1688 and that of 1399 are as closely parallel as it is possible for two historical events to be, and the constitution was never in so great danger in the second as in the first period, and never in serious danger in either.

If by the critical period of English constitutional history is meant an age when the real character of the result as well as its form and details were at stake—when the course of constitutional growth might have been turned in a different direction—we must find it, as we must in nearly every case of vigorous growth, near the beginning. In this sense the critical period of the English constitution, the decisive period which controlled the future, was the thirteenth century.

At the end of the twelfth century no indication is to be found, in the existing situation, of the constitution which was to be. If the conditions of the time looked forward to anything it was to a result like that in France, to an almost ideal absolutism, a government in which all the machinery should be operated by the king and exist only to give expression to his will, with no means of limiting that will or even of giving expression to a will in opposition. From this result England was saved during the thirteenth century, and this not by the possession of any peculiar institutions nor by any

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saving action
was by the great victory.*

statesmanship or foresight, but by a series of events and circumstances which were almost accidental in character.

At the close of the twelfth century England was still a thoroughly feudal state.¹ The beginnings of important changes which go back to an earlier date had as yet produced no essential modifications in that system. As a feudal state, England differed but little institutionally from the feudal states of the Continent, but much practically in the greater power of the sovereign. This is only saying that it was a feudal state of the type of a barony rather than of a kingdom. It was the feudalism of the duchy of Normandy expanded into the feudalism of the kingdom of England without any essential change of character. In so far as the general institutions of the state are concerned there was nothing which furnished any check upon the king, or which promised to develop into any check which was not strictly feudal in character, nor any precedent of resistance to his will which was not also feudal. Hardly can we say that there was any precedent of successful resistance at all. The tendency towards a limitation of the sovereign which was latent in all feudalism and which was destined under favoring conditions to lead to such important results in England, was still too slight to be capable of any except the most temporary and local application, or to give the faintest promise of any future growth.

At the close of the next century there is evident a complete and revolutionary change, as if there had occurred somewhere in the interval a night of the 4th of August and the meeting of a Constituent Assembly. Feudalism—true feudalism—had disappeared as a ruling system from the domain of both public and private law, or it would perhaps be more accurate to say that as a political and economic system feudalism was just transforming itself into its most permanent contributions to English institutions, under anything like the original form; on one side into the land law, even at that date highly artificial because based upon a system which no longer corresponded with the facts, and on the other side into the group of new institutions derived from the *curia regis*, of which the most important was the parliament. With reference to the other chief element of the situation at the beginning of the century, the absolute

¹ The extent to which feudalism pervades the historical sources of the Norman and early Angevin reigns has hardly been sufficiently recognized. Had every other monument of feudal law disappeared it would be possible to reconstruct almost the whole body of it from the second volume of the Abingdon Chronicle alone. By this I mean of course the living principles and practices of the tenth and eleventh centuries, not the more highly elaborated and technical law of the thirteenth century and later lawyers. Some other collections give more information still upon special sides of feudalism, as the Ramsey cartulary upon economic feudalism and the Gloucester cartulary upon the legal questions involved in the transfer and lease of land.

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kingship, an equally great change had taken place, though the change here was less nearly completed. The unlimited kingship had indeed disappeared and if it is hardly possible to say that a definitely limited kingship had taken its place, the idea of such an institution had been formed, the fundamental principles upon which it was to be based had been clearly and consciously conceived, a series of precedents of their successful enforcement against the opposition of the sovereign had been established and the machinery by which in the end the government was to be operated in accordance with them had begun to take form. The continuous and rapid progress of the fourteenth century was needed to erect upon these beginnings anything which may be called a constitution in the modern sense, but the thirteenth century was the determining and creative age which rendered the work of the fourteenth possible.

If at the beginning of the thirteenth century England was still a thoroughly feudal state, in the feudal system of the twelfth century one development of decisive influence upon the future had taken place. The extreme severity with which the kings enforced their feudal rights and pushed them to the utmost limits, as in the case of wardship and marriage, had forced the baronage to study the question of the king's rights from their own point of view, and to endeavor to define and limit them by specific formulation. The charter of Henry I. as a statement of feudal public law is crude and incomplete. It could not be otherwise considering its date, and it is but slightly more so than the similar statements of both public and private feudal law which were made at about the same time in Italy;¹ but its purely practical character is evident at a glance. It is an attempt by definition of existing rights to check a development of them in favor of the king which the barons had reason to fear had already begun. That progress in this direction was made during the following century is evident both in the far greater clearness of conception and statement in the Magna Carta, and, in a different way, in the assertion at about the same time that feudal obligations in England did not include service in France—a claim which the recognized feudal law of the beginning of the century would not warrant. Of all the influences existing in England at the beginning of the thirteenth century which could shape the progress of that age, this tendency to subject the rights of the king

¹ It is true that this distinction does not exist in feudal in the same way that it does in other systems of law, that the feudal system is, as it has been called, a usurpation of the domain of public by private law; and yet, if the distinction is not pushed too far, it is useful and for certain purposes necessary. There is a sense in which the *curia* of the king is a different thing from the *curia* of a minor baron, though no line of institutional difference can be drawn between them.

to strict scrutiny and definition is the most important. It is the only tendency opposed to the absolutist drift of the time, and combined with the fundamental principles of feudalism it determined the result.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the fact which set in motion the train of events, was the break-down of the feudal system as a source of government supply. The increasing amount and complexity of business in England, which showed itself on one side in the rapid development of the royal courts, showed itself upon another in the increasing expenses of the government, which it was no longer possible to meet with the ordinary sources of revenue. To the men of the time the efforts of the kings to raise money were signs and proofs of their complete depravity, and there is no doubt but that the difficulties of the case were complicated through more than half the century by bad government; but the best king that ever reigned, had his lines fallen in England in the thirteenth century, would have been forced to resort to much the same expedients. The French monarchy had to face this difficulty later and less suddenly than the English, but it made use of practically the same means to meet it, and experienced practically the same opposition, though this was for special reasons less united and less intelligent.

If it could have been possible for John, or for his minister, to have an idea so far in advance of his time, we should be tempted to say of him that he was trying in the early years of his reign to develop something like the regular annual revenue of a modern state. To do this under the conditions of the time required, not merely the most arbitrary action on the part of the king, begun and directed by his will alone, but also a more violent straining of the king's feudal right than any of his predecessors had ventured upon. It is no wonder that the alarm of the baronage was excited. If they had not had behind them the training of a century and a half in guarding carefully their feudal rights against the encroachments of an absolute monarchy, they could hardly have failed to realize the tendency of these measures. While, however, the question of taxation set in motion the train of events, Magna Carta shows plainly that the barons had not failed to recognize the more insidious but equally great danger with which they were threatened by another advance of the royal power—by the rise in the king's courts of another system of law and justice than the feudal. This involved a violation of feudal law less openly and directly than did John's taxation, but quite as truly; and many provisions of the charter, both of a general and of a special character, are aimed against it.

But these tendencies of John's toward absolute action were only the natural continuation of tendencies which had begun at least as early as his father's time, and which had continued through his brother's reign. There is evidence in the *Magna Carta* that this fact had not been unnoticed by the barons. But if they had been conscious of the drift of the kings' policy they had been apparently powerless against it. There was no opportunity under either king to arrest it. What made successful opposition possible under John, and gave the opportunity for the *Magna Carta*, was not the fact that this tendency was now more rapid and undisguised, but it was the character of the king. Had John been as firm and steady as his father, or even as his brother, it is more than probable that he would have been successful. It was John's badness, and in the essential matter his weakness, which made it possible to unite against him a powerful opposition, and to force him to a formal and emphatic recognition of the rights of his vassals. In other words, the existence of the *Magna Carta*—the first step toward the English constitution—depended on the character of the king, always something of an accident in a monarchy.

Examined from the point of view of those who framed it, the *Magna Carta* will be found to contain three great provisions or sets of provisions. First, no taxation of the feudal community without its consent, beyond the regular aids.¹ Second, no modification or violation of the law by the arbitrary action of the king; and third, should the king be determined to free himself from the law, the right of forcing him to submit to it by civil war and if necessary by temporary deprivation of the royal power. It will be seen at once that this last logically involved to make it complete what the *Magna Carta* explicitly disavowed, but what was immediately and continually found necessary, the right of permanent deposition.²

¹ It will be noticed that while Art. 12 of *Magna Carta* does not prove that London was a commune it places it for the purpose of the article in the position of a king's vassal, which was technically the position of the French commune. This is the more noteworthy as a comparison of this article with Art. 32 of the Articles of the Barons shows that the point was somewhat carefully considered.

² This right and not that of electing the king was the essential one upon which the security of the constitution depended. The old Teutonic election was as empty a form in England as in France. The right of choosing the successor of a deposed king was a logical but unessential result of the right of deposition. What was absolutely necessary to the continued existence of the constitution was the right of deposing a king already in possession of the throne, or of holding this fate in reserve as a means of coercion. That the right of election received later so much more emphasis than the right from which it was derived was due to accidents of the situation at the accession of one dynasty after another, while few occasions arose for the exercise of the more fundamental right.

It would be of course impossible that the right of deposition should be formally embodied in the public law of any state not on the verge of dissolution. See the account

It is hardly necessary to say that these provisions were all drawn directly from the feudal law and were recognized incidents of that law wherever it existed, or that in this form they could not have been derived from any other system of public law existing at the time.¹ They are merely specific forms of the fundamental principle of feudalism that the relation of lord and vassal was the result of a voluntary agreement by which both were alike bound and which neither had a right to modify without the consent of the other. The whole body of the feudal law was a development of the idea of contract, and the great pre-occupation of those who framed it was to guard against any unwarranted infringement of the contract, direct or indirect, by either party to it. That much the greater portion of feudal law as written elsewhere consists of limitations upon the vas-

Feudal idea of
contract in
Magna Carta

of this period in Plehn's *Matheus Parisiensis*—a very interesting discussion, but too theoretical and too strongly influenced by apparent analogies in the institutional history of Germany. The treatment of the question of election to the crown in Roessler's *Kaiserin Matilda* agrees better with the facts.

¹ On the feudal right of insurrection and on other rights which the charter emphasizes, especially on clause 39, see Dodu, *Histoire des Institutions Monarchiques dans le Royaume Latin de Jérusalem*, pp. 159-171. This book is an admirable introduction to the study of the Magna Carta. In some points of detail at least the feudal situation in England was more closely parallel to that in the Kingdom of Jerusalem than to that in France.

That the clauses embodying the first and third of these principles were dropped from the Magna Carta as reissued during the century is not a matter of importance. Practice constantly respected both. In taxation we have evidence that the barons watched carefully over their rights (see Shirley, *Letters of Henry III.*, I. 151; the action of the county court, which Stubbs supposes in this case, is not evident in the text; *Const. Hist.*, II. 224-226), and at the close of the century the principle in greatly expanded form—the whole idea of taxation having changed in the meantime—was virtually restored to the Magna Carta in the Confirmation of the Charters. A very interesting statement of the other principle is that which was extorted from Henry III. in the Confirmation of 1265: *licet omnibus de regno nostro contra nos insurgere*. Stubbs, *Charters*, p. 416.

In regard to these omissions, which have occasioned much discussion and which cannot yet be fully explained, these points may be suggested. If clauses 12 and 14 of the original Magna Carta were strictly interpreted, they required the summoning of the common council of the kingdom and its action on the occasion of every extraordinary grant, instead of what seems to have been the more usual and certainly more convenient feudal method of consent by local groups or by individuals. If scutage was understood in its strict feudal sense and no account made of the irregular or changing meaning of the word, the provision in 12 and 14 must have seemed to many of exceedingly doubtful propriety. Probably clause 44 of the reissue of 1217 affirmed all that was intended by clause 12. If the king could be trusted to respect the law, clause 12 was unnecessary; the general principle of the law fully covered the case, as it did not the details of action in such cases as wardship and marriage, and clause 35 of 1217 may have been considered a sufficient pledge. A comparison of the four editions of the charter to 1225 shows that there was a constant study of its language and constant attempts to improve it in clearness and to avoid saying more or less than was meant. One is tempted to say that some of the changes must have arisen from attempts to enforce the provisions of the charter in the courts.

sal's right of action does not make the Magna Carta really exceptional or indicate that it is not to be classed among the statements of feudal law. The formal feudal law, like every system of law, occupied itself with the protection of those rights most exposed to attack. In England, as we have already said, the extraordinary power of the sovereign compelled a careful scrutiny of his rights, an explicitness in their definition, and an emphasis of the illegality of other action which was not common elsewhere. In the field which more nearly corresponds with private law we have the same conditions as on the Continent, and English land law is occupied mainly with limitations upon the vassal's action.

If we reduce these three principles to their simplest form of statement they mean that the king is bound to observe the law and that if he will not he may be compelled by force to do so. It will be again seen at once that this is the corner-stone of the English constitution. It is the underlying fact of its history—the protective and creative principle which made it possible. Henceforth—if the Magna Carta becomes permanent law—the king is subject to the public law of the state. Henceforth against an arbitrary king civil war and deposition are not revolutionary in English history. They are legal and constitutional expedients, as Parliament is reported to have said in effect to Richard II.

This gives us the place of the Magna Carta in the constitutional history of England. It is not a creative document. It contains nothing new except the provision, temporary in its very nature, creating a body of twenty-five barons to enforce its provisions. In its statement of specific law it looks backward and not forward. It belongs to an old system which had served its purpose and was doomed to destruction. But in this fact consists its inestimable service. It gave a permanent form to the fundamental principles of the feudal system at the moment when that system was giving way upon every side. For the barons could not save feudalism. The needs and interests of society which had once created that régime were now working with the kings against it. Evidence of this tendency is not wanting even in the Magna Carta, and before the close of the century in some important matters the barons themselves found, unconsciously but truly, their anti-feudal outweighing their feudal interests. The danger was that with the system itself these pregnant ideas would disappear also, as they did elsewhere. The Magna Carta by its formal statement made their preservation depend no longer upon the continued existence of the system from which they sprang, but upon the conditions of the future. What service was rendered by the Magna Carta in later stages of the

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history of the constitution when a not unnatural idealization had given to some of its clauses a meaning which would have seemed strange to the men who wrote them, it is not the place here to enquire. At the moment when the foundation of the constitution was laid it was its great and sufficient service to lay that foundation, to carry over from the system which was disappearing into the new system which was taking form, and whose form was yet undetermined, the controlling principles which shaped and fixed the future. The importance of the Magna Carta in English constitutional history never has been and cannot be exaggerated, even if much that has been said of it in the past is unwarranted by the facts. Upon the principles which it enunciated rests the whole constitution. Without them, constantly cherished and courageously enforced, the constitution never could have been made; the inevitable tendency of declining feudalism towards a strong monarchy would have triumphed, and Parliament itself, which would have been formed in any case, would have been as helpless against powerful kings as the French estates general.

This is saying that the English constitution rests finally upon the feudal system. The formative principles of the constitution were derived directly from the feudal system. Without that system the constitution, as it existed in the fifteenth century or as it exists to-day, would not have been possible. The English limited monarchy of later times could never have been regarded as a direct outgrowth of the Saxon, non-feudal state, as it existed for instance under Canute, except by a preconceived and strained interpretation of the facts of history. The whole drift of that state was toward a monarchy of the Carolingian type in which the crude checks upon the sovereign's will or equally crude machinery for operating the nation's will, belonging to the primitive German public law, had either entirely disappeared or been dwarfed into insignificance.¹ The accomplishment of this result was made impossible in England by the Norman Conquest. It was the thorough feudalization of England which resulted from the Conquest that made the constitution possible, not by establishing a strong monarchy against which primitive Teutonic liberty reacted later, but by introducing with the strong monarchy a new

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¹ To speak of these as checks upon the sovereign's will is to carry back our conceptions into the earlier time where they did not exist. They were not checks upon the sovereign's will as such in the Teutonic constitution. They were rather survivals of an earlier form of government disappearing before the new and rapidly increasing monarchical power. The Saxon monarchy advanced along this road so much more slowly than the Frankish not from any greater devotion of the race to liberty, nor because it possessed different or better institutions, but mainly because one set of influences, most decisive in hastening the results on the Continent, was lacking—the Roman survivals.

conception of the relation of the king to those of his subjects who in that age constituted the nation, and who alone could constitute it, by introducing the definite contract-idea of the feudal system.¹

In the meantime the Magna Carta itself determined nothing. All depended upon the interpretation and application which should be given it in the future, and if the opportunity to put it into form depended upon the accident of a king's character so also did its position in the future. Had a king like Henry II. or Edward I. reigned in England during the fifty years which followed the death of John the Magna Carta might have made more difficult, but it would not have made impossible, the completion of the work which John had begun in the early years of his reign. Such a king might easily have thrown the Magna Carta into the background, have avoided any repetition or ratification of it, and have established a series of precedents of royal action without reference to the law which it would have been very difficult to overcome. The events of the months immediately following the granting of the charter make this certain, and while the attempt to enforce the principles of the Magna Carta by civil war and deposition before the death of John was of the greatest value as a precedent it was too inconclusive to determine the future. Of far greater value were the precedents established in the reign of Henry III., carrying the right of controlling the king by force far past the middle of this century of transition and making it a permanent element in the new conception of the state then forming in England. This result was rendered possible by the long reign of Henry III., as a king as bad as his father, weaker in character and less able, prodigally wasteful of money and constantly under the influence of foreign favorites.

The results of this reign in many directions it is impossible even to outline in this article. For the present purpose these suffice as resulting partly from the character of the king and partly from the position of the foreigners in England :

1. The formation of a distinct, continuous, and almost in our sense of the word an organized party of opposition which even the arbitrary methods of Simon de Montfort were not able to destroy. This was the instrument by which the work of the reign in continuing the tradition of the Magna Carta was accomplished and the results here indicated produced.

¹ That the feudal system would in the course of time have been introduced into England if the Norman conquest had never occurred is more than likely. But the slight tendencies toward feudalism already manifest in Saxon England had up to that time produced no result of importance, and the practices which may be termed, in a popular sense of the word, feudal, do not clearly exhibit the institutional characteristics of Continental feudalism.

2. The beginning of a new conception of the nation and the state—of the nation as something standing over against the king, to be distinguished from him in thought, having great interests of its own which might clash with those of the king—not exactly our idea of the organic nation but rather of the community of those classes which had a definite interest in the condition of public affairs—a primitive and undeveloped idea but richly fruitful even at that time. And of the government of the state no longer as of something belonging to the king personally, to be administered by his will and in his interests exclusively, but as something belonging as truly or even more truly to the nation, with which the king is vested but which he is bound to administer in the interests of all according to certain recognized principles, so that if he does not he may be temporarily at least divested of his right to rule and others may be appointed in his stead to correct the abuses which he has permitted to exist.

3. These ideas together, as acted upon and enforced by the opposition, gave birth to the idea of the limited monarchy, of the king limited in his action not merely by certain specific provisions of the law, but by the interests of the community, and law and interests alike guarded by the leaders of the community, soon to be able to act through definite and rapidly improving institutions.

The series of events during the reign in which these ideas were given expression is less important, institutionally considered, than as continuing the tradition of the Magna Carta and determining and enlarging its interpretation. The most important of them—the Provisions of Oxford—have no institutional significance. They are of interest as the beginning of a series of apparently unconnected but similar experiments, whose object seems to be to devise some kind of machinery by which the authority of a king who abuses his trust may be temporarily exercised by the leaders of the nation or by Parliament—a series which goes on into the fifteenth century almost to the point when, under the Lancastrian dynasty, faint beginnings show themselves of what was to be in the end the machinery for the permanent exercise of executive authority by the nation, the cabinet system.

Though these ideas of the relation of the king to the nation and to the government were still crude and but half-consciously held, they represent great progress since the accession of John. They were, it is true, logically involved in or easily derived from the feudal idea of the relation of the king to his vassals, but they were not likely to take shape under a king like Henry II. The opportunity, first, to give these ideas in their primary and undeveloped

form an expression which tended to render them permanent, and then to carry them forward in expanding growth, was due to what must be called, so far as human insight can go, the accident of two successive reigns of bad and weak kings. From the end of the reign of Henry III. their growth depends much less upon accident; they are exposed only to the dangers incident to growth, though it is not until after another reign with its continued precedents and its complementary institutional growth that they may be called secure. From the beginning of the fourteenth century their development could have been prevented only by revolution, and this would have been possible only by the occurrence together, on the one side of a king able to foresee the future and strong enough to control the means of action, and on the other of circumstances paralyzing the action of the opposition, a conjunction not likely to occur and as a matter of fact never occurring.

By this date then the nation had begun to be conscious of itself and to realize its right to compel the king to regard its interests. But ideas of this sort are never of much value in history unless they are embodied in institutions through which they can act directly and permanently upon the course of events, and the attempt which was made at that time to give institutional expression to these ideas was wrong in principle and destined to no result. In another direction, however, unconnected for the present with these ideas and quite unconsciously, another institutional growth had begun which soon furnished the required machinery and, in its latest development, has so completely transferred the executive authority from the sovereign to the nation as to render any further conflict between them impossible. This beginning was made by a modification of the feudal *curia regis* which was apparently slight in character but which was revolutionary in its consequences.

It is a familiar fact that the Magna Carta shows that a division of the baronage had already been made into two classes, the major and the minor barons. Such a distinction as this was not peculiar to England, nor was this an early date for it. The especially important fact is that at the beginning of the thirteenth century this distinction of classes in the membership of the *curia regis* was consciously and sharply made, thus enabling a modification to be made of the basis of membership of the least important of these classes in the *curia regis* without seeming to change at all the character of that institution. Two generations also of experience of the jury system in public business in special relation to the minor barons had made familiar an easy method by which this change could be accomplished. Suggested beyond any doubt by the jury system,

formed by its methods and upon its model, and in order to accomplish the same result in a different kind of business,¹ the introduction of the new element into the *curia regis* seemed a most natural and easy step. Indeed it is using other ideas than those of the time to speak of a new element at all. At the moment when this step was taken, probably the most important ever taken in the strictly institutional history of England, no one appears to have been conscious of anything new. It was the beginning of a real change and might have been followed, even if innovation had gone no further, by the most important consequences; but considered by itself it involved no necessary departure either in principle or in law from the feudal system. It was simply a change of method. Not so the step which followed next although it is true of this also that it was taken apparently without any consciousness of change. This step was the introduction into the *curia regis* of certain non-feudal elements, the representatives of selected towns.

In considering the history of this step not too much emphasis should be laid upon the summons issued by Simon de Montfort in December 1264. It would be very difficult to show that this act was regarded by anyone later as a precedent to be followed or that it had any influence upon the final result. Borough representatives would have been summoned to the great council by the close of the century if Simon's writs had never been issued and for reasons very different from those which influenced his action. It was inevitable at a time when stricter feudal ideas were rapidly disappearing and in a régime which was one of classes only, that a class so distinct as the burgesses, having so many interests peculiar to themselves in the conduct of government, and having also such rapidly increasing power and such means of making their power promptly felt, should be allowed a voice in the management of public affairs. It should not be overlooked that the thing which was peculiar to England and decisive in its constitutional history was not the creation of Parliament nor the invention of the representative system, however important and interesting some peculiarities of detail may be in both particulars. The peculiar and determining fact was that Parliament at the moment when it came into existence as a distinct institution

¹ That is, to make known the local feeling. See especially the writ of 1254 (Stubbs, *Select Charters*, p. 376), which deserves most careful analysis. Just when the modern idea of organic representation arose or from what earlier idea it was derived, it is difficult to say. It could hardly have been found in the shire courts, but it apparently formed itself during the age of the formation of Parliament, though just what was meant by some of the phrases used may be open to question. The original idea seems to have been less that the community should assist through its representatives in forming the opinion and making up the decision of a deliberative body than that it should convey by delegates its own decision already made.

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body

found ready to its hands, as the result of a line of development independent of its own, a traditional policy of opposition and of the control of the sovereign, based upon definite principles and rights. As the heir of the feudal *curia regis* it inherited a right of consent to extraordinary taxation, now greatly enlarged in importance and practically the sole dependence of the government. As embodying the party of opposition, from now on strongly reinforced by the leaders of the new third estate, it was the guardian of the old right of protecting the law against the king, enlarged by the experience of the century into the right of protecting the general interests of the nation. It was upon the basis of these rights, reaffirmed in their enlarged significance in action and in statement at the close of the century, that Parliament erected the constitution.

But if the burgesses were certain to be admitted into the older institution there was nothing in that fact or in any other circumstance of the time that determined the form and character which the new institution was to assume, and this was a question of vital importance for the future. Upon it depended the existence of the constitution quite as much as upon the survival and the broadened significance of the ideas of the Magna Carta. In this particular the decisive period, the danger period, was that which extended from 1254 to 1295. We have a right, I think, to make 1295 the date of the beginning of Parliament. To be sure there was nothing whatever about the parliament of 1295 considered by itself alone which indicated that it was to be any more truly the model parliament than any one of the different experimental forms of the preceding forty years. It possessed more of the features of the *curia regis* than of a later parliament;¹ the whole question of estates and of organization was still unsettled; the struggle for the supremacy of the new parliament over the survivals of the old *curia regis* had still to be fought out in the following century, but as a historical fact the parliament of 1295 was the model parliament. The age of experimenting was over. In all the creative fundamental principles, both of constitution and of powers, Parliament was in existence as a different thing institutionally from the old *curia regis*. The later development was a perfection of details, an application of established principles to a constantly enlarging range of cases, not a work of new creation.

¹ It is a very interesting fact in the institutional history of England that, after the permanent division into two houses in the next century, the upper house was consciously regarded as continuing the *curia regis* and the lower house as something foreign to it. This is to be seen in such facts as the freedom of the members of the upper house, but not of the lower, from trial by jury; in some of the features of the struggle between statutes and ordinances; in the continued judicial power of the upper house in which the lower had no share; and in the extraordinary form of the impeachment trial.

To understand how easily a different and far less efficient form might have been given during this period to the new institution, or indeed how little effort it would have required to have prevented altogether the formation of a really effective parliament, it is only necessary to study the forms which the institution assumed during this transitional period. Especially instructive are the occasions when we find the two forms which were later most successfully employed by the French kings in weakening the estates general—the division of the national parliament into provincial assemblies and its division into distinct assemblies of the different estates. These forms occur without especial comment or protest. The danger which lay in them was not evident. Their competence within their separate fields was not less than that of a full parliament of the next century, considering the difference of date. Nothing indicates that there would have been any difficulty in directing the future development of Parliament along the line of these precedents. Indeed the kings for some time continued to negotiate separately with some of the classes to avoid the difficulty of dealing with Parliament and were induced at last to give up the practice only by the most skilful management of the House of Commons in the fourteenth century. It is not necessary to say, however, that if these had been the controlling precedents no parliament would have been formed in the English sense and no constitution.

What saved Parliament and the constitution in this crisis was ignorance, was the lack of experience. Had it been as possible for Edward I. to foresee the future in this respect as it was for Charles V. and Charles VII. of France, and to understand the danger to the monarchy which lay in the growth of a strong parliament, he could, so far as we can now see, and he probably would, have prevented it. It was hardly possible to do this after the close of his reign; it was entirely impossible after the deposition of Edward II.

The date of the Confirmation of the Charters may be taken as the close of this period of English constitutional history. From a time when no beginning of a constitution is apparent, when every circumstance promised the speedy formation of an absolute rather than a limited monarchy, and when the slight tendency earlier manifest in English feudalism to check a development of royal power had been so long without influence as to seem about to disappear, from such a time England had advanced through the three great crises which have been described to what is clearly a constitutional beginning, with a more or less organized opposition, acting upon clear and definite principles capable of wide application, and through a primitive but even then most efficient institution capable also of

Growth in the
14th century.

rapid and extensive growth. From this beginning Parliament made, as has been said, the enormous advance of the next century. This it did by the attachment of conditions to grants of money; by cutting off all uncontrolled sources of revenue; by insisting upon the equal right of the House of Commons in all legislation; by extending parliamentary control from the income to the expenditure of the state; by declaring the king's ministers responsible to itself as well as to the king; by extending in the revolution of 1399 the right of deposition into a right of breaking the order of succession; and, as a result of that revolution, by denying the responsibility of members to the king for their action in Parliament. A bare enumeration of these achievements shows how very far the transformation went in that century of the old feudal absolutism into what may rightly be called a constitutional monarchy, and how very complete must have been the preparation afforded by the work of the thirteenth century.

GEORGE BURTON ADAMS.

CHATHAM'S COLONIAL POLICY

THE long and desperate struggle of England with France in the middle of the eighteenth century for the headship of the New World may be regarded as the war of one man against a nation. It was the war of Chatham against the old giant of ambition, the "glorious way of thinking" which the whole house of Bourbon had received as a family legacy from their common ancestor, the Great Monarch of France.

For England, before Chatham's colonial policy was framed, the colonial war was chiefly a mercantile question. That the French had passed the Rhine and threatened Hanover, was nothing to the nation of merchants whose interests were not directly affected. But the encroachments of the French on the hinterland of the American colonies, the depletion of the Newfoundland banks by the cod fishers of New France, and the competition of the French West Indian sugar plantations, kindled a flame which leapt across the continent and caught the islands of the Caribbean Sea. Therefore the voice of the "mercantile part of the nation" was still for war, and the victorious war minister became their idol: for a successful war meant the monopoly of a profitable trade, not only with the American plantations and the Atlantic Islands, but also with Indian nabobs, Arabian sultans and Ashantee kings. No man should rob them of their colonists. These were their very children whom they had bound apprentices to the colonial trade and who had thriven by their industry until they were in a position to start business on their own account for the clear benefit of British trade.

It has become of late the fashion to extenuate this quaint political morality, and to deprecate the "falsification of history" which estimates the political wisdom of the statesmen and parliaments of the reign of George the Third by the contrast of our modern enlightenment.

It is true that allowance must be made in all ages for the force of contemporary sentiment; but at the same time it may at least be of interest to ascertain the true meaning of the colonial policy of the one British minister who, before the loss of the American colonies, can be said to have had a colonial policy at all.

It is usual to insist that the later alienation of the American colonies from the mother kingdom was directly due to the taxation for which Chatham's successful war policy furnished a plausible excuse.

That Chatham himself did not approve of the financial policy of his successors, or at least of the constitutional doctrine by which it was held to be justified, is a matter of common knowledge. At the same time it may be that taxation was not the only cause of civil strife, and in any case Chatham's sentiments towards the colonies during his famous ministry have never been clearly explained. Still less has any serious attempt been made to conjecture the attitude which he must have adopted in view of the inevitable results of his own war policy.

The reason of this lack of knowledge is unfortunately only too clear. While the political memoirs and official despatches which commemorate the most notable events of the period have been freely used for the purpose of the historian's narrative, the official correspondence of the several departments of the state in which the details of the statesman's policy can alone be traced, and the great mass of family papers which contain many a clue for the elucidation of that policy, have never been examined for the present purpose.¹

It may be possible then from these neglected materials to throw some further light on the interesting problem which has been referred to. But it will be necessary in the first place to define briefly the position of the colonial question at the date of Pitt's assumption of office from the respective points of view of the government and the governed with regard to the three main issues of the French war, extraordinary taxation and illicit trade. It will then, perhaps, be of interest to examine Pitt's policy herein as far as his ministry extends and to consider the logical consequences of that policy which was brought to such an untimely conclusion.

The opinion common amongst English historical students that the history of this period has been invariably treated by American writers in a partial and exaggerated spirit is curiously wide of the truth. The truth indeed is that the ablest, at least, of these writers have been careful to consult the original sources of history which had remained for a hundred years neglected in this country.² On the authority of these contemporary evidences they have compiled a real historical narrative of the causes and effects of this momentous struggle.³ So far from exonerating the colonists from all responsibility for the grievous mistakes committed therein and for the heavy sacrifices which they entailed, we find these patriotic writers

¹ For the key to the classification of these sources, see *Quarterly Review*, October, 1899, Art. 3. For the value of the departmental records referred to, see the present writer's article on "Poor General Wolfe" in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, July, 1884.

² *I. e.*, England. The writer, Hubert Hall, Esq., F.S.A., Director of the Royal Historical Society, is an official of the Public Record Office in London.—ED.

³ The historical sources referred to have been summarized by Parkman and by Winsor.

admitting the justice of the strictures of colonial governors and commanders and the admissions of clear-sighted observers of the course of events. The colonist of those days, they tell us frankly, was "simply a 'provincial'—and a narrow one." They can quote sympathetically the outburst of a much-tried governor, "Such wrong-headed people, I thank God, I never had to do with before," and they virtually admit that there is some truth in the proposition that "a governor is really to be pitied in the discharge of his duty to his King and Country in having to do with such obstinate and self-conceited people." We read throughout of "clashing interests," of "internal disputes" in the face of an outward enemy and of the "misplaced economy of pennywise and short-sighted assembly-men" wherein "lay the hope of France."

For in the common view of English ministers and colonial governors, of British parliaments and colonial assemblies, France was the deadly enemy of the lives and liberties of the American provincials. And France was gathering her famous regiments upon their borders. Nay, but for the blockade of the French ports and the fatal drain of the campaign in Germany, France could have placed ten men in the field for every British regular or provincial. As it was the odds were exactly reversed in respect of numbers, but not, it was said, of fighting power; for "numbers avail nothing without counsel and valor."¹ This was not unnaturally the view of the professional soldiers who secretly despised the peaceful disposition of the colonists. The English settlers, they bitterly complained, were "of a commercial, the French of a military disposition: the latter enterprising, restless, subtle, active and ambitious; the first sedentary, softened, fond of quiet and lucre."²

It was a great mistake, these wise-acres assured the government, to suppose that the "American English are fitted for military purposes without the exercise of some painful campaign." Their only chance lay in the superiority of numbers, and this was deliberately sacrificed by the parsimony of the colonial governments. "We have it in our power," an official writer declared, "to be ten times as strong as the French and much better provided: but if ten men are in war with a thousand and the latter detach only an equal number to the engagement, what benefit do they receive for their superiority of numbers?"³

It is no wonder then that men saw the "English everywhere invaded, defenceless and impotent." An intelligent colonial writes in the year 1756 to an English correspondent in the same pessimistic strain:

¹ Pringle MSS.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

"The people in England are not aware of the difficulties we meet with in carrying on the war here. Our enemies, rich and poor, are obliged to act against us. With us our Colonies from envy and particular interests draw against one another. In short, such is our situation, peace would seem necessary for the present in order to prepare ourselves for war."¹

And yet, it would have been replied, that for several years past, and in a definite form since 1754, the English government through its colonial officers had incessantly urged upon the several assemblies the absolute necessity for such preparations. But this was all to no purpose. The assemblies "think they have served their country if they allow £10,000 or £15,000 for the current service of the year, and as few troops as possible," instead of raising a sufficient force, once for all, by means of a liberal grant. Thus in the disastrous campaign of 1756 it was estimated that the New England colonies, with a population of nearly half a million, could only provide General Johnson with 3,000 men for the attack on Crown Point; whilst Braddock, who should have been supported by the men of Pennsylvania, Maryland and the two Carolinas, colonies reputed to possess an equal population, had not in fact more than 800 provincials in his doomed army.²

It is true that exception might be taken to these semi-official statistics; but the point which we have to consider is this, that these versions of the campaign were communicated to ministers at home and received general credit in England. Moreover in substance they were correct. The real indifference of the colonial burgesses to the pressing requirements of the war can scarcely be denied and must be explained on wholly different grounds. On every side we read of bitter disputes between the colonial legislatures and the executive bodies. "The governor has embroil'd himself with the house of Representatives," writes quaint and honest Jeremiah Gridley from Boston in January of 1758, and has prorogued them "with a severe message, which they *had not time to answer*." And he adds that "the aspect of things is frowning."³

A month later the Earl of Loudoun unbosoms himself to the Duke of Newcastle in a dispatch such as Strafford might have endited to Laud. The colonists he considers are too many for their governors, at least in New England. A governor comes over sea bringing with him exalted notions of his dignity as the representative of the Crown. He tries to "ride the high horse," but pride comes before a fall. The assembly "waits for him" and trips him up, and from that day he is unable to carry a single point. There should be no mistake about it. The British regulars were an

¹ Pringle MSS.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

alien garrison. The Bostonians were preparing to resist the quartering of troops, and all the other governments of North America were only waiting "to see the success Boston had in their dispute to have turned the troops out of doors everywhere."¹

When things have come to this pass a colonial revolution is within measurable distance. But it might be asked who was really responsible for this state of things? Let us hear the other side.

The American colonists in the middle of the eighteenth century may have been "sedentary" and "softened," and were not improbably also "fond of quiet and lucre," but they shared these attributes with the Londoners whose ancestors had bearded and baffled tyrants from King Stephen's days onwards, and with the Dutch burghers who in a just cause had held the soldiery of Spain and France at bay behind their dykes.

The real answer to the sneers of their military critics is to be found not only in the complete failure of the latter to inspire confidence in their own plan of campaign, but also in the courage, the pertinacity and the final success of the citizen militia during their war of Independence.²

But as yet the position of the colonists was merely one of passive resistance to the futile proposals of an incompetent government. This attitude is well expressed in a memorial of the Assembly of Connecticut in the year 1758 setting forth all the sacrifices made by that colony, in common with the other New England colonies, since the beginning of the war.³

In the first place, when they were required to raise a thousand provincial troops for the expedition against Crown Point in 1755 they not only cheerfully complied, but, fearing this number would not suffice for such a service, they voluntarily added five hundred more as a reserve. They also enabled New York to furnish its quota by raising men in their colony in return for a very inadequate subsidy. Finally they not only produced the reserve above mentioned, but in the crisis of this disastrous campaign they voted an aid of fifteen hundred more. And so from year to year they have thrown precious lives (and more precious money) into the bottomless abyss of these frontier wars, and so they are ready to do again, "but, alas, it is to be feared to little purpose more than the loss of many lives and to the great expense of the government."

¹ *Ibid.*

² Some curious newsletters referring to Braddock's defeat have just been published by Mr. Darnell Davis, *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, October, 1899. The allusions in these to the superiority of the colonial militia against an ambushed enemy are particularly interesting at the present moment.

³ Pringle MSS. The same version is given in the Colonial Entry Books.

As to the responsibility of Newcastle, as the nominal head of a reactionary government, it is unnecessary to speak. The policy of a statesman who was Secretary of State for nearly thirty years without being aware that Cape Breton was an island may be left out of the question. The two ministers who were practically responsible for the disasters which brought Pitt into office were Halifax, as President of the Board of Trade and Plantations, and Sir Thomas Robinson as the departmental Secretary of State. If we add to these military and naval advisers as pedantic as Ligonier and Anson, commanders such as Braddock and Loudoun, governors of the type of Shirley, and the whole crew of brigadiers and post-captains, attorneys-general, vice-admirals and revenue officers, all prepared to take their cue from the sententious loyalty which pervaded the optimist despatches from Whitehall, we shall not be surprised if "the just grievances of his Majesty's loyal and faithful subjects" waited in vain for redress.

It is worthy of notice that Sir Thomas Robinson was the author of the precious policy which had brought about a crisis in America such as that which in England preceded the Petition of Right in the reign of Charles I. His scheme for a defensive union of at least the northern colonies in the year 1754, a "Plan or Project of general concert . . . for their mutual and common defence," though acceptable neither to loyalists nor to patriots, was certainly a plausible device; but it was also a plan which failed. And how could such a union be effective when its possible results were viewed with a jealous apprehension and when the whole conduct of the campaign and the patronage and credit of military service were assumed by the King's officers? The provincials were not required to save themselves so much as to save the regulars; food for powder like the helots whose bodies paved the way for the decisive charge of the janissaries. For with the Secretary of State's "Plan of Defense" were issued certain orders to colonial governors which may be regarded as the first cause of the estrangement which ripened into separation.

"You should use your utmost diligence and authority in procuring an exact observance of such orders as shall be issued from time to time by the Commander-in-Chief for quartering the troops, impressing carriages and provisions and necessaries for such troops as shall arrive or be raised within your government—which orders have been continued down to this day. (1758.)"¹

But it was not only that the colonists as a body distrusted the policy and the very capacity of their rulers at a great crisis of their

¹ Loudoun to Newcastle, February 19, 1758, in Fringle MSS. and Colonial Office Records.

fate, and that they resented the ostentatious employment of regular troops; they were practically left to pay the bill, or at least more than their fair share.

In the year 1756 we find the Board of Trade attempting to estimate the total cost of the three great expeditions of the previous year. Admitting to the fullest extent the principle that the cost of the war must be chiefly borne by the mother country, the Board wished to make the most liberal allowance within their power. This they naïvely admit is also a matter of policy, to "encourage and reward" the colonies for the efforts which they have made in the past and which they will more than ever be required to make in the future. In order to obtain information on this subject they had examined the colonial agents, but unfortunately the latter were unable to furnish precise figures, and therefore it was only possible to make a calculation based on the apparent and probable expenditures entailed by the votes of the assemblies.

The estimate made by the Board for the total expenditure incurred by the several colonies involved in the war amounted to the sum of £170,000, and of this sum they recommended that the British government should repay £120,000. It was added, as a sort of rider, that this estimate was probably too high for some colonies, though possibly somewhat too low for others, and that it did not include the cost of transport, commissariat and incidental expenses, which had not been ascertained.¹

The recommendation of the Board was submitted to Parliament and the proposed grant was reduced to £115,000. It would be difficult now, though by no means so difficult at the time, to ascertain the approximate cost of the entire war to the colonies. The figures contained in a later estimate for Massachusetts alone are startling;² but if this should seem an exceptional case, it may be noted that the comparatively poor colony of Connecticut found itself after three unsuccessful campaigns in debt for the sum of £70,000 or £80,000 "above all that could possibly be received for the service of those years."

The estimate of the Board of Trade, although it was more liberal than any subsequent grant, might, therefore, reasonably have been doubled, without taking into account the compensation due to individuals for purveyance or transport, as to which it should be remembered that claims for similar compensation were preferred by England's German allies during the Continental campaign, and were reluctantly admitted by the British treasury.³

¹ Colonial Office Records, Board of Trade Journals.

² Pringle MSS.

³ Treasury and Audit Office Records—"German Demands."

In justice to the colonies, however, it should be stated that this aspect of their financial difficulties was not presented by them as a grievance. The burden of taxation and debt incurred by them was meekly, if not very cheerfully endured, and even the moral liability of the mother country for this outlay was not directly asserted. Their case, indeed, resembled that of children who have been required to contribute out of their own pockets to some work of piety. They submitted yet they secretly repined. But when they found that something more than this was expected of them, that they were not only bound to pour out their blood and treasure in the quarrel of King George of England with King Louis of France, but also were required to desist absolutely from all commercial dealings with their best customers, their good friends the enemy, the sacrifice seemed too great even for their simple loyalty. How were they to carry on a war without the funds which the French themselves so thoughtfully supplied? Even the stern rule of Moses had not prevented the children of Israel from spoiling the Egyptians.

But the policy of the British government was inexorable. The French were to be starved out of America, and not only out of America but out of the West Indies. This, the second cause of the great rebellion, was the policy of Halifax at the Board of Trade. Only a week after the declaration of war with France the Board submitted to the Council additional instructions to be sent to all the American governors

"to take especial care and use their utmost endeavours to hinder all correspondence between your Majesty's subjects in America and the subjects of the French King, and to prevent any of the Colonies and Plantations belonging to the enemy in America being supplied with provisions or warlike stores of any kind."¹

These practices, it is stated in the preamble, have hitherto "greatly prejudiced" the King's service and "endangered the dominions of the Crown," though the reality of the danger is by no means apparent. On the contrary it might be shown that the constant drain upon the French settlements caused by the habitual misgovernment and extortions of their officials made them unable to compete with their enterprising neighbors. The balance of trade was entirely against them. Possessed of the sea power, England could cut off all hope of succor from the French colonies without paralyzing the trade of her own plantations. But the real motive of this measure is to be found, not in the strategical exigencies of the colonial war, but in the desire to preserve inviolate the tradi-

¹ Colonial Office Records, Board of Trade, Plantations General, No. 44.

tional policy of English commerce which demanded that a large percentage of the profits on all the trade of the colonies should be paid as a premium to the mother country.

The history of the growth of this clandestine trade and of the means by which it was successfully prosecuted belongs to a chapter of colonial history which still remains to be written. When Pitt assumed office it had been recognized as a flourishing industry since the year 1746, and was chiefly carried on by collusion between the English, French, Spanish and Dutch settlers on the American continent and the adjacent islands. It was alleged that the Dutch colonies of Curaçao, St. Eustatia and Guiana and the Spanish free ports of Hispaniola served as *emporia* for the clandestine carrying trade of the American colonies and the West Indian islanders with the French settlements. Dutch ships clearing from Holland or Ireland and French ships from Brest or Dunkirk could discharge their cargoes at these convenient centres whence they were distributed by small colonial craft. The American traders it seems were also accustomed to clear out for some Dutch port, but their real destination was a French one where they discharged their cargo of colonial produce and laded again with sugar, rum, cotton or molasses for home under a fictitious clearing for another Dutch port; or if it was cleared for New York, the cargo was reputed to be the produce of an English sugar island and was passed as such by custom-house officials who were bribed to "do the needfull."

It was discovered that many colonial merchants had written contracts to supply the enemy with provisions and warlike stores. Others were supplied with Dutch or French passes to be used as occasion required. These French passports were made out in France and openly sold in Boston. They were addressed to all French commanders and governors and required them to pass the American vessels named therein engaged in supplying the French settlements. If they were boarded by a British cruiser these passes were destroyed, but the bulk of this illicit trade was carried on by small swift sloops or oared cutters which defied pursuit amongst the shoals and creeks of their native coasts.¹

Naturally these ingenious devices for frustrating the monopoly of British trade appeared equally reprehensible to colonial governors and law officers and to the ministers and naval and military commanders of the English crown. "In short, Sir, what tricks do they not play?" is the summary of one worthy official's complaints. It

¹ The above allegations appear in the miscellaneous American papers among the Pringle MSS., *e. g.*, in Bundle 98. A good account is also found in B. T. Plant. Gen. 44, and in Admiralty Jamaica Despatches for 1758—1762.

was even thought that these free-traders "appear much more our enemies than the French themselves."¹ To Halifax and the Board of Trade "the nature of the Trade appeared so destructive, its extent so great and the facts relative to it so alarming" that the whole matter was forthwith referred to the Council.²

Across the course of these dissensions and disasters there came suddenly the calming and invigorating influence of a great statesman. And yet the violence of the evil was such that the effects of the most potent remedies are hardly discernible during two more years of bitter failure and despair.

Perhaps it is in his colonial policy that Chatham's acute and virile statesmanship shows to the best advantage. He was the first English minister who recognized the responsibilities of empire with its possibilities, the first high-almoner of state-craft who cast his bread upon distant waters.

Although he did not assume office until January 1757 there exist proofs that Pitt had followed the troubled history of the American colonies with close attention for some years past.³ The principal phases of that history are illustrated by papers which are still preserved amongst the Chatham manuscripts. We know from a published correspondence that he "dreaded to hear from America"⁴ during the unchecked mismanagement of Newcastle's administration, and when a year later he proclaimed his ability "to save this country" singlehanded he had estimated the effect of a successful colonial war.

From existing reports, intelligences, and from the summaries of official correspondence, all of which are still preserved amongst the unpublished Chatham MSS., we are enabled to follow the course of Chatham's American policy. The development of his plans was slow at first, for it was not possible to undo in a year the effects of three years of disastrous mismanagement following upon a century of general misgovernment.

The colonies must be saved, and they must be saved by their own exertions. "You may depend upon it," writes Jeremiah Gridley, "that a great man said we are to depend for our defense upon our own forces and not upon the regulars."⁵ From first to last this was the guiding principle of Pitt's military strategy and for the present the importance of the colonies was strategical. But in

¹ Pringle MSS.

² Colonial Office Records, Board of Trade Journals, March, 1760.

³ The American papers in the Pringle collection appear to go back to the year 1746. Pitt was made paymaster of the forces in that year.

⁴ *Grenville Correspondence*, June 5, 1756.

⁵ Pringle MSS.

order that these measures of self-defense might prove effective it was necessary that the drooping spirits of the colonists should be raised, that they should be encouraged to play their part with vigor. To accomplish this, as Pitt saw clearly, the colonies must be first conciliated, and indeed conciliation was the keynote of his policy, the panacea which he continued to advocate in a later period of civil troubles.

It would not be an easy matter to define the quality of this conciliation. Perhaps indeed it amounted to little more than a discouragement of the official tone which had been adopted by recent ministries and their agents in dealing with the recalcitrant assemblies. Doubtless the chief factor in the work of conciliation was the selection of a commander-in-chief after the minister's own heart in the person of Amherst, who during the crisis of the war exercised practically the powers of a governor-general, whilst at the same time the powers of the reactionary Board of Plantations were sharply curtailed.¹ Finally Pitt refrained from pressing the enforcement of the recent official crusade against illicit trade except so far as it actually impeded his dispositions for the campaign. Thus one part of the monetary difficulty experienced by his predecessors was avoided, and for the rest the colonists were not slow to recognize that a really successful war was a highly profitable venture. The most dispirited assembly was at length "encouraged by having so grand a plan opened with such prospect of its being carried to effect."²

The plan in question was one which Pitt really deserves the credit of having adopted for he did not himself originate it. A campaign against the French settlements in the nature of a frontier war extending from Virginia to the lake regions was henceforth to be abandoned in favor of a descent upon Canada starting from a given base and carried out both by sea and land. Quebec itself was the real objective of such an expedition and Quebec cut off from succor from France by England's sea-power must sooner or later fall and with it the French dominion on the continent.

"When the spring is diverted or cutt off, the river must dry up. Such is the position of Quebec that it is absolutely the key of French America, and our possession of it would for ever lock out every Frenchman."³

It is interesting to notice that this earlier plan did not contemplate a direct assault on Louisburg, which, until its capitulation should be ensured by the fall of Quebec, was to be rendered harmless by a mere blockade. With this exception the whole course of the future campaign was foreshadowed in a plan which was appar-

¹ Order in Council, June, 1761.

² Pringle MSS.

³ *Ibid.*

ently submitted to Pitt in the year 1756.¹ That this plan was not put in execution at once was entirely owing to circumstances beyond the minister's control. His instructions to Loudoun and Abercrombie display just as much energy and foresight as are evident in his direction of the successful campaigns between 1758 and 1761. The different results are due partly to the want of a free hand in the choice of instruments to carry out his plans, which as he afterwards complained were systematically thwarted by his colleagues in the Council, and partly to the lack of colonial interest in the war. The colonies had not yet been conciliated.

The turning-point in the fortunes of the war with France in America was reached in March, 1758, the date of Pitt's instructions to Amherst commanding the expedition against Louisburg for "the diligent prosecution of this great enterprize."

After the fall of Louisburg the issue of the war was never in doubt, but new difficulties arose as its area became enlarged and when its strictly colonial character dropped out of sight. The success of Pitt's colonial policy was written upon the walls of Quebec and Montreal before the impending danger of the Family Compact caused him to attempt its expansion upon imperial lines. As a counter-blow to the threatened Bourbon alliance France must be attacked in Louisiana and Martinique. She must be driven out of America and the West Indies, just as she must be humbled by descents upon her sea-board. Thus she would be reduced to conclude a peace before she could gain time to recover her ground by a new alliance with a maritime and colonial power. It was with this great object in view that, in the spring of 1761, Pitt issued a circular to the governors of the American colonies directing them to appeal to the assemblies for a grant of fresh levies for colonial defences to enable the government "not only to secure the Conquests already made, but also to push on the war with the utmost vigour until the French are totally removed from this continent."²

In the dangerous state of the colonial temper Pitt had worked wonders by his crusade of three years past. Even now his influence, exercised through his chosen agent Amherst, prevailed over personal interests and local selfishness. At the first asking the canny New Englanders demurred to this unusual proposal. Their forefathers had not haggled in vain over subsidies, nor protested in vain against forced loans, shipmoney, billeting and martial law under impecunious

¹ Pringle MSS.

² This and the following references to the colonial correspondence of the period have been chiefly taken from the series of "Governor's Letters" (America and West Indies) in the Colonial Office Records.

personal monarchs. They wished for further information as to the objective of these armaments. Moreover, as of old redress of grievances must precede supply. The Pennsylvanians who had a bitter feud with their "Proprietors" refused point-blank to pass any appropriation until certain acts of the assembly had been allowed. Other colonies voted less than two-thirds of the levies granted for the campaign of Quebec, and then with strict limitations as to length of service. Billet-money and conduct-money had been docked by the red-tape of the British Treasury for arms not returned into store, and this system must be disavowed. Even then these provincial levies must be employed for local defences only. Where there was no danger of French invasion they must be used as frontier police against the Cherokees or other savage neighbors. A winter campaign was out of the question and the troops must be disbanded in November or earlier if peace should not be concluded before that date. The governors were in despair. One "had no hope of obtaining more." Another fears "this is all he can bring them to." A third objects that "in the present state of the Province . . . he should meet with unsurmountable difficulties." But the Secretary of State was unmoved. He betrayed neither surprise nor indignation at this answer to his appeal. These sturdy colonists were his spoilt children, and he knew how to bear with their wayward moods. The governors were told to "try them again;" to beg one that was so noted for its public spirit not to "furnish a precedent for the others to refuse;" to "give satisfaction to the Assemblies;" whereupon Mr. Secretary "hopes soon to be informed" of their resolves "to be entirely conformable to His Majesty's expectation." The result was so far satisfactory that men and money were voted for the purpose in hand. Even Amherst's expectations were at length satisfied, and the veterans of Canada could be led against Dominique, Guadeloupe and Belleisle.

It has been said that Pitt before he resigned the seals in October of this year had planned the capture both of Havana and Manila. But even if this persistent assertion were true, which it can be shown from contemporary state papers was not the case, Pitt was no longer at hand to superintend his own strategy. The whole plan of the campaign of the year 1762 depended upon the co-operation of the American colonies, and this could not be forced either by promises or by threats. It was useless for the new Secretary to require the despondent governors to represent to the assemblies "the necessity of their complying with the king's demands," which were even higher than before. It was childish to assure them that they "would rejoice hereafter when they found that their compliance

with the king's commands met with his Majesty's approbation." It was dangerous to threaten that their refusal would "exclude them from any title to His Majesty's particular favour."

The result was disastrous in the extreme. Some assemblies "broke up without having in any respect whatever complied with His Majesty's requisitions." Others treated the royal message in a "disrespectful manner." Inadequate votes were passed and still worse amidst a total absence of enthusiasm for the war. And so though Martinique fell and then Havana, these and other conquests could not be held with the force available. When Amherst had been pressed for reinforcements he had replied that he dared not part with another man if America itself was to be safely held.

This may well be the secret of those concessions which made the Treaty of Paris seem so disadvantageous to this country. If the whole of these vast conquests were to be retained, there must either have been a great increase in the regular establishment or sweeping concessions to the colonies in the direction of self-government and commercial privileges. As it was, George the Third and Lord Bute had no intention of spending money upon military establishments or subventions, neither were they willing to forego the revenues which the Crown received directly or indirectly from the colonies. The only course open was to abandon the bulk of the conquests of 1761 and 1762.

But unhappily the matter did not end here. The colonies were indirectly responsible for the odium which attached to the authors of the treaty, and they must be brought to book once for all. Then the spiteful and futile attempts to impose what was practically a war fine upon those high-spirited and semi-independent communities completed the ruin of the great schemes which Pitt had conceived for restoring the balance of the European power in a new world.

That Pitt himself would have carried out these schemes on a still larger scale and with an even more successful result we can scarcely doubt. We cannot doubt at all that he would have refused to cede an inch of territory within the sphere of Anglo-Saxon influence in the Atlantic. That he would have triumphed over all difficulties with the colonies we may well believe, though this might have involved a scheme of imperial federation, a scheme which might have altered the whole course of our history, which might in fact have detached England from Continental politics, which might have led to the consolidation of an unbroken sphere of Anglo-Saxon influence in the North Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

It may fairly be asked how far we are in a position to venture upon this forecast of Pitt's colonial policy, which must necessarily

have undergone some important modifications at the conclusion of an European peace. To this we may reply that the statesman's later speeches in defence of the constitutional liberties of the colonies prove that he regarded them as something more than the weapons of his vengeance against a perfidious enemy.

There is evidence once more amongst the Chatham papers that long before the conclusion of the great war the problem of the future government of the colonies had engaged his attention. The danger had been clearly foreseen by more than one of his advisers of "the projects of independency which a consciousness of growing strength and the annihilation of the French power might give birth to in our American Colonies." To this it was replied that "an upright and steady government will always have due weight with the bulk of the people," whilst it might be possible to retain their goodwill by important constitutional changes. Canada might be erected into a kingdom for Prince Edward, and if necessary another sovereignty might be created in the colonies themselves. Such a confederation of crowns would be more effective, because more natural, than the family compact of the Bourbons, since here would be found "the union of two peoples of the same blood, religion, polity, language, laws, honour and genius under the same family."¹

It would be but a vain speculation to suggest that any such scheme as this would have seriously engaged Pitt's attention if he had remained in power for some ten years longer. But even after an absence of five years from the helm of the state, and in spite of the conclusion of a peace which had thwarted his deep-laid plans, these dreams of colonial federation might still have been realized under a ministry in which Chatham kept the direction of American affairs in his own hands. It would seem indeed that such a plan was in his thoughts during the ministerial crisis of the spring of 1766, for there exists amongst his papers a draft in his own hand of an ideal ministry in which as a new Secretary of State for the "American Department" there appears the name of "Mr. Pitt." In such a congenial position we cannot doubt that he would have devoted himself to devise some remedial measures which might have removed the worst features of colonial misgovernment.

The standing army necessary for the protection of the colonies would have been under the strictest discipline and control and the regiments would have been changed every two or three years. The inquisitorial aspect of the Navigation Laws in connection with illicit trade would have been no longer apparent with the destruction of

¹ Pringle MSS. This remarkable paper is undated, but appears to have been received by Pitt in 1750.

the French power in the New World. Finally the colonial assemblies would have enjoyed the fullest rights of legislation and taxation for all purposes of local government. Even when the colonies had been goaded to armed resistance by ten years of perverse misgovernment, Chatham's just and humane scheme of constitutional reform might have saved the situation and might have paved the way for an inevitable and honorable concession of independence which would have left no lasting traces of bitterness or resentment.

The scheme in question may be regarded as the epitome of Chatham's strenuous advocacy of the cause of colonial liberty from 1765 to the day on which he yielded up his breath with the name of his well-loved children upon his lips. It is embodied in the "Provisional Act for Settling the Troubles in America," introduced by Chatham in the House of Lords on February 1, 1775. The provisions of this famous measure need not be recited here. The clearest description of the scope and intention of this "true reconciliation" between England and her colonies may be found in the sneering summary by one of its opponents, "it fell in with the ideas of America in almost every particular." It contained indeed the fullest expression of Pitt's earliest conception, "you must repeal her fears and her resentments, and you may then hope for her love and gratitude."

How near this measure lay to the great statesman's heart may be judged from an examination of the passage which is shown in the plate, a facsimile of a page of the original draft in Chatham's own hand, from which the painful care bestowed upon the drafting of this bill is apparent. The wording of the passage as drafted is as follows and differs, as will be seen, from the final version:

"Always understood that the free grant of a supply¹ from the Colonies is not considered as a Condition of Redress, but as a Testimony of their Affection."

In this one sentence is revealed the spirit of Chatham's colonial policy, and the same sentiment of justice and moderation pervades the whole of a measure which its author prophesied would "make its way to the public, to the nation, to the remotest wilds of America," and would remain a monument of his endeavors to save his country.


The bill rejected by the House of Lords in 1775 is indeed a monument of this kind, but it did not mark the close of Chatham's efforts on behalf of "our brethren and countrymen in America, of the same language, laws, liberties and religion; endeared to us by every tie that should sanctify humanity." These words were spoken in 1777 and during the session of this year his voice was several

¹ "Contribution" and "aid" successively rejected.

and for the free grant of
the ~~aid required by the aid~~
aid ~~be always~~ ^{being expected} ~~under~~
and that it is expected not
as a condition of Redup, but
as a fruit of affection

The free grant of the aid
^{fully before} before required, being understood,

" always understood, that the
free grant ^{the confederacy} ~~is~~ ^{from the Colon}
is not ~~to be expected~~ ^{is}
of Redup, but as a fruit of
affection.



times raised in passionate protest against a policy of force. "We have invaded them as much as the Spanish Armada invaded England."

On May 30 of this year before a crowded House, its approaches blocked by peers and commoners, officials and spectators roused from the apathy of sullen despair by the magic of his name, Chatham pleaded once more the cause of the nation whom he loved.

"I remember," there rang out in one of his happiest sentences, "when they raised four regiments on their own bottom and took Louisburg from the veteran troops of France." He was thinking of the days when as Paymaster of the Forces he first took an interest in colonial politics. Then follows quickly the closing scene in which, protesting in the interests (as these might well have been) of England and her colonies alike against the dismemberment of a great empire, he adjured the country to choose between their enemies and friends and not to "fall prostrate before the House of Bourbon"—the statesman's ruling instinct strongest in his death.

And so the world has passed. The country of Chatham's birth has long ago forgotten the place-names given in his honor, but the great nation which he called into being has not forgotten that Fort Pitt was planted on the ruins of Fort Duquesne. There are some memories which will always be hallowed in connection with the meanest and saddest episodes in a nation's history, and amongst these the memory of Chatham's brave and honest friendship with the Americans of his day will not be easily forgotten by their grandchildren's children.

HUBERT HALL.

TERRITORY AND DISTRICT

It is well known that from the time when the United States asserted independence of England and established an organized government we have had what other nations would have called a colonial system and a definite colonial policy ; but with the memory of the many humiliations we had suffered from the hands of the English so fresh in our minds, the term "colony" seemed to carry with it something of reproach and inferiority, and consequently it was an appellation most carefully to be avoided. The name which was adopted in place of colony and the policy that was established for the dependency thereby designated are closely bound up with the first organization of our government. In order to facilitate the ratification of the Articles of Confederation certain states ceded to Congress their claims to the lands lying north and west of the Ohio river, and the United States thus came into possession of a property in which colonists from the eastern states were already beginning to settle. Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784 divided this western country directly into states, but the Ordinance of 1787 established an intermediate stage of government and provided for the division and the erection into states at some later time. With the re-enactment of the latter ordinance in 1789 by the First Congress under the new constitution and the establishment, less than ten months later, of this same form of government in the North Carolina cession, the policy of the Ordinance of 1787 may be said to have been adopted, and ever since that time, as that ordinance had been enacted for "the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio," the name of "territory" has been applied to this intermediate stage of government.

The fundamental principle of the territorial system of the United States has been that these colonies or territories were to be under the direct supervision and control of Congress, but that they were to be treated as states in embryo. That is, they were to be granted an increasing measure of self-government ; they were to be encouraged in their development until they had grown so great that they might claim the right of advancement to the full rank of statehood ; and this right was to be accorded to them, and they were to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states

as soon as might be consistent with the interests of the country as a whole. In accordance with this principle twenty-eight territories have been organized, all but three of which have become states and members of the Union.¹ Until the recent and unexpected acquisition of territory, as a result of our war with Spain, somewhat changed the conditions, only two deviations from this policy are to be met with in the entire course of a history that is the record of an unparalleled growth and expansion. The first of these deviations occurred in 1804, at the time of the establishment of a government in the newly-acquired province of Louisiana, and was only a momentary lapse from our established policy, and the second has been in the case of Alaska.²

When Jefferson in 1803 purchased the vast tract of country to the west of the Mississippi there were many persons in the United States, and the President himself was among the number, who felt that this action was contrary to the established principles of the Constitution and that an amendment to that instrument would be necessary to validate the acquisition. But the purchase of Louisiana was so evidently beneficial to the interests of the United States and was so generally acquiesced in by the people, that the proposal to amend the Constitution was soon dropped and never seriously brought up again.³ Owing, however, to the location of Louisiana, lying outside of the original limits and beyond what had come to be regarded as the natural boundary of the United States, and on account of the character of the inhabitants and the fact that their previous training had little fitted them for the responsibilities of self-government, Congress was not quite ready to extend the principles of our territorial system to the whole of this vast country, and when it came to the establishment there of some form of government Congress made a distinction. The southern part was organized as the Territory of Orleans with a government not, it is true, of the same representative type as that of the second stage

¹ New Mexico, Arizona and Oklahoma, all of which seem likely to be allowed to organize as states in the near future.

² The District of Columbia is not here included because it so evidently forms no part of our territorial system. That it should be called a district and not a territory has no reference whatever to its lack of representative institutions, or to the fact that it can never become a state. It was originally referred to, apparently on account of its size, as a "district of territory," and the name of District of Columbia was applied to it long before any sort of government was established for it by Congress, and, indeed, years before the seat of government was moved from Philadelphia to Washington; and when, in the years 1871 to 1874, the experiment was tried of granting it a regular territorial government, the name of District of Columbia was still retained.

³ It is remarkable how little originality is shown by the present opponents of expansion. All of their arguments were presented at the time of the Louisiana purchase, and were answered then as now by the inexorable logic of facts.

under the Ordinance of 1787, but still with a regularly organized territorial government, while in all of the northern part no regular government was established, but the officials of the Territory of Indiana were given authority over it; and this northern part was not called a territory but the District of Louisiana.¹

That this distinction in name was as intentional as the difference in government is shown (1) by the remonstrance of the inhabitants of the District of Louisiana against the sort of government that had been provided for them and their petition for officers and a government of their own in accordance with the principles of the Ordinance of 1787,² (2) by the report of the committee of the House of Representatives appointed to consider the question,³ and (3) by the fact that when Congress in 1805 acceded to this request and gave to the District a government of its own, its name was changed to that of the Territory of Louisiana.⁴ As has been said, this was only a momentary lapse from the accepted policy of the United States, for the District of Louisiana was changed to a territory within a year from the time of its first establishment, but the mere fact of its existence for however short a time is of considerable significance.

From this time until after the close of the Civil War the territorial acquisitions were so evidently a fulfilment of our "manifest destiny," and in most cases were so closely bound up with the slavery question, that the organization of these acquisitions into territories followed almost immediately and as a matter of course. But with the purchase of Alaska in 1867 the territorial system of the United States entered upon a new phase. The remote situation of Alaska, its inhospitable climate, the difficulty of developing such resources as it might prove to have, and especially the fact that its scanty population was so largely composed of uncivilized Indians, all tended to render it extremely improbable that this region would ever sufficiently develop to be organized as a state and to be admitted into the Union. And this fact was recognized in the treaty by which we acquired possession of Alaska. In the treaties with France, Spain and Mexico, by which our other territorial acquisitions had been made, it was specifically provided that the inhabitants of the ceded territories should be incorporated into the Union. But in the treaty with Russia for the cession of Alaska it was only stipulated that the civilized inhabitants should have the rights and privileges of the

¹ For the details of this and other legislation already referred to, see Farrand, *Legislation of Congress for the Government of the Organized Territories of the United States, 1789-1895*, Newark, N. J., 1896.

² *Annals of Congress*, 8th Cong., second sess., pp. 1608-1619.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1014-1017.

⁴ Act of March 3, 1805.

citizens of the United States, while the uncivilized tribes were to be completely under the regulation of Congress.¹

For seventeen years from the time of its cession the inhabitants of Alaska were allowed to shift for themselves and only in 1884, when the establishment of some form of civil government became imperative, was an act for this purpose passed. It was not a regularly organized territory but a "civil district" that was thereby constituted. There was to "be appointed for the said district a governor," who was to have the usual powers and to "perform such acts as pertain to the office of governor of a territory," and it was specified that there should "be no legislative assembly in said district, nor shall any Delegate be sent to Congress therefrom," but certain laws of the United States and "the general laws of the State of Oregon, . . . so far as the same may be applicable," were declared to be the law in said district.² In order to place beyond any question just what was intended by this act, we shall let the framers of the bill speak for themselves. Benjamin Harrison was then chairman of the Committee on Territories. In explanation of the bill when it was before the Senate, he said, "We are attempting here some legislation that is *sui generis* in some respects. . . . It was not believed that we should confer upon the few people residing there a full territorial organization. We have described this Territory as a civil district, and have organized for it a government simple in form . . . and yet one that we believe will be efficient to bring to every resident of the Territory . . . the reasonable protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."³ And Mr. Garland of Arkansas, also a member of the Committee on Territories, further stated, "The bill does not undertake to provide what we call technically a Territorial government for Alaska, but . . . we deemed that Congress had the power to provide just such a government as it saw proper there, anything short, if you please, of a regular Territorial government, as we understand it technically."⁴

Thus Alaska was constituted and still remains a "district." In a general sense it may be regarded as one of the territories of the United States. But when terms are strictly used Alaska is to be designated as a district rather than a territory, meaning by that a part of the public domain (or property of the United States)

¹ The writer is under great obligations to Mr. Walter MacNaughten of Wesleyan University for his assistance in the preparation of this article, especially in the examination of the records of Congress relating to Alaska.

² *Statutes of the United States*, 48th Cong., first sess., Chap. 53.

³ *Cong. Rec.*, 48th Cong., first sess., p. 594.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 631.

to which representative institutions are not accorded and which there is no intention of incorporating as a state into the Union, or at least no immediate probability that it will be so incorporated.¹

As a result of our recent war with Spain the United States has come into the possession of large tracts of land lying outside of the American continent. Some of the strongest objections to the acquisition of these islands are due to the fact that they are frequently referred to as "colonies" of the United States, and it is felt that we have the right neither to hold nor to acquire colonies.² The matter is little bettered by designating these possessions as territories, for this has been generally understood to mean that they were to be organized as regular territories having governments such as are established in New Mexico, Arizona and Oklahoma, with the implied obligation of eventually admitting them into the Union, whereas it is decidedly questionable whether the inhabitants are fitted to exercise the rights of self-government, and there is no doubt that we are not ready to take the position that these new possessions are ever to become states and members of the Union.

It is not within the province of this paper to discuss the constitutional right of the United States to acquire these islands; their acquisition is an accomplished fact in which the people generally have acquiesced just as they did in the purchase of Louisiana. Nor is it the intention of the writer to discuss what rights and privileges must be or ought to be granted to the inhabitants of the islands. It is desired simply to point out that, in the history of the United States, territory has been acquired, concerning which there was considerable doubt as to whether it could ever be raised to the dignity of statehood and incorporated into the Union, and concerning which there was no doubt that the inhabitants were not fitted to exercise the rights of self-government; that in those cases Congress

¹The Federal Supreme Court, in the case of the *Steamer Cogitlam vs. the United States* (163 U. S., 346), has declared that "Alaska is one of the Territories of the United States," but this assertion was made solely with reference to the similarity of the judicial courts of Alaska to other territorial courts and in no way invalidates the distinction that is here made between a district and a territory. Appropriation acts and other statutes of Congress refer loosely now and again to the Territory of Alaska, but when terms are carefully used the above distinction is made. Thus the governor is almost invariably referred to as the governor of the District of Alaska, the statistics of the Eleventh Census were ordered to be taken for the District of Alaska, and in the act of March 3, 1899, establishing a criminal code for Alaska, although in the debates in Congress on this measure the Territory of Alaska was generally spoken of, it was for the District of Alaska that the code was enacted.

²To the best of the writer's knowledge, this is the first time in our history that territorial possessions of the United States have been referred to as colonies, a term that was most carefully avoided by our fathers in all of our earlier history and one that still calls forth the strongest opposition.

has established the precedent of granting a form of civil government without representative institutions ; and that until the inhabitants were capable of governing themselves and had been accorded this privilege, with its implication of later admission into the Union, their body politic was to be designated a district rather than a territory.

It is not easy to draw a hard and fast line between a territory and a district, for there will be many instances in which the form of government of the one will shade off into that of the other ; special considerations, particularly with reference to our new possessions, will have to be taken into account. The question into which class each shall fall must be decided in the particular case ; but the general principles of the distinction are not hard to make. Both the territory and the district may be said to be included in our territorial system, but until any particular part is capable of self-government and has been granted representative institutions in accordance with such self-government, and until it is our recognized intention that such part shall eventually be organized as a state and admitted into the Union, let that part be known as a district and not as a territory. Thus, under what seems to be the present attitude towards our new possessions, let us speak of the Territory of Hawaii, but of the District of Porto Rico and the District of Luzon or the Philippines.¹

MAX FARRAND.

¹ The government that has been established for "the island" of Porto Rico is in a large measure representative, but it is significant that a proposal in the Senate to amend the bill so that it should read for "the territory of Porto Rico," was opposed by Mr. Foraker, the chairman of the Committee on the Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico, and was finally rejected by the Senate (*Cong. Rec.*, 56th Cong. first sess., pp. 3749 and 3800).

THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1801

IN the second session of the Sixth Congress, during the closing months of John Adams's administration, an act was passed, known as the Circuit Court Act or the Judiciary Act of 1801, which considerably increased the Federal judicial establishment of the United States.¹ President Adams and the Federalist party have been very generally condemned for passing this measure, on the ground that such an enlargement of the judiciary was entirely unwarranted by the actual needs of the country and was only effected for the purpose of keeping the Federalists in control of the judiciary for a long time to come, and Adams was most severely censured for his appointments to office under the act, partly because of the character of the appointments, and partly because some of them were rushed through in the last moments of his term of office, and hence were commonly stigmatized as "midnight appointments." Without taking either one side or the other of the question as to whether this judicial reorganization was a necessary or even desirable reform, or as to whether Adams is to be so severely criticized for the appointments which he made, inasmuch as many of the assertions that are commonly put forward in reference to these points are either absolutely incorrect or are so loose and general as to be very misleading, it may be serviceable to give a correct statement of some of the facts in the case, which will be of assistance in reaching a final and just conclusion on the whole matter.

In the first place, the judiciary act of 1801 was not adopted solely because the recent presidential election had gone against the Federalists. The greatest change that was made in the judicial system by this act was a reorganization of the circuit courts, and this was a reform that had been agitated from the very establishment of these courts. The original act of 1789 had ordered that the circuit courts should be held by two justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.² Almost immediately the members of that court had protested,³ and as early as 1790 the Attorney-General (Edmund Randolph) had reported against this practice.⁴ In 1793

¹ Act of February 13, 1801.

² Act of September 24, 1789.

³ *American State Papers, Miscellaneous*, I. 52.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

it was provided that one justice of the Supreme Court should be sufficient for the holding of circuit courts;¹ but even this relief was not adequate and complaints were still made from various quarters. Some sort of revision of the system was recommended from time to time, and in his speech at the opening of the first session of the Sixth Congress in 1799, the President insisted upon such "a revision and amendment" as "indispensably necessary."² In accordance with that recommendation a committee of the House was appointed and reported a bill which was finally postponed, but became the foundation of the act that was adopted in 1801.³ It should be stated, however, that this original bill was evidently to a great extent a party measure, for one of the members of the House of Representatives naively remarked, in opposition to a motion to postpone its further consideration, that "the close of the present Executive's authority was at hand, and, from his experience, he was more capable to choose suitable persons to fill the offices than another."⁴ Yet the mere fact that the necessity of some such measure had been insisted upon and that at least one bill, strikingly similar in its provisions, had been introduced in the House of Representatives is proof positive that the change and enlargement of the judicial system as established by the Act of 1801 were not to be attributed solely to the recent Federalist defeat.

In the second place, there were not as many judgeships created by this act as is always asserted. Previous to 1801 there had been seventeen districts, in each of which was a court presided over by a district judge.⁵ The judiciary act of 1801 established twenty-two such districts, adding five new ones to those already in existence. But this did not mean, as has been taken for granted by practically every writer on this subject, that positions were thereby created for five new judges. Of the five additional courts four were created simply by the division of old districts, that is to say, the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Tennessee, each of which had formerly constituted a single district, were now divided into two districts, and no provision whatever was made for the appointment of new judges. It may safely be assumed, therefore, that the district judge in each of these states was to hold court in both districts, and if any doubt exists as to the correctness of this assumption, it must be removed at once by the fact that neither

¹ Act of March 2, 1793.

² *Annals of Congress*, 6th Congress, 188, 189.

³ *Ibid.*, 7th Congress, first session, 672.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 6th Congress, 648.

⁵ Acts of September 24, 1789, June 4, 1790, June 23, 1790, March 2, 1791, and January 31, 1797.

Adams nor Jefferson ever appointed any judges for these new districts that were thus established. The fifth of the new districts was made up of the territories of Ohio and Indiana, where territorial courts with extensive jurisdiction were already established,¹ and again no provision was made for a district judgeship, nor was any such judge ever appointed. It is evident, then, that this new arrangement of districts was merely one of convenience and did not involve any increase in the number of judges.

As already stated, the principal feature of the act of 1801 was the reorganization of the circuit courts. Until the passage of this act, fourteen of the seventeen districts—the districts of Maine, Kentucky and Tennessee not being included—had been grouped into three circuits, Eastern, Middle and Southern, in which circuit courts were held, originally by two justices of the Supreme Court, but after 1793 by one such justice, and the district judge of the district in which the court sat.² By the act of 1801 all of the twenty-two districts were "classed into six circuits," and instead of the Supreme Court justices being detailed to hold circuit courts, distinct judges, known as circuit judges, were to be appointed for this purpose. Three such judges were assigned to each of the first five circuits. To the sixth circuit, which comprised the states of Kentucky and Tennessee and the territories of Ohio and Indiana, only one circuit judge was assigned, who was to hold court with the district judges of the two states included. It was provided that whenever the office of district judge should become vacant in Kentucky and Tennessee, the vacancy should be supplied by the appointment of a circuit judge, but this did not involve the immediate filling of any new positions, for district courts had been established, and district judges had been appointed thereto, at the time of the admission of these states into the Union.

The new judicial appointments, therefore, that were placed in Adams's hands by the act of 1801 were to these circuit judgeships alone, sixteen in all,—no small number, to be sure, but considerably less than is usually asserted.³ It is true, that in each of the five new districts an attorney and a marshal of the United States were

¹ By act of March 3, 1805, the territorial superior courts were given the jurisdiction of the federal circuit and district courts, with appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States.

² Same acts as in note 5, on p. 683.

³ The correctness of this statement is rendered absolutely certain by a comparison of the amounts apportioned to the judiciary in the appropriation acts of 1800 and 1801, the increased appropriation of the latter year corresponding exactly to the salaries of these judges, with the increase in salary of five of the district judges, and the salaries of the judges of the District of Columbia, in which a circuit court was established at this session of Congress.

to be appointed, but if one may judge from the official reports of the department and the memoirs of some of the officers,¹ the positions were not very lucrative except, possibly, in some of the more important districts; and they certainly are not included in the assertions which this article is criticizing, and may consequently be disregarded in this connection.

Furthermore, the increased expense of this new establishment, over which such a cry was raised by the Republicans in their demand for economy, a cry which has been taken up by some of their more recent followers, was not enormously great. The salaries of the new judges to be appointed under this act amounted to \$31,500.² Allowing \$15,000 for contingent expenses, the total increased cost of the system erected by this act was less than \$50,000, a very different thing from \$137,000, which it was assumed in 1802 in the debates in Congress that the repeal of the act would save the government.³

In the last place, there is a general disagreement among historians, and all seem to be equally in error, as to Adams's appointment of members of Congress to positions under this act. As the Constitution provides that "no Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time,"⁴ it was out of the question for Adams to appoint any members of Congress as circuit judges, but it is maintained that the President violated the spirit of the Constitution by advancing district judges to the new positions and then filling the vacancies thus made with senators and representatives. One writer mentions two such appointments,⁵ another says that there were "many;"⁶ as a matter of fact, there were four.⁷ Of the sixteen circuit judges appointed, six were promoted from the position of district judge, and to the vacant district judgeships thereby created three senators and one representative were named.⁸

¹ *American State Papers, Miscellaneous*, I. 303; cf. J. H. Morison, *Life of Jeremiah Smith* (district attorney for New Hampshire), Boston, 1845.

² In the first five circuits the salary of the judges was fixed at \$2,000, in the sixth circuit at \$1,500.

³ *Annals of Congress*, 7th Congress, first session, 37.

⁴ Article I., Section 4.

⁵ McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, II, 610, note.

⁶ Channing, *The United States of America*, p. 158.

⁷ Two members of the House of Representatives, Otis of Massachusetts and Kittera of Pennsylvania, were also appointed to the places of two district attorneys, who received appointments as judges.

⁸ Senators Green, Paine and Read, and Representative Hill were respectively named for the district judgeships of Rhode Island, Vermont, South Carolina and North Carolina.

As was stated at the outset, this article is not intended as a vindication of President Adams and the Federalist party for the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1801, nor of the appointments to office that were made under it; its purpose is simply to correct some of the mistaken notions that are current regarding those measures, and to refute some of the charges that have been made. It is not true that the bill was only "introduced after Mr. Adams's defeat for re-election in 1800,"¹ for the act of 1801 was merely a copy of the bill which was introduced at the previous session before that presidential election had been held. The act did not "erect thirty-six new judgeships"² nor even add "twenty-three well paid places to the list of offices within the President's gift,"³ for, as we have seen, aside from the clerks, attorneys and marshals, there were but sixteen judicial offices established. Nor can the increased expense entailed, amounting to less than \$50,000, be fairly regarded as "prodigal" or a "serious inconvenience"⁴ to a government whose annual income amounted to over ten millions. And finally, as to the appointments that were made, it would seem to be a wholly natural proceeding to promote some of the district judges to the higher positions that were opened, and it would depend solely upon the character of the men themselves, whether it were right that members of Congress should be appointed to the district judgeships thus vacated; it is, therefore, apt to give a wrong impression to say that the Constitution was "evaded by promoting many district judges to the new positions, and filling the vacancies thus created by the appointment of members of Congress."⁵

MAX FARRAND.

¹ Tyler, *Parties and Patronage*, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*

³ McMaster, *op. cit.*, p. 533.

⁴ *Annals of Congress*, 7th Congress, first session, pp. 27, 30.

⁵ Channing, *Students' History of the United States*, p. 314.

PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S PROPOSED INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

DURING President Buchanan's administration Mexico was in the usual chronic state of revolution; before the close of this period civil discord brought this republic to the very verge of ruin. Two parties had grown up which were bitterly opposed to one another, and which became involved in a struggle for the control of the government. The Conservative party was closely connected with the Church and was favorable to absolute government; the Constitutional party claimed to represent the people and was covetous of the enormous wealth still remaining to the Church.

In 1857 a so-called Constituent Congress adopted a constitution and provided for a popular election, under which General Comonfort was chosen President, and in December he was inaugurated President of the republic in the city of Mexico. Within a month General Comonfort was overthrown by General Zuloaga, who in turn was declared President by his faction. The entire diplomatic corps, including the minister of the United States, recognized the government of Zuloaga as the *de facto* government of Mexico.

The Constitution of 1857 provided that in the absence of the President his duties should fall to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Accordingly the Chief Justice, General Benito Juarez, a full-blooded Indian, but a man of great ability and patriotism, withdrew with a scanty following to Guanajuato and set up a "Constitutional Government." He soon succeeded in establishing himself at Vera Cruz, and all the northern and southern provinces acknowledged his jurisdiction. General Zuloaga's authority waned even in the capital, and eventually General Miramon became the leader and head of the Conservative government.¹

In the midst of these turmoils, life and property in Mexico were no longer safe. In vain did the minister of the United States demand protection for his fellow-citizens, and seek indemnities for past injuries.² Claims estimated at more than \$10,000,000, based upon the violation of an express provision in the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and gross injuries to the persons and property of Amer-

¹ For the political condition of Mexico during this time see H. H. Bancroft's *History of the Pacific States*, Vol. VIII., Mexico, Vol. V., p. 646 *et seqq.*

² President Buchanan's second annual message, December 6, 1858.

ican citizens, arose.¹ Murder, plunder and imprisonment of citizens of the United States by different parties claiming and exercising local jurisdiction were frequent. American citizens could not visit Mexico without imminent danger.²

A few selected and well established facts will show the intolerable nature of this rule of anarchy. An American named Crabbe and his associates were executed without trial in Sonora; four sick Americans, who had taken refuge in the house of an American within the territory of the United States, were seized and murdered; General Marquez, who was in the service of the government of Miramon, seized three American physicians in the hospital at Tacubaya, while they were attending the sick and dying of both parties, and executed them without trial. Ormund Chase was seized by Marquez at Tepic and shot on the 7th of August, 1859, and his friends could not even conjecture the cause of his arrest.³

In his third annual message President Buchanan said: "Outrages of the worst description are committed both upon persons and property. There is scarcely any form of injury which has not been suffered by our citizens in Mexico during the last few years. We have been nominally at peace with that Republic, but 'so far as the interests of our commerce, or of our citizens who have visited the country as merchants, shipmasters, or in other capacities, are concerned, we might as well have been at war.' Life has been insecure, property unprotected, and trade impossible except at a risk of loss which prudent men can not be expected to incur. Important contracts, involving large expenditures, entered into by the central Government, have been set at defiance by the local governments. Peaceful American residents, occupying their rightful possessions, have been suddenly expelled the country, in defiance of treaties and by the mere force of arbitrary power. . . . Vessels of the United States have been seized without law, and a consular officer who protested against such seizure has been fined and imprisoned for disrespect to the authorities. Military contributions have been levied in violation of every principle of right, and the American who resisted the lawless demand has had his property forcibly taken away and has been himself banished." The various European governments made similar complaints.⁴ Neither party was humane; but the Conservatives

¹ President Buchanan's second annual message, December 6, 1858.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Senate Exec. Doc.*, 36th Congress, first session, Vol. I., pp. 36-50.

⁴ See Lord Russell's despatch to George B. Mathew, August 24, 1860 (*Brit. and For. St. Pap.*, LI. 548), and Mathew's despatch to Russell, September 28, 1860 (*St. Pap.*, 1861, Vol. LXV.); also the French ambassador's despatch to the captain-general of Cuba, April 29, 1861 (*Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862, pp. 286-287.)

were especially unfriendly to the United States, and consequently they treated American citizens harshly, and even brutally.¹

In addition to claims for damages to persons and property, our government had grievances against Mexico for not restraining large bands of hostile and predatory Indians from roaming freely over the Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora and the adjoining territories of the United States; and our southern frontier was kept in a constant state of alarm by lawless bands of Mexicans crossing the border and committing depredations on our remote settlers. It was alleged that the local governments of these Mexican states were perfectly helpless and were themselves terrorized by the Indians. Life and property were insecure on our frontier, and anarchy and violence prevailed; settlement of the country was arrested, and the stage and postal communication established between the Atlantic and Pacific was in danger of being destroyed.²

The gravity of the situation was shown in 1858 in a controversy between the Mexican government and our minister, John Forsyth.³ The Mexican government had issued a decree on May 15, levying a certain tax on capital whether held by Mexicans or foreigners. Forsyth formally protested against it and advised his countrymen not to pay the contribution, but to allow it to be forcibly exacted.⁴ Notwithstanding this protest, when Mr. Solomon Migel, a citizen of the United States, refused to pay, he was ordered to leave the country within three days. The Mexican government understood that the refusal of Mr. Migel to comply with the decree was really the act of the diplomatic agent of the United States, and it was warned that if it proceeded to carry out the decree of banishment, it would "take the step upon the peril of its responsibility to the sovereignty of the United States."⁵ Nevertheless, Mr. Migel was banished, and thereupon Forsyth suspended diplomatic relations with the Conservative government.⁶

This episode led to grave consequences, for Forsyth was upheld by President Buchanan and was instructed not to renew the relations thus broken off, but to withdraw the legation of the United States from the Republic. President Buchanan was resolved to

¹ See Forsyth's despatch, No. 80, to Cass, June 25, 1858. *Senate Ex. Doc.*, 35th Cong., second session, Vol. I.

² President Buchanan's second and third annual messages.

³ Forsyth to Cass, No. 79, June 19, 1858, and Cass to Forsyth, No. 49, July 15, 1858. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35th Cong., second session, Vol. I.

⁴ Forsyth to Cass, No. 78, June 17, 1858, and A with No. 78. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35th Cong., second session, Vol. I.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Forsyth to Cass, No. 79, June 19, 1858. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35th Cong., second session, Vol. I.

adopt a new policy.¹ Cass wrote to Forsyth: "Your action upon this occasion, and the circumstances attending it, have led the President to consider the condition of Mexico, and the state of our relations with that country. Both are equally unsatisfactory. The government at the capital has neglected the just complaints of the United States, and evinced no disposition whatever to redress the injuries that have been committed upon the persons and property of our citizens. Your previous efforts upon this subject have failed, and the reports received from you indicate little expectation of a favorable change, till the United States, to adopt your own language, shall give striking evidence of their will and power to protect their citizens."²

After the withdrawal of the American legation, President Buchanan sent a special agent to Mexico,³ with instructions to study the political condition of the country, the strength of the Constitutional government and such other matters as would aid the President in shaping his policy with reference to Mexico. Upon the strength of the report of this agent, a new minister was sent to Mexico, with discretionary powers to recognize the Constitutional government at Vera Cruz, if upon his arrival in Mexico he should find the report of the special agent confirmed by his own observation, and that government entitled to recognition according to the established practice of the United States.⁴

Even before diplomatic relations with the Conservative government ceased, it was thought that the Constitutional party would be less unfriendly to the United States and more ready to redress the grievances of American citizens;⁵ after the rupture, the hostility of General Miramon to the United States, and the continued outrages against our citizens committed by his supporters led President Buchanan to conclude that the only hope of a satisfactory adjustment of our relations with Mexico, was the recognition and tacit support of General Juarez.⁶ Hence Mr. Robert McLane, the newly appointed minister to this mission, soon after his arrival in Mexico presented his credentials to President Juarez.⁷

As early as 1858, President Buchanan had foreshadowed a determined policy with reference to Mexico; he declared that

¹ It should be stated that the published correspondence between our ministers to Mexico and the Department of State is very meagre.

² Cass to Forsyth, No. 49, July 15, 1858. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35th Cong., second session, Vol. I.

³ President Buchanan's third annual message, December 19, 1859.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ President Buchanan's second annual message, December 6, 1858.

⁶ President Buchanan's third and fourth annual messages.

Third annual message.

abundant cause existed for a resort to hostilities against the Conservative government, but that the success of the Constitutional party appeared to offer hopes of a peaceful adjustment of our difficulties with the country. "But for this expectation, I should at once have recommended to Congress to grant the necessary power to the President to take possession of a sufficient portion of the remote and unsettled territory of Mexico, to be held in pledge until our injuries shall be redressed and our just demands be satisfied."¹ It was therefore only an unfolding of his schemes when Buchanan adopted the conclusions of Forsyth and McLane as his own, that "Nothing but a manifestation of the power of the government of the United States and of its purpose to punish these wrongs will avail." He therefore took the very aggressive step of asking Congress for power to enter Mexico with the military forces of the government at the call of the Constitutional authorities, in order to protect American citizens and enforce the treaty rights of the United States.²

There was still another influence which caused Buchanan to take this step. He described the Mexican Government as a "wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is impelled by the different factions." Under these circumstances the President held that it was our duty as a good neighbor to extend to her a helping hand, and significantly added that, "If we do not, it would not be surprising should some other nation undertake the task, and thus force us to interfere at last, under circumstances of increased difficulty, for the maintenance of our established policy." In the light of later events, it is interesting to note that President Buchanan either had a strong conviction that it was the true policy of the United States to intervene in Mexico, or else he held up before the American people the probable European intervention to justify and excuse his own policy towards Mexico. Later, in speaking of the refusal of Congress to give him power to use the military forces of the United States in Mexico, he said: "European Governments would have been deprived of all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concerns of Mexico. We should thus have been relieved from the obligation of resisting, even by force, should this become necessary, any attempt by these Governments to deprive our neighboring Republic of portions of her territory—a duty from which we could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people."³ The only European sovereign whom

¹ Second annual message.

² Third annual message.

³ Fourth annual message.

the President suspected of a desire to interfere in Mexico was the Emperor of the French. The French minister exercised great influence over General Miramon, and shortly before this Napoleon III. had directed his attention in a special manner to Central America. "The President, therefore, watched his proceedings with constant vigilance, under the conviction that should he attempt to colonize the whole or any portion of Mexico, this would almost necessarily involve the United States in a war with France in vindication of the Monroe Doctrine."¹

The presence of two rival governments increased the difficulty of rendering any effective assistance in establishing a stable government in Mexico. The Constitutional government was well disposed towards the United States, but its authority was not acknowledged by the central provinces around the city of Mexico, and consequently it was powerless to act for the whole country. The Conservative government was unfriendly, almost defiant towards the United States, and it could not be reached by a military force except by passing through territory occupied by the Constitutional government. The President was of the opinion that the necessary consent and even the aid of that party could be obtained. But however that might be, he considered it the duty of the government of the United States to protect our citizens in their just rights secured by treaty. Therefore, he recommended that Congress "pass a law authorizing the President, under such conditions as they may deem expedient, to employ a sufficient military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future."² . . . "Such an accession to the forces of the Constitutional government would enable it soon to reach the City of Mexico and extend its power over the whole Republic. In that event there is no reason to doubt that the just claims of our citizens would be satisfied and adequate redress obtained for the injuries inflicted upon them."³

Disturbances on the boundary between our country and Mexico added to the grievances already enumerated, and for these Buchanan had equally drastic measures. In 1858 he advised Congress to take the necessary steps to assume a temporary protectorate over

¹ *Buchanan's Administration*, pp. 275-276.

² This recommendation recalls Jackson's message to Congress, February 6, 1837. The Mexican government had for some time ignored the claims of the United States for damages to the property and injuries to the persons of American citizens; finally Jackson asked Congress for authority to enforce the demands of the United States by the military power of the government, but Congress was not willing to invest the President with power to make offensive war against Mexico.

³ Third annual message.

the states of Chihuahua and Sonora by establishing military posts within these states, in order to restrain the predatory bands of Indians.¹ The next year this recommendation was repeated.²

Both of Buchanan's remedies came to naught because Congress was not prepared to authorize intervention in the domestic affairs of a neighboring state;³ thereupon he worked out another method of accomplishing the same objects. McLane, the accredited minister of the United States to the Constitutional government, was instructed to negotiate a treaty with that government.⁴ The precise nature of McLane's instructions will never be known until our State Department permits the publication of the correspondence between Mexico and the United States, during this period; but the resulting treaty has been published, and from it we can get an understanding of what the administration was willing to accept, though by no means what it desired, in the adjustment of our relations with Mexico.

On December 14, 1859, McLane concluded with the government of Juarez a treaty of "transit and commerce," and a "convention to enforce treaty stipulations;"⁵ and on January 4, 1860, the President submitted this treaty to the Senate for ratification.⁶ It was published in the *National Intelligencer*, February 18, 1860, apparently through the indiscretion of some senator. It is an important landmark in our relations with Mexico. The treaty of "transit and commerce" only indirectly provided for intervention; but it gave to the United States a privileged status which must result in a controlling influence over the political and commercial affairs of Mexico. The "convention to enforce treaty stipulations" provided for direct intervention under certain conditions.

By the treaty of "transit and commerce" Mexico ceded to the United States in perpetuity the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec from ocean to ocean by any kind of road, with the understanding that both republics were to enjoy the use of the same. As soon as any route across the isthmus was established, the republic of Mexico agreed to provide a port of deposit at each ter-

¹ Second annual message.

² Third annual message.

³ "These recommendations of the President were wholly disregarded by Congress during the session of 1859-1860. Indeed they were not even noticed in any of its proceedings. The members of both parties were too exclusively occupied in discussing the slavery question, and in giving their attention to the approaching presidential election to devote any portion of their time to the important Mexican question." Nor did the next annual message of December, 1860, receive any more attention than the previous ones (*Buchanan's Administration*, pp. 274-275).

⁴ Fourth annual message.

⁵ *Exec. Journal of U. S. Senate*, XI. 115.

⁶ Fourth annual message.

minus, and no duty was to be levied by the Mexican government on foreign goods passing over the route, except such as were intended for consumption in Mexico. The mails of the United States were to pass over the route free of all charges, provided they were in closed bags and not intended for distribution along the road.

Our government was given the right to transport troops, military stores, and munitions of war by the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and by a route from the city of Guaymas on the Gulf of California to some suitable point on the boundary between the United States and Mexico near the one hundred and eleventh degree of longitude west from Greenwich.

Mexico also ceded to the United States in perpetuity the right of way over any railroad, or route of communication at that time existing, or to be constructed, from the cities Camargo and Matamoros, or any suitable point on the Rio Grande, in the state of Tamaulipas, *via* Monterey, to Mazatlan on the Gulf of California, and from Rancho de Nogales or any suitable point on the boundary between Mexico and the United States near the one hundred and eleventh degree of longitude west from Greenwich to the Gulf of California in the state of Sonora.

All the stipulations and regulations with reference to the transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec were extended to the other routes, except the right of transporting troops, military stores, and munitions of war over them. The Mexican Republic reserved the right of sovereignty over all of the routes specified in the treaty.

Both republics agreed to protect these transits and to guarantee the neutrality of the same. Moreover, Mexico agreed to employ her military forces, if at any time it should become necessary to protect the persons and property passing over any of the routes mentioned; but it was further stipulated that "upon failure to do this from any cause whatever, the Government of the United States may, with the consent or at the request of the Government of Mexico, or the minister thereof at Washington, or of the competent legally appointed local authorities, civil or military, employ such force for this and for no other purpose; and when, in the opinion of the Government of Mexico, the necessity ceases, such force shall be immediately withdrawn."

"In the exceptional case, however, of uniform or imminent danger to the lives or property of citizens of the United States, the forces of the said Republic are authorized to act for their protection without such consent having been previously obtained; and such forces shall be withdrawn when the necessity for this employment ceases."

In consideration of the privileges granted by Mexico to the United States, the government of the United States agreed to pay to the government of Mexico the sum of four millions of dollars, of which two millions were to be paid immediately upon the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, and the remaining two millions were to be retained by our government for the payment of claims of citizens of the United States against Mexico.¹

The conventional articles to enforce treaty stipulations, maintain order, etc., were the most remarkable features of the treaty; if they had been ratified by the United States Senate, a radical departure from the traditional policy of our government, not to interfere in the domestic concerns of other nations, would have been made.

Article I. provided that "If any of the stipulations of existing treaties between Mexico and the United States are violated, or the safety and security of the citizens of either Republic are endangered within the territory of the other, and the legitimate and acknowledged government thereof may be unable from any cause, to enforce such stipulations or to provide for such safety and security, it shall be obligatory on that government to seek the aid of the other in maintaining their due execution, as well as order and security in the territory of that Republic where such violation and discord occur; and in every such special case the expenses shall be paid by the Treasury of the nation within whose territory such intervention may become necessary; and if disorder shall occur on the frontier of the two Republics, the authorities of the two Republics nearest the place where the disorder exists shall act in concert and co-operation for the arrest and punishment of criminals who have disturbed the public order and security of either Republic, and for this purpose the parties guilty of these offenses may be arrested within either Republic and delivered over to the authorities of that Republic within which the crime may have been committed; the nature and character of such intervention as well as the expense thereof, and the manner of arresting and subjecting to punishment the said criminals, shall be determined and regulated by an agreement between the executive branches of the two governments."

The reason given in the preamble for this extraordinary provision, is that the existing civil war in Mexico and the disturbed condition of the inland frontier of Mexico and the United States may make it necessary for the two republics to act in concert with

¹The eighth article of the treaty of 1853 between the United States and Mexico contains provisions similar to those enumerated above. The stipulations in the "treaty of transit and commerce" with reference to the United States mails, the transportation of troops, and the protection of the routes are somewhat similar to those in the treaty of 1853. *Treaties and Conventions*, ed. 1889, p. 697.

their military forces in order to enforce treaty stipulations and maintain order.¹

On the same day that Forsyth concluded the treaty and convention with the Juarez government, he wrote to the Secretary of State that it was only after he had given the Constitutional authorities to understand that the United States would enforce the fulfillment of treaty stipulations by the military power of the government, whether the convention was signed or not, that the Minister of Relations consented to sign it.

The President submitted the treaty to the Senate January 4, 1860, and from that time till May 31, it went through the usual form, receiving attention from time to time in the executive sessions of the Senate.² On May 31, it was seriously considered. The provision which appears to have received most attention had nothing to do with the intervention features of the treaty, but related to reciprocal trade in the natural and manufactured products of the two republics. When the final vote was taken, eighteen senators voted for ratification and twenty-seven against it.³ "So it was resolved, That the Senate do not advise and consent to ratification of the treaty of transit and commerce between the United States of America and the Mexican Republic, dated at Vera Cruz, December 14, 1859."⁴

After the decision was announced, Mr. Simmons of Rhode Island moved that the vote of the Senate be reconsidered, and it was ordered that this motion be postponed until the next day.⁵ It

¹The full text of the treaty was published in the *Daily National Intelligencer* of February 18, 1860, and also in the *New York Times*. I have not been able to find it in any printed public document.

²*Executive Journal of the U. S. Senate*, XI. 115, 116, 126, 127, 135, 146, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 192-199.

³Those who voted in the affirmative were Messrs. Bragg of N. C., Clingman of N. C., Davis of Miss., Fitch of Ind., Fitzpatrick of Ala., Green of Mo., Gwin of Cal., Hemphill of Tex., Johnson of Ark., Johnson of Tenn., Lane of Or., Mason of Va., Polk of Mo., Powell of Ky., Pugh of O., Rice of Minn., Sebastian of Ark., and Toombs of Ga.

Those who voted in the negative were Messrs. Anthony of R. I., Bigler of Pa., Bingham of Mich., Brown of Miss., Cameron of Pa., Chandler of Mich., Clark of N. H., Collamer of Vt., Doolittle of Wis., Fessenden of Me., Foote of Vt., Foster of Conn., Grimes of Ia., Hale of N. H., Hammond of S. C., Harlan of Ia., Hunter of Va., King of N. Y., Pearce of Ind., Seward of N. J., Simmons of R. I., Slidell of La., Sumner of Mass., Trumbull of Ill., Wade of O., Wilkinson of Minn., and Wilson of Mass.

Of the eighteen who voted in the affirmative, all were Democrats; four belonged to the Northern States. Of the twenty-seven who voted in the negative, twenty-one were Republicans and six were Democrats; five of the Democrats belonged to states south of the Mason and Dixon line. See *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., first session, Part I.; also *Ex. Journal of the U. S. Senate*, XI. 199.

⁴*Ex. Journal of the U. S. Senate*, XI. 199.

⁵*Ibid.*

was not, however, till June 27 that Simmons's motion was again taken up; on that day it was agreed to reconsider by a vote of twenty-six to fifteen. Senator Wilson of Massachusetts then moved that the further consideration of the treaty be postponed to the first Monday of the next December.¹ When Congress met in December the country was too much excited over secession and slavery to again take up the Mexican treaty, and consequently, June 27, 1860, was the last time that the Senate considered this remarkable treaty.²

Naturally enough Miramon protested against the treaty which would have led to the early overthrow of his government and the establishment of the authority of the Constitutional government over all Mexico. Hence two protests were filed: one by O. Muñon Lea, Miramon's Minister of Relations, and another by Miramon himself. Both throw light upon the preceding negotiations.

Mr. Lea protested on the ground that such a treaty would lead to new complications, and therefore prolong the civil war in Mexico; that it would be dishonorable for the United States to take advantage of the weakness of Mexico to secure the acquisition of territory, or the grant of a transit route across Mexico; and that, even if the Constitutional government were the *de facto* government of Mexico, President Juarez had no authority to make a treaty granting away territory, or a transit route, because the Mexican Constitution expressly declared that, "it is ordained that only to Congress belongs the power to approve treaties, compacts, or diplomatic conventions and to grant or deny the entrance of foreign troops into the territory of the federation." The protest also set forth that when the government of Miramon was installed in January, 1858, it was at once recognized by the Minister of the United States, who in March of the same year presented a plan of a treaty for a new boundary line between the two republics. This involved a considerable loss of territory to Mexico, and other regulations of great importance. The Minister of Relations declined to accept this proposition, because such a treaty would excite domestic strife just when peace was the principal object of the Mexican government. "From that time Mr. Forsyth declared himself in open hostility to the Government, favored, as far as he was able, the enemies who were warring against it, broke off, without waiting for instructions from Washington, and without any ascertained cause, the relations existing between the two countries, and did not leave the Republic until, wearied with so many fruitless efforts to break down the very Government he had recognized, he lost all hope of realizing his desires."³

¹ *Ex. Journal of the U. S. Senate*, XI. 199.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 228, 229. Schouler's *History of the U. S.*, V. 453, note.

³ *National Daily Intelligencer*, January 16, 1860.

These insinuations must be taken with due allowance, but they undoubtedly show that our government failed to secure something that it greatly desired, presumably the cession of Mexican territory, and it is not at all unlikely that this was the real cause of the breach of diplomatic relations with the Miramon government, and the decision to recognize the government of Juarez as more favorable to the concessions desired by the administration.

General Miramon's personal protest practically repeats the same charges; it refers to Mr. Forsyth's efforts to secure a new boundary line between Mexico and the United States for a consideration and to the American minister's insistence "that they should avail themselves of this opportunity to gain a few millions of dollars in the existing strife; that is, in the war against the Constitutional forces. This proposition so unworthy of a nation was rejected in terms already known to the Republic."¹

The McLane-Juarez treaty awakened great interest both in the United States and the leading countries of Europe, especially England, France and Spain. In the United States the North generally opposed the ratification of the treaty, while the South favored it, although there are notable exceptions to this statement.² There was an impression in the North that the policy of the administration with reference to Mexico was deliberately planned with a view to strengthening the slave power, and hence the treaty came to be a party question. Thus F. P. Blair in a letter to J. J. Crittenden expressed the belief that the whole scheme was one to secure more territory for slavery.³

A correspondent of the *New York Tribune* declared that the administration aimed at the ultimate absorption of Mexico by the United States in order to offset, politically, the growing greatness of the West, and to illustrate Calhoun's idea of equality in the Senate; that the slave section knew that the next census would reveal the comparative weakness of the South, and consequently they had contrived a plot by which they could increase their population and territory; and that this was the inspiration of the whole scheme. This correspondent thought that the political game in the treaty was the same as that played by President Polk.⁴

On January 10, 1860, the *National Intelligencer* devoted nearly three columns to a criticism of President Buchanan's Mexican pol-

¹ *Daily National Intelligencer*, February 9, 1860.

² See *supra*, p. 696. Memorials from citizens of New York and Chicago were presented to the Senate, favoring the ratification of the treaty. *Exec. Journal of the Senate*, XI. 152, 153.

³ Coleman's *Crittenden*, II. 186.

⁴ *New York Tribune*, February 28, 1860.

icy. It maintained that the use of our military forces in Mexico in concert with one of the warring factions, which was unable to establish its supremacy, was not only opposed to the general principles of public law, but also to our own theory of popular government; and that revolutions were so common in Mexico that, in order to maintain any kind of stable government there, it would be necessary to assure perpetual presence of American troops "as the armed Janissaries of some Mexican satrap."

A correspondent of the *Boston Courier*, who was described as being "peculiarly well informed on Mexican history and current politics," pointed out that Juarez was shut up in Vera Cruz and that only the frontier states acknowledged his government, while all of the rich and populous states of the interior acknowledged the government of General Miramon. Hence, he concluded that President Juarez could not make a treaty that was worth having; the one thing which Juarez needed most was money, and all that he could offer in exchange for money was territory; such a step would assure his downfall and establish Miramon's popularity. As to the Isthmus routes, neither of the rival governments could maintain a safe transit across any part of the republic.

While such a discussion was going on at home, the measure could not fail to attract attention in Europe. Foreigners foresaw the practical absorption of Mexico by the United States, and this at once aroused the commercial ambition of England, and the race prejudices and religious animosity of Spain and France.

No official expression on the subject from the government of Great Britain can be found in the published correspondence of either country, but the President's policy did not escape the notice of the *London Times*. On January 11, 1860, it predicted the annexation of a part of Mexico by the United States, and added, "In one sense this is a gain to humanity. Beautiful and fertile regions, now desert, will pass under the hands of the cultivator, mines will be worked, harbors will be filled with shipping, and a new life will animate that vast region. . . . Although we have not the slightest wish to interfere with the Americans, it is but right that an adequate force should be at hand to protect British interests in those quarters." On January 13, the *Times* once more took up the subject and commented at length on the President's policy, expressing approval and declaring that, "saving British interests, we should look on such a proceeding without the least dissatisfaction."

Quite different was the position taken by Spain. The Spaniards were intimately connected with the Mexicans by ties of blood and religion; the Spanish government naturally looked with jealousy

upon a proposition which would ultimately result in the extinction of an ancient Spanish province. Ever since 1858,¹ the government at Madrid had been urging France and England to unite with it in a joint intervention in Mexico. The powerful influence of the Church was on the side of the Conservative government in Mexico, while the Constitutional government confiscated the enormous revenues of the clerical orders and declared for religious liberty. These considerations together with the monarchical sympathies of the Conservative government, caused the Spanish government to throw the weight of its influence on that side and to look with uneasiness upon the favor shown to the government of Juarez by the United States.²

President Buchanan's Mexican policy excited a lively interest in the Spanish court, and the Spanish government redoubled its efforts to induce France and England to join with it in an intervention in Mexico for the purpose of putting an end to anarchy and of establishing a stable government, that is, of putting down the Constitutional government and supporting Miramon.³ Consequently, on April 18, 1860, the Spanish Minister of State declared that "no people, and Spain less than any other, can consent to the absorption, or even the protectorate, or to the exclusive preponderance of any nation whatever over the vast and rich continent discovered and civilized by our ancestors."⁴

In a despatch to the Spanish ambassador at London urging the co-operation of England in a joint intervention in Mexico, the Spanish Minister of State points out that the McLane-Juarez treaty is prejudicial to the interests of England, and that if the treaty is ratified, it will produce complications which will affect not only Spain, but all commercial nations, because the great oceanic routes will be dominated by a people who preach the political and commercial exclusion of Europeans from America.⁵

It is difficult to ascertain just what the attitude of the French government was at this time toward the proposed American intervention in Mexico. No full official expression appears to have been published on the subject, and the *Moniteur*, the organ of the government, passes over the whole matter with a simple mention of the treaty. Perhaps Napoleon III. was too much engaged in European affairs to give due attention to political controversies in America. There is, however, some evidence that he considered intervention in

¹ *Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862.

² *Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862, pp. 271, 283, 284-286.

³ *Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862, pp. 211-213, 215.

⁴ Calderon Collantes to M. Mon, April 18, 1860. *Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862, p. 212.

⁵ Calderon Collantes to the Spanish ambassador at London, May 11, 1860. *Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862, p. 215.

Mexico,¹ but there is nothing to indicate that he was hostile to President Buchanan's plans ;² on the other hand he appears to have desired the friendly co-operation of the United States with England, Spain and France in the establishment of a permanent and responsible government in Mexico.³ When the Spanish ambassador urged the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1860 to intervene in Mexico, he replied that they must wait until the Senate of the United States had approved or rejected the treaty made with President Juarez and that his government had decided to put off every resolution upon the subject until after the vote of the American Senate.⁴

It must be admitted that the situation in Mexico was intolerable ; it was inevitable that, sooner or later, some foreign power, or combination of powers should intervene, if security was not given to foreign residents and treaty obligations were not observed. Yet it should be borne in mind that the Constitutional government, under the leadership of the able and patriotic statesman Juarez, evinced a greater willingness and ability to restore order and settle all international disputes, than its rival, the Conservative government, under the leadership of the unscrupulous Miramon. Juarez was carrying on a desperate struggle against the privileged classes, who, rather than give up the least of their privileges, preferred to betray their country to a foreign prince. The principles for which Juarez fought met with a sympathetic response in the United States, and the success of his arms in 1860 gave him undisputed control over the whole of Mexico. What he needed was time to complete his reforms at home and to adjust the relations of his government with foreign governments. A little patience and friendly assistance from the governments which had undoubted claims against Mexico would, in all probability, have enabled such a leader to maintain a stable government based upon the will of the people and to settle amicably all controversies with foreign powers. It would be idle to speculate upon what would have been the course of events in Mexico had President Buchanan's intervention been carried out ; yet in the light of later events it appears altogether probable that the pretext for intervention by the three European powers would have been removed and our government would have been spared the humiliation of seeing its much-cherished and jealously guarded Monroe Doctrine rendered ineffective at a time when civil war necessarily weakened our foreign policy.

HOWARD LAFAYETTE WILSON.

¹ *Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862, pp. 205-216.

² See *supra*, page 692.

³ *Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862, p. 223.

⁴ M. Mon to M. Collantes, May 4, 1860. *Archives Diplomatiques*, Tome III., 1862, p. 214.

DOCUMENTS

*Letters of Ebenezer Huntington, 1774-1781.*¹

EBENEZER HUNTINGTON was born at Norwich, Connecticut, December 26, 1754, the fourth son of General Jabez Huntington. After preparation at the grammar school at Lebanon he entered Yale College, in October 1771, where he was graduated in 1775. The same year he received an honorary degree of A.B. from Harvard College. Already, on the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1775, he had joined the army before Boston as a volunteer. In September he received a commission as first lieutenant in Captain Chester's company of the Connecticut regiment commanded by Colonel Samuel Wyllys. In June, 1776, he was appointed a captain in that regiment. Toward the end of the year he was made deputy adjutant-general, and deputy paymaster-general to the troops on the North River under the command of Major-General Heath. In January, 1777, he was appointed a major under Colonel Samuel B. Webb in one of the sixteen additional regiments which Congress had authorized General Washington to raise. He was with Washington at Valley Forge, and in the passage of the Delaware on the night of December 24. In 1778, Colonel Webb having been made a prisoner, and the lieutenant-colonel being sick, Ebenezer Huntington commanded the regiment and marched it to Newport to reinforce the troops intended for the attack on Rhode Island. On October 10, 1778, the lieutenant-colonel having resigned, Huntington was promoted to that position. In 1781, as lieutenant-colonel in a regiment of light infantry, he marched from the North River to Yorktown, and served at the siege of that place. From 1792 to 1823, he was adjutant-general of the state of Connecticut, and from 1799 to 1805 he was also major-general of the third division of the Connecticut militia. He was actively interested in the establishment of the turnpike between Norwich and New London, the first in the state (1791), in the establishment of the first insurance company at Norwich (1794), and of its bank (1796), of which he was president for many years. In 1798 he was appointed a brigadier-

¹ For the following letters we are indebted to Miss Perkins, of Norwich, Connecticut, a granddaughter of their writer.

general in the provisional army raised by the United States at that time. From 1810 to 1811, and from 1817 to 1819, he was a member of Congress. He was an excellent disciplinarian, and a man of great dignity and force of character. He was twice married, and died on June 17, 1834. The letters here printed should be brought into connection with the letters of his brother Jedidiah Huntington, which are printed in the *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Fifth Series, IX. 493-518, with the letters of Jedidiah and Joshua, another brother, printed in the same society's *Proceedings*, Second Series, VII. 355-360, and with the letters printed in the three volumes of the *Correspondence of Colonel Samuel Blachley Webb*, edited by Mr. Worthington C. Ford. A portrait of Gen. Ebenezer Huntington is given in Miss Caulkins's *History of Norwich*, ed. 1866, facing p. 419.

I. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.¹

NEW HAVEN April 15th 1774

Hon^d Sir In your last p^r Esq^r Sherman you wrote me that you intend to send a horse for me next may, should be glad if it is not Inconvenient, you would Please to send of your own family with it, for I have Several old Clothes that I want to have at Home, and Cannot Carry them myself with other Necessaries.

The Vacancy² begins Generally the 6th Day of May, towards Night, but as it Comes on friday, so that Scholars that live at any great Distance, Can not get home that week, the President and tutors will (I believe) let them go away on thursday.

Last Monday was freemans meeting here when they made Choice of Esq^r Bishop the first Deputy and after going round two or three times more made Choice of Esq^r Darling the Second Deputy.³ After that they tried hard to vote in the Petition which was drawn up at the Convention in Middletown but Could not Effect it. at last they Divided the house and got it in by three Majority have nothing further to write you but am in all Respects your Affectionate and Dutiful son

EBENEZER HUNTINGTON

P S The Deputies in this County are Pretty much as they were Last Year there are but 3 New ones in this County.

II. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

ROXBURY CAMP June 25th 1775

Hon^d Sir

As I seldom have written to you perhaps you may think it is owing to Negligence, but I Assure you that is not the Case it is owing to my being

¹Of Norwich, the writer's father.

²The vacation at Yale College, where the writer was at this time a student.

³Samuel Bishop and Thomas Darling represented New Haven in the General Assembly of May, 1774.

so Prodigiously Hurried for the fall business in Flaxseed time is nothing to be Compared to the fatigue I undergo daily, get to bed att 11 oClock and up as soon as light appears with a great deal of Care on my hands.

Nothing has happen^d Lately worth Mentioning Except Yesterday, about 1 oClock the Regulars began firing from their breastwork and block house upon our lowermost Centinels and main guard but did no harm. they Continued their fire till about 3 oClock. then they hove severall Shells Carcases &C with a few shott from their Cannon. about four oClock two of our men very Imprudently ran down upon the neck to destroy the house their main guard was kept in, Suspecting they were then out, but they were fired upon by about thirty of the Regulars, who killed them, then went up to the bodies of the Dead and every one to a man thrust his Bayonet into their bodies. they might have Easily taken them as they were both unarm^d but they rather choose to destroy them than to take them Prisoners. (a disgrace to the name of britons).¹

Our men in General did not regard their firing one half so much as they do a Shower of hail. three men belonging to the Train of Artillery from Rhode Island Espyed a Shell falling ran up to it knocked out the Phiz and brought it up to the General with almost two Pounds of Powder in it. it is Strange that our People regard their firing no more than they do, but it is Certainly true they do not Pay any Attention to it.²

We hear from Boston by a Gentleman who made his Escape from thence in a fishingboat that Maj^r Pitcairn and Maj^r Sheriff and Col^l Williams are Certainly killed and about thirty other Officers³ and about twelve hundred Privates killed and wounded so that their loss is in a greater Proportion than it was in the Lexington Battle. the number of Wounded from Connecticut is 23 13 Missing. N Hampshire, 19 Missing Seventy four Wounded. as to the loss the Massachusetts Sustained I have not been able to Learn.

I am well and have been Well Ever since I left home and as to Coming home in July I do not think at Present that I Can be With you so soon but Cannot tell should be Glad you would get a Certificate from President Daggett that I am in Regular Standing at College and likewise a Recommendation as I imagine I can have a Degree without Going to Connecticut for it if I have it Certifyed that I am in Regular Standing, for Doct^r Langdon hath given me Encouragement that he will give me one if N Haven President refuses it if I am denyed it only because of my tarry from College this Summer and my leaving it without Liberty in the Alarm Last April.⁴

I am Your Dutifull Son EBENEZER HUNTINGTON.

¹ Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 22, 23; diary of Samuel Bixby, in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.*, 1875-1876, p. 288; diary of Ezekiel Price, *ibid.*, 1863-1864, p. 192; Heath, *ibid.*, 1858-1860, p. 295.

² See Frothingham, *Siege of Boston*, p. 213.

³ The British official account, *Remembrances*, 1775, p. 99, gives 21 officers killed (or mortally wounded) in the battle of Bunker Hill. Among them were Major Pitcairn of the marines and Major Williams of the 52d. Major Sheriff of the 47th was not killed.

⁴ The writer received his A.B. degree from Yale College and also, in the same year, an honorary degree of A.B. from Harvard.

III. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

Hon^d Sir

CAMP AT ROXBURY, June 29th 1775

I receiv^d your letter p^r Mery Yesterday with a dozen of flints: you wonder why I want so many; the reason is this, My store is so situated that in Case the regulars should Come out I cannot move any thing out of it; therefore I shall have no reason for not fighting to defend it, which had I no other reason would be Sufficient to Induce me to be Prepared for Defence.

My Chest got safe to hand p^r M^r Morgan but was most grievously disapointed in not finding one or two Striped Jacketts in it, which I much wanted and which might have been sent very Easily.

In my last to you I made mention about a degree, I informed you that there was a Chance of my having a degree Conferr^d upon me by Doct^r Langdon; Should be glad to have Liberty from you to purchase a suit of Clothes as my light Clothes were much dirtied for want of a Change before my Chest Came, which Obliges Me to ask Liberty for a new suit to make me appear Properly Cloth^d at such a time, should I succeed, but at the same time would not be over Desirous as I am disposed to be as frugal as Possible; I understand the Assembly are Called together Concerning raising more troops. should it so happen that Chester¹ should be promoted and M^r Webb should get the Command of that Com^y should be Extremely happy in having a first Lieu^t Birth under him at the same time would say that I would not Except of a Second Lieu^t Birth under him nor any man in the world and Quit my business. I find that three fourths of the Captains in the Province Pay are as unfit for their Station as I Should be for a Gen^l in Command, not flattering myself would venture to say that I look upon myself fit for a Captaincy.

As to news have none but what you have hear^d I am in all Respects with proper Regards your Dutiful Son

EBEN HUNTINGTON.

N B Should be Glad you would show the lines above to some member of the lower house² that would try to get me the birth above mention^d

IV. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.³

Dear Brother

ROXBURY CAMP, Octo^r 3^d 1775.

With Pleasure I fulfill my obligations to you in the Letter way. I should have wrote to you before but the great uneasiness which hath

¹ John Chester, who had married Huntington's sister, was captain of the ninth company in the second Connecticut regiment. Samuel B. Webb, a brother-in-law of Chester, was his first lieutenant. *Colonial Records of Connecticut*, XIV. 425; *Correspondence of Samuel B. Webb*, I. 44.

² Huntington's father, to whom the letter is addressed, was a member of the upper house.

³ The letter is addressed "To Mr. Andrew Huntington, Merchant, Norwich, fav of Cap^t Trumbull." Andrew, the writer's brother, was the second son of Hon. Jabez Huntington, the five sons being, in order of age, Jedidiah, Andrew, Joshua, Ebenezer, and Zachariah. For the episode of Dr. Benjamin Church, see Washington's *Writings*, ed. Sparks, III. 115, 116, 502-506; *Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll.*, I. 84-94.

been in the Reg^t about my Commission hath taken up all my time. the matter is at Length in a measure Subsided though I can not say the Officers like the matter so well as I could wish.¹ You will be much Surprised to hear that our famous Doct^r Church that great pretended Patriot is now under a Special guard of a Captⁿ and 40 Men for Corresponding with Gage and other of his Hellish Gang. the Plot was discovered by his Miss who is now with Child by him and he owns himself the father (for he has Dismissed his Wife) she was the bearer of some of his Letters from this place to Newport to Cap^t Wallace who hath the forwarding them to Boston. she left them with a man she Supposed friendly to Doct^r Church but was mistaken who having a Curiosity to know the Contents open[ed] Them but they were wrote in Characters so that he was not able to Understand them, but Guessing the contents brought the Letters and Girl to Gen^l Washington who after an Examination and 4 Hours under guard Confess^d she Carried them from Doct^r Church, his tryal has not been yet, but Suppose it will be e'er long.

I wish that my Chest might be forwarded as I am in want of sundry things that are in the Chest. As to news more than I have wrote have not anything. I am in all Respects Your Friendly Brother

EB HUNTINGTON.

P. S. Those Letters of Doct Church's and sundry others that were taken out of his Desk all of them wrote in Character are Decyphering will give you the contents when I shall become knowing to them. Give my Love to your Wife and Other Sisters and Brothers and also your Children.

V. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

ROXBURY CAMP NOV^r 23^d 1775

Hon^d Sir

This minute I rec^d your favour by post and Observe the Contents. Am very glad that I am clear of those difficulties as to the Reg^t not only as it eases me, but as it gives you Satisfaction to hear those difficulties subside. The universal determination of the Soldiers from Connecticut seems to be for home at the Expiration of their Seven Months altho' they have been repeatedly Solicited in Gen^l Orders to tarry longer. We have great reason to fear that our Enemies knowing our Situation will Endeavour to take the Advantage of it which if they do the Consequences will be worse than it is Generally thought.

I have inclosed you a List of the Officers only of Col^o Wyllys Reg^t upon the New Arrangement, but will Endeavour to give you a list of the whole Brigade p^r next post. Orders are now given out for one Officer

¹ When the Continental commissions were announced in general orders, September 20, 1775, the appointment of Ebenezer Huntington to a lieutenantancy in Chester's company caused a remonstrance; it was signed by nearly all the officers in the regiment and addressed to General Spencer. The grievance was that he did not rise by gradation or seniority. See a letter of Captain John Chester, in the *Correspondence of Samuel B. Webb*, I. 104-106. Washington's letter of dignified rebuke is printed there and in Sparks, III. 108, 109.

out of Each of the new Companies to go on the Recruiting Service. The 2^d Lieu^t of our Company is now out on that business. when he returns, I expect to have an Opportunity to go on the same business.

As to news we have none. Family in usual Health, Brother Joshua was well Yesterday. I am your very dutiful Son,

EBENEZER HUNTINGTON.

VI. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT ROXBURY Jan^y 12th 1776

Hon^d Sir

This day I rec^d your fav^r p^r M^r Nevins in which you are pleas^d to say that I have not acknowledged your fav^r in which was inclosed a letter from Cap^t Chester. That letter I have rec^d dated Jan^y 2^d I thought I had acknowledged it or should have done it before this time.

As to filling up the new Army, it is Carried on as well as could be expected considering how disgusted the Old Soldiers went home. As for my own Part I have inlisted but a few, but the Company is as forward as some others. the other two Officers are now on the recruiting service. the Ens^l I hear has inlisted about 18 Men but do not know whether it may be relied upon. the other L^t has been gone but about 8 days. I made a Serg^t belonging to Wethersfield who went home and inlisted twenty two men, came to Camp and after he came to Camp was Encouraged by a Captain of the Reg^t to an Ensigncy if he would join the 22 Men to his Company accordingly the fellow left me. because I had not the Inlistment they had signed, I could not hold him nor his men. As to paying a Visit to my friends at home I lay by all thoughts of it at Present and conclude to wait till we have open^d intrenchments on Dorchester hill. I am your ever dutiful son,

EBENEZER HUNTINGTON.

P S Inlisted into Cap^t Hanchits Comp^y certain thirty nine men besides Commission^d Officers.¹

VII. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT ROXBURY 21st Jan^y 1776

Dear Brother

Your favour of the 11th Instant I this day Rec^d (I believe) by the hands of M^r Prince. You must have heard different Accounts ere now from Quebeck than what you mention in your letter. I wish it had been as you hear^d (that is it had not been worse). Brave Montgomery is dead, but he dyed in defence of a glorious Cause, and I hope is happy. Poor Arnold escaped with a wound that Splinter^d the bone of his leg; tho^t his wound was not bad, yet he was Obliged to be out so long, to make a safe retreat for his men, that he was much weakened with the loss of Blood, and very much fatigued. The Aid de Camp of Gen^l Montgom-

¹Oliver Hanchit, captain of the tenth company, second Connecticut regiment. See *Collections of the Rhode Island Historical Society*, VI. 82.

ery's was killed.¹ Maj^r Bigelow, and Meiggs are spoken highly of likewise Maj^r Ogden who acted as Major of brigade, who received a ball through his Shoulder. this young Gentleman and One Burr² who was Secretary to Col^o Arnold both came Volunteers from N Jersey, and are much spoken of as to Activity in the battle and great good Courage.

I wish to be able to give you the particulars of the whole battle but Imagine that you will be able to get it sooner through the Gov^rs Hands,³ as I make no doubt he will have the particulars. I feel very anxious about Sister Lucy.⁴ I hope you will be able to tell me that she is better by next Letter. I wish to tell you something about Dorchester but cannot, tho' Expect to be able to, by the first of Feb^r. I have enclosed you the Strength of Gen^l Spencers Brigade for your Curiosity. I venture to send it to my friends but should it get into the hands of our Enemies it might be of great damage, by showing our Weakness just at this time. you will see that it is not Exposed. I conclude by subscribing myself your friendly Brother

EBENEZER HUNTINGTON.

P S a Paper came out of Boston last friday I intended to have got it and inclosed it to you but T. Fanning first got it and has inclosed it to Brother Joshua.

VIII. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT ROXBURY March 4th 76.

Hon^d Sir

This night our Orders are to take Possession of Dorchester Hill under the Command of Brig^d Gen^l Thomas. Two thousand men including proper Officers to Parade at 6 oClock at Dorchester—to be relieved at 3 oClock to morrow morning by three thousand men including Officers, among which are the Col^o Maj^r Chester, Maj^r Trumbull and myself. we expect a warm Engagement but at the same time think it uncertain as they must know that we shall go very strong and I hope strong enough to Repulse them should they dare to show their heads there. But the God of Battle alone can determine—who is able to save us. You will no doubt hear before this reaches you some flying Report about our taking Possession there. That you may think I am not unmindful about the danger I am going into I can tell you that my Cloaths and Papers are properly secured In case that my maker should in his great good Pleasure so ordain that I should not live to Come off the Hill.

I must beg your Prayers for us in every Difficult time and Pray that we may succeed as we trust that we are fighting the Lords Battle. from Gen^l

¹ Two aids were killed, Capts. McPherson and Cheeseman.

² Timothy Bigelow, Return J. Meigs (afterward postmaster-general), Matthias Ogden and Aaron Burr.

³ Governor Jonathan Trumbull, whose daughter Faith (d. November 23, 1775) had been the wife of Jedidiah Huntington. See Stuart's *Trumbull*, pp. 194-196.

⁴ Lucy Coit, first wife of Andrew Huntington, died May 9, 1776.

Spencers Brigade there are going this night 9 Capⁿ 27 Subalterns 42 Serg^{ts} 42 Corp^s 708 Rank and file. at 3 o'clock to morrow morning 12 Capⁿ 36 Subalterns 57 Serg^{ts} 57 Corp^s 863 Rank and file. I had like to have forgot to Acknowledge a Letter rec^d the night before Brother went from this, the reason was because I was unwell but am better now.

I have no news to write further but remain your ever Dutiful Son

EBENEZER HUNTINGTON

Respects to Mamma. Love to brothers, and Sisters.

IX. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

ROXBURY CAMP 7th March 1776

Hon^d Parent

Dorchester Hills are at last taken Possession of by our People^l who went on in the Even^g following the 4th March in a Party of 2000 men including Proper Officers under the Command of Brigadier Gen^l Thomas who began two forts, one on each of the high hills, and two small redoubts just as you Pass the neck which Redoubts were built to Play upon the floating Batteries that should attempt to annoy our People Passing the Neck. This Party was reliev^d at 3 o'clock next morning by a larger Party of 3000 men Including Proper Officers. The Party was increas^d from 2 to 3000 in Expectation of an Attack as soon as they should discover us, but we were unhappily mistaken—I say unhappily, because I believe it would have Put an End to the War in the N England Colonies, had an Action taken Place. We went on so well Prepar^d that had they come out with a number suff^t to withstand us, the town would have been in the hands of our great and brave Gen^l Putnam in a little time after they had come out.

I wrote you the 4th March intended to have sent you p^r M^r Hyde but he has not taken it and I now send it p^r Post.

I should Lengthen the letter but the Post is waiting.

I am your Dutiful Son, EBEN^r HUNTINGTON

X. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT ROXBURY March 21st 76.

Hon^d Sir

Since we have taken Possession of Dorchester hill I have had the pleasure of receiving two letters from you the dates I have forgot and as the letters are both out of my Pocket you will excuse my acknowledging them Otherways.

When Doctor Turner set out from this Place I was in Boston and Could not write to you but desir^d him to inform you that I wanted a horse to be sent to me immediately as I then expected that the troops would march to N. York very soon and that I should march with them,

¹ Washington to the President of Congress, March 7; Heath, *Memoirs*, pp. 40, 41; diary of Ezekiel Price, in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.*, 1863-1864, p. 240; *Correspondence of Samuel B. Webb*, I. 134, 135.

but since he went away, the Comp^r which I had the Care of has been fill^d up and the Captaincy given to Jed^d Hyde¹ which has so much oblig^d me and all my friends that this morning By good advice I shall wait on his Excellency to resign my Commission unless something can be done to Satisfaction, tho' at the same time I request a horse to be sent. Last Sunday our troops marched in and took Possession of the town of Boston after the regulars had evacuated it which they did about four o'clock Sunday morning after Plundering every thing they wanted without respect to Persons. they were in so great fear of our following them as they quit- ted the Neck that they had filled up the streets in several Places with Old Casks to stop our Progress and ran of with great Haste and all the signs of fear Possible to be shewn. The town of Boston is not so much de- stroy^d as I expected tho' it is destroy^d more at the North and at the south End than any where Else. M^r Cutlers family are well I have din^d there breakfasted and drank there in the afternoon.

Maj^r Chester and myself got Lodgings at M^r Rowes² the first night we enter^d town and had an Offer of a bed there as long as we Should Chuse to stay in town besides we had an Offer of a bed at two other Places at any time when Convenient for us.

I Expect to be with you before the next week is out and Can give you the particulars of three days adventures in town but at Present shall only Subscribe myself your ever dutiful Son,

EB HUNTINGTON

XI. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT ROXBURY March 24th 1776.

Hon^d Sir

I wrote you p^r post since which have rec^d a letter from you p^r M^r W^m Gale and a horse. When I wrote you p^r Post I inform^d you I was that day going to Cambridge to resign my Commission which I thought I should do but when I waited on his Excellency he seemed not a little Surprized that I should wait on him with such a request, and Gave me a very severe Reprimand. After a long talk with the Gen^l he told me that If I could not think better by the time I should wait on him again he would give me a Dismission. Yesterday Brother Jed^d went to Cambridge and saw the Gen^l and talked upon the Subject but did not take a Dismission for me but Obtain^d Liberty of the Gen^l for himself and me to have a furlough as soon as the fleet should sail out of this Harbour whose motion I now await. as soon as they sail, we shall set out for Nor-

¹ According to the returns printed in Force's *Archives*, Fourth Series, IV. 643, Jedidiah Hyde had been a captain in the 22d Continental regiment since January 1, and Ebenezer Huntington his first lieutenant.

² John Rowe, a prominent Boston merchant, whose diary was edited by the late Hon. Edward L. Pierce for the Massachusetts Historical Society; see *Proc.*, Second Series, X. 97, entry for March 18. The house, which stood on the north side of Pond Lane (Bedford Street), was afterwards the home of Prescott the historian; there is a picture of it in the quarto edition of Ticknor's *Life of Prescott*.

³ Jedidiah Huntington, now colonel of the 17th Continental regiment of infantry.

wich. I expect to take your further Directions about Resignation, tho' am determin^d for myself never to act as a Subaltern Officer again and Jed Hyde to have a Captaincy.

I am in all Respects Your Dutiful Son,

EBENEZ^r HUNTINGTON.

XII. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

N YORK CAMP June 23^d 1776.

Hon^d Sir

Your favour of the 11th Instant I have rec^d and several others since I left Norwich which I should have answer^d had I not told my mamma as I left home that I would not write a letter home untill I had the appointment to a Captaincy (unless in a Case of absolute Necessity) which is the only reason.

I have now the pleasure to inform you that there is discover^d the most Hellish and Diabolical Plott^t that ever hath been plann^d since the Powder Plott, that of destroying our Gen^l Officers and Magazines also the City under the guidance of that Infamous Villain Tryon, and we suppose the Mayor of this City² as the Mayor and about thirty others are Confin^d on Suspicion and Suspicion well founded. they had determined to murder our Gen^l Officers when a Signal should be given from the Asia, burn the City blow up the Magazines and attempt to destroy the Army, for which Purpose they had bribed some of the army that they might more Easily effect the Purpose but kind heaven it seemed tho' he Suffer^d them to lay a Plott has interfer^d in our behalf and Sav^d us from those designing Children of the Devil who Plotted our destruction. The Gen^l deeply affected at such a plott has wisely and prudently doubled his Guard in and about the City and ordered patrolling partys to be Patrolling all Night.

Every Precaution which a wise and prudent Gen^l could take, our Worthy Commander has used.

The Company I now Command is the one that I was in before and Cap^t Hyde gone into the Company that was Maj^r Wells. Your Expressions of Fear as to my keeping too much Company, I fear arises from Information as I am Conscientious of doing it formerly, viz on my first Arrival here, but since that have kept but very little. I was Oblig^d to get Seventy two Dollars of Brother when he was here by reason of being oblig^d to board out in the City alth'o at a Private house only my board was £13 15 Y Currency for about five Weeks besides I was necessarily put to Considerable other Expen^{ce}.

I am very sorry that our Assembly did not see fit to Promote some of our Officers here in the Army, upon several Accounts: in the first Place, as I think they most deserve it, in the Next Place it is following the Example of Pennsylvania, who promoted a number of their Officers, who

¹ The Hickey Plot. See *Minutes of the Trial and Examination of Certain Persons* etc. London, 1786.

² David Matthews.

were in the Rifle Battalion at Cambridge, and besides those very men who are now in the army, will have men Come from Connecticut higher in Commision than them who could not have got an Ensigncy last May is a year ago when some that are here had Captaincy's, but I can readily suppose they acted on good Principles.

Maj^r Trumbull¹ has rec^d the Appointment of Dep^y Adj^t Gen^l, that is Adj^t Gen^l for the Northward and sets out to morrow with Gen^l Gates for Quebeck or the Northern Army, and I believe has made a vacancy for my worthy Classmate, Peck,² Adj^t of Col^o Huntingtons Reg^t, or Else, for Keyes, or Charles Whiting, but rather think that Peck will get it.

This from your dutiful Son

EBEN^r HUNTINGTON.

XIII. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT N YORK 10th August 1776

Dear Brother

Yesterday, I wrote you a long letter, and going into the City last Evening, to Col^o Chesters, I lost it in which I Endeavour^d to Clear my Character, for not Writing oftener but it seems I was not permitted to send it. I could wish that I had not lost it, as I think that I should have fully Satisfied you, but never mind that says you, if it is material, give the reasons over again, and so I will part of them. Well then—A regiment of Officers to Quarrel with, who were Continually exerting themselves, to Injure me, and my Character. Can you believe that they went to Every Reg^t on the Ground which is a fact I say and enquir^d the number of Officers from Norwich, then Petition^d to the Gen^l setting forth the Number in s^d Petition, and most Scandalously abusing my Character, to prevent my Getting a Captaincy. but the Gen^l, that Justice might be done, desir^d Gen^{ls} Green and Lord Sterling to decide the dispute, before which Gentlemen M^r Champion and myself, set forth our Pretensions, butt the Regiment hearing that the matter was like to be in my fav^r, drew up another Petition and Presented to the Gentlemen Arbitrators (as soon as we had given our pretensions) unbeknown to me, with every injurious and malicious insinuation against me, that they had ingenuity to invent, setting forth that unless the Captaincy was given to M^r Champion all the Officers in the Reg^t would resign their Commissions, which had the Effect I could wish, for the Gentlemen seeing how they interested themselves, took no notice of it, tho' I had wrote an answer as soon as I found out they had Petition^d, but it was too late as they had determin^d in my fav^r, about as soon as they rec^d the Regimental Petition. After the dispute was settled, I was to receive my Commission but Gen^l Washington being Oblige[d] to go to Philadelphia I did not receive it till June, all which time I had but very little peace from the Officers; so little that I did not

¹ John Trumbull, the painter. See his *Autobiography*, p. 26.

² Trumbull had been brigade-major to General Spencer. His place was filled, July 28, by the promotion of William Peck, Yale 1775, adjutant of the 17th Continental regiment of infantry. Charles Whiting was adjutant of the 22d.

pretend to Walk out, without Sword and Pistols (and well Loaded) as I expected to be Insulted, which had it been the Case, I should have done that which might have given my friends uneasiness, for I was almost as a desperado, but matters are now easy, and I believe I am in a fair way to live unmolested.

Night before last about 1 "Clock all the Regiments in the Lines were order^d out under Arms, to receive orders to lye on their Arms, as the Ships of War in the Edge of the Evening had all hauld without the Transports and they (the Transports) had orders to be Clean ready to receive the troops on board who are now on Staten Island.¹ We Expect an Attack Every high Water, and have the Strictest orders to the Officers and Soldiers not to be absent from Camp without Leave from the Col^l. I am, after giving love and Compliments to friends and Acquaintance,

Your Friendly Brother

EBEN^r HUNTINGTON.

XIV. To JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT N. YORK 5th Sept^r 1776

Hon^d Sir

Three days since I wrote a Letter for you and not knowing any immediate Conveyance I forwarded it to Kingsbridge desiring it might be forwarded p^r the first Opportunity. This will be forwarded as far as Colchester p^r M^r Norton who rides (as Camp Post) from that Place. I believe it may be relied on that those who are missing² from Col^l Huntington's Reg^t are 1 L^t Col^l, 6 Cap^{ts}, 6 L^{ts}, 6 Ens^{es}, 1 Adj^t, 21 Serg^{ts} and 100 Rank and file 2 Drums and fifes. the L^t Col^l³ Cap^t Brewster and Cap^t Bissell we have intelligence from who are Prisoners and Maj^r Wells of Col^l Wyllys's Reg^t. Col^l Clark and Maj^r Wells have wrote p^r flag. Every thing is at this time in a Critical situation but we hope we are able to maintain our Present Post.

On the Even^g following the 2^d Instant at 11 "Clock a Ship of War went up the East River and Came to an Anchor against Turtle Bay where we had about 3; Hundred Bb^s flour Stored. Our People removed all the flour that Night and Next Morning paid her a handsome Salute from two twelve Pounders which were drawn down to the Edge of the River about Day Break. they Hulled her thirteen times which was so disagreeable to her that she Slipped her Cable and Pushed up behind Blackwells Island (an Island which Extends from Hellgate towards N York about three Miles) Just as she Came to Anchor our People had the Good Fortune to heave an Eight Inch Howit through her Side which burst in her Hole. Tho' her Hull was Secured from the Shott from our Cannon Her Riggins

¹ The passage did not in fact take place till August 22.

² As a result of the battle of Long Island, August 27. The return for the 17th Regiment, printed in Force's *Archives*, Fifth Series, III. 717, gives 63 more of the rank and file as missing, but otherwise agrees with the statement made above.

³ Joel Clark.

and Yards were not and this Morning finding that She Could not lye safe at her Station has fell down towards N York about a Mile, against a Spot of Marshy land in hopes we could not molest her. but I am in hopes we shall be Able to do it. Maj^r Crane of the Artillery is Endeavouring to get some Artillery plac^d so as to reach her.¹

Doct^r Turner arrived here Yesterday and Doct^r Lee. Our friends are as well as usual. Poor Militia! they desert, Numbers of them, being very uneasy, their reasons no doubt you will have, as we are in hopes they will not go unask^d and unpunish^d. We hear that Gen^l Lee is on his March and is to be at Elizabethtown this Night (but not from Head Quarters). Col^l Sam^l B. Webb Ad Cong to his Excellency is so unwell as to be Oblig^d to Ride in to the Country.

I am in Health Dear Parent Your

Dutiful Son

EB^r HUNTINGTON.

P S Since I wrote the above I have got the other letter I wrote you 3 days ago and now inclose it.

XV. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT WEST CHESTER, 6th Octo^r 1776

Hon^d and dear Sir

Several of yours have come to hand since which I have not wrote before this, the date of my last I am not able to mention. One of Yours p^r Cap^l Perkins, one p^r Erastus, and one p^r M^r John Leffingwell I have rec^d. the others (if any have come) I do not recollect.

The Resolves of Congress relative to raising of 88 battalions, you have undoubtedly paid attention to before this time.² As the matter is to be under the direction of the Assembly, I hope they will be inform^d as to the Characters of some Particular Officers. Among the Officers, that will be Provided for, I hope that Robert Warner 1st L^t, Elias Stillwell 2^d Lieut, Jonth Hart 2^d Lieut, Sam^l Richards Ensign, and Thomas Hender Ensign, will meet with good Success. several others of my Acquaintance in the Army I might with Propriety mention, but as It would make the matter tedious, I would not do it. I hope, Should I have the Offer of a Captaincy (and nothing better) that I might have the Good Luck to have Warner, Stillwell or Hart and Ensign Richards in my Company.

I have wrote a line to Esq^r Benjⁿ Huntington³ and inclosed it unseal^d hope you will deliver it if it meets with your Approbation. I am dear and Hon^d Sir your dutiful Son

EBEN HUNTINGTON

¹ See Washington's *Writings*, ed. Sparks, IV, 74.

² See *Journals of Congress*, September 16, 1776. These resolves left the appointment of officers, general officers excepted, to the several states.

³ A member of the Connecticut Council of Safety.

XVI. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

CAMP AT WESTCHESTER 11th October 1776*Dear Brother.*

Whether it is through your Negligence, or mine, that so few Letters pass between us, I will not say, but this I can say, that, If it is mine, it has happen^d by reason of duty, in paying attention to the Reg^t as you will readily Imagine, there being not but Nine Officers of my Rank, in the Whole Brigade to do duty. Eleven days of the Nineteen last past I have been on Guard, and not a Letter of yours for a Comforter

I hope that you will be so good, as to write p^r Every Opportunity, and I can Assure you I will Endeavour, that no Opportunity shall Escape me. The Phoenix and two other Ships of War, have Passed our Chevaux de Frize and gone up the North River, and have taken two of our Row Gallies,¹ Fisher in the Crane, and Baker in the Indepen[den]ce are the Gallies that have fell into their hands besides some small Craft. the Ships with their Prizes now lie against Tarry Town, in Toppon Bay, about 10 Miles above Kingsbridge. Two Ships yesterday Came to Anchor in Harlem River, nigh the Ship, that has been there some time since. When the Ships went up the River on Wednesday there was as Brisk Firing of Cannon as need be, but never a Man hurt as I have yet hear^d of. I am dear Sir your Friendly Brother

EB HUNTINGTON.

XVII. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

PEEKS KILL 25th Nov^r 1776*Hon^d Sir*

This comes p^r M^r Grover, who can better tell you News from this Post than myself. The Anxiety I am in for the raising of a new Army is not small but to parents I think I have an undoubted right to write freely. the present appearance is very Gloomy, the British troops making head wherever they attempt, our people instead of behaving like brave men, behave like Rascalls, and to add to that, it seems that the British Troops had gone into the Jerseys, only to receive the Submission of the whole Country. People Join them almost in Captains Companies to take the oath of allegiance. besides those of the Militia who have been sent for our Assistance, leave us the minute their times are out and would not stay tho' their eternal Salvation was to be forfeited if they went home; The Perswasion of a Cicero would not any more Effect their tarry than the Niagara falls would the Kindling of a Fire. besides the slow Progress of a new army, seems as though the few that remain till the first of January, are to fall a Sacrifice to the British Savages. Dear Father, no Man unless on the Spott can have a tolerable Idea of it. Our Stores lost without an Exchange of a Shott. A Hell itself could not furnish worse beings than Subsist in the world where our army are now posted. I am dear Sir in Great fear for our Political Salvation while I subscribe myself your Dutiful Son

EBEN^r HUNTINGTON.¹ Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 68, 69.

XVIII. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

PEEKS KILL 2^d Dec', 1776*Dear Father*

As the Gen^l has this day order^d an Express to the Gov. I thought it my duty to inform you that I am well. as to acknowledging the receipt of your favours, it is not in my Power for I do not receive any. two days ago I forwarded some letters from Col^o Huntington to Col^o Trumbull to be forwarded. hope you will receive them by the time this reaches you.

Gen^l Lee and Sullivan with their Division are this day Crossing the Ferry nigh this Place going to the Jersies.¹ Col^o Chester is with them and very well. Brother Joshua was well Yesterday. About twenty Reg^{ts} from the Northward who were dismissed were Returning and hearing our Situation in the Jersies, were by Order of Gen^l Gates Embodied, and are marching to Join Gen^l Washington ; by this time we have reason to believe, are Join^d, Gen^l Gates, and Arnold at their head. Rogers who Commanded the Rangers in the british Service is Disgraced.²

A flag which went in two days ago to the Enemy were (by being Oblig^d to wait an answer) Spectators of a Scene which is pleasing. The Persons who went in with the flag were sitting in Company with a Col^o M'Donald and some other Officers and in comes Rogers, with his hatt on, says, how do you do Gentlemen (meaning our flag of truce) but no reply was made, except by Col M'Donald, who says, you Dam^d Rascal, why do you Presume to wear your hatt, among Gentlemen. if you are not out of the Room immediately I will kick you out, accordingly he went out. Col^o M'Donald followed him and not shutting the door after them Col^o M'Donald was hear^d to say, that you are an Insolent Rascal and if you Ever come into Gentlemans Company again, Where I am, I will Cane You as long as I can feel You. Rogers's Reg^t is taken from him and given to another Officer.³

I am dear Sir Your Dutiful Son

EB. HUNTINGTON.

XIX. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

PEEKS KILL 3d December 1776

Dear Father

Yesterday I wrote you p^r Express which was going to the Governour, since which nothing material has turn^d up. The Divisions under the Command of Gen^l Lee and Sullivan, which were at this place when I wrote you before, have not Entirely passed the Ferry. Chester Passed Yesterday. M^r Carpenter is now at this place. he left Col^o Huntington

¹ Heath to Washington, December 2. Force's *Archives*, Fifth Series, III. 1041.

² The celebrated Robert Rogers, who had broken his parole and accepted the command of the "Queen's Rangers." Washington's *Writings*, ed. Sparks, IV. 521. See also Trumbull to Cooke, Force, Fifth Series, III. 1077.

³ It was not until the autumn of 1777 that the command of the "Queen's Rangers" was given to Simcoe.

Yesterday at his Station¹ he was hearty and well. The slow progress of enlisting men makes me feel Anxious for the 1st of January, for sad Experience teaches me that Troops will not tarry after the time of Enlistment expires, tho' death stares them in the Face returning to their Homes. I am Informed that Maj^r Wells who was taken prisoner at Long Island,² came Yesterday to Gen^l Spencer's Quarters at White Plains on Parole. what news he brings out do not Learn. I am dear Sir Your Dutiful Son

EB. HUNTINGTON.

XX. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

PARARMUS 19th Dec^r 1776

* Hon^d Sir

I have the pleasure to inform you that last sunday We had the Satisfaction of Marching into Hackinsack, in which Place we found many Arms &C and warlike stores a few. Rum, sugars, and a Great plenty of Wine. about 60 disaffected persons were taken up in a few hours, but the Gen^l finding so great a number of these People, that it would take all his division to guard them, we took about 8 Prisoners of War in and about that Place.³

The Brave Gen^l Lee was made Prisoner about Six days since by a Party of the Enemies light Horse (on his march to Join Gen Washington) about 70 Miles in the Rear of his Division. There has been several Skirmishes If we may believe Report between some Militia Reg^t and the Regulars one Skirmish Certain, not very unfavourable to the Militia. the Militia took a large drove of Cattle and Sheep from the Regulars, 317 Sheep and the Rest were Cattle they had Collected for the use of their Army. Last Night we had intelligence that the Enemy were marching to Hackinsack from New York, and had got to a bridge within about 5 Mile of Hackinsack, called Acquaconack Bridge. We have no reason to doubt the truth of it, and without doubt I may be able in my next to give you some account of an Action between the Division of Gen^l Heath and their party under Col^l Leslie.⁴

I had like to have forgot to acknowledge the Receipt of two of your fav^{rs} of the 8th and 11th instant, am very sorry that you could not have fav^d me with news that the Enemy had landed at Newport and that they were dislodged by the Militia. Our troops or rather the troops under Gen^l Heath have this day been Reinforced by about 1200 Militia under the Command of Gen^l George Clinton one of the best of Men. Gen^l Washingtons Army lye on the other side of the Delaware but his head Quarters 12 Miles beyond at Bristol. Do not let the Matter about Gen^l

¹ Col. Jedidiah Huntington was at this time encamped at Ramapo in Orange County, Force, III. 1039, 1072.

² Major Levi Wells of the 22d Continental infantry.

³ See Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 99, 100, and Heath to Washington, December 15, in Force, III. 1234.

⁴ Heath, p. 102.

Lee be mention^d as from me unless you have hear^d it some other way, as it will rather discourage the Country than otherwise. Col^o Huntington is well at this Place where we live happily. Good Living and in the best Country in the World.

Tell Mamma that I have two Pounds of good green tea which I will send her p^r first Opportunity. Compliments to all friends while I subscribe myself your Dutiful Son

EB HUNTINGTON

XXI. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

WETHERSFIELD 27th April 1777

Dear Brother

Col^o Huntington informs me that the present week is the time fixed on for you to be married.¹ I am sorry to inform you that the Prospect of my being with you at that time is small, by reason of my Col^o being absent, and of Course much business is on my hands which requires attention to, yet not despairing of my paying one Nights Visit at Norwich this Week. Should I be disapointed of seeing a brother (whose affections I ever had the good fortune to share) engage under the Sacred Bands of marriage it will not in the least diminish my Affections for him or his dear Partner, but tho' absent and not the Pleasure but of a small acquaintance with the Person engaged to, yet that small acquaintance very agreeable, I shall wish them to enjoy every Happiness this world affords. I wish she may prove a kind and Affectionate Mother to the tender Offspring of a former and most agreeable Parent (of which I do nor will not, entertain the least doubt) and a Partner to you whom you will ever love, and in whose Company you will ever be happy. had you never known the happiness of a Married State I as a Brother might have said many things to you, which now would be very improper.

Was I not engaged in the Military line a few weeks would let me know the happiness attending the Married state, which I doubt not is great as I think the Satisfaction of unbosoming oneself to a Partner who could and would share the Good and ill Fortune attending us in this world is far beyond what a Single Life affords or can do. after wishing Miss Phelps and Yourself Happiness I subscribe myself your Friendly Brother

EB HUNTINGTON

XXII. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

KING STREET 9th November 1777.

Dear Brother

I wrote you the 2^d of this Month from Fish Kills, and would have acknowledged the Rec^d of your last, did I not believe I had done it 3 Weeks ago. It would be Conferring a great favour on me if you

¹ Andrew Huntington was married on May 1, 1777, to his second wife, Hannah Phelps, of Stonington.

would as often as once a Week give me the Domestick News, and not neglect me because you dont receive my letters. you shall not have reason to blame me for Neglect, for I assure you I will write (as I ever have done) p^r every Opportunity If time can be got. In one of my former letters, I beg^d the favour of you to desire Col^o Abbott to make me a Pair of Elegant Leather Breeches (White) and don't recollect you have ever acknowledged the Receipt of the same. I wish that the Breeches might be Procured, let the price be what it will, it matters not. I wish to hear what becomes of the Privateer whether you have hear^d from her, since she left Boston, as You in your last favour inform^d me, that she was Repair^d and would soon leave Boston for a Cruise. Hath any Prize ever arriv^d that she hath taken? What is the Value? Should there arrive any Articles in any of the Prizes, which we want in the Army, wish you to procure them for the Use of this Regiment. Although I expect to leave this Regiment and the Army, before the Opening of another Years Campaign, still I have a desire to procure every article which the Reg^t may stand in Need of. I wish you to present my love to Sister H, and the rest of the Good people, whom I am determin^d to pay a Visit to in the Course of this Winter. I am dear Brother, Yours Affectionately

EBEN^r HUNTINGTON.

Deserters say that the Inhabitants in N York are putting their Effects on board Ship (very uncertain). Rivington has publish^d Burgoynes Capitulation at Large and not a Comment on them, in his Paper Acknowledges the Destruction of two ships at the Chevaux de frize one a 64 the other I forget.¹

Since friend Leonard hath been at the Northward, he hath fought a Duel, no person hurt on either side.

XXIII. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

CAMP WARREN 21st Sept^r 1778.

My Dear Brother

Your favour of the 12th instant was handed me this day, indors^d on the back as forwarded by two Diff^t Gentleman, one at Pomphrett, and the other a Cap^t Wallace at Providence, by which you may Judge, how direct Letters Come to me. this is the first I have rec^d from you, notwithstanding that, had it been in my power to have wrote you, I would have done it with the Utmost pleasure. As to the particulars on the Island, I was (for want of time when Opportunity Offered) Oblige[d] to Refer my Father to a letter of Col^o Trumbulls to the Governour,² without giving him any of the particulars, which I could have wished to have done. As to the Bills you gave me, against M^r Whittlesey, I have Collected them and will inclose you the Money, the first Opportunity. I am very glad to hear so much Credit given the Militia for the Readiness

¹ The *Augusta*, 64, and the *Merlin*, 18, destroyed October 23, 1777, after the fight at Red Bank. Sparks, V. 113.

² See the *Autobiography* of John Trumbull, pp. 51-57.

they shew to prevent the Landing of the Enemy at N London (or rather I am *happy* to think they deserve it). I have hear^d that Father took his Head Quarters at M^r Shaws. It would have Afforded me much Satisfaction to have been in his family, on such an Occasion. I am very happy to hear that the Reports which have been Circulated, of the Action of the 29th of last Month¹ have been to the Advantage of the Reg^t, but it affords me equal pleasure, to hear that my Conduct on that Day was as Satisfactory to my friends. I Cannot but Blend the Credit of the Reg^t, and my own, if any due me, together, as the Command of the Reg^t during and Just before the Action, Devolved on me, (with two field Pieces of Artillery, and about forty men of Col^o Jacksons Reg^t, who had been detach^d in the early part of the day, as a Covering party to them) as Col^o Livingston² had left the Reg^t and rode over to the Left, to see how the Action went on, and in his Absence, rec^d a Slight Wound, by which Means he did not join the Reg^t till the Action was over, which lasted very heavy about Nine Minutes at about fifteen Rods Distance; the rest of the time was rather at Long Shott than Otherwise. It was rather an injury to the troops, who were not Engaged, as they shewed themselves desirous of a share in the Glory, and would have done honour to themselves had they had an Opportunity. The troops universally behav^d well, as far as I could make my Observations.

As to Burning Bedford,³ it appears to me one of the most Wanton Acts of Cruelty they have been Guilty of, as they met with not the least opposition, Tho' they are Capable of doing anything that the Devil Can Suggest. It is my wish, that should the fortune of War heave that Rascal, Gray, into our hands, that he should be burnt alive, in a Manner agreeable to the Indian Custom. I wish you would give me a little Account of Leonardus, as I hear his Movements have been rather Eccentric, than Otherwise. Domestick News, if any at all, as it affords me much Pleasure to hear anything in the Domestick way. I expect to set out for Boston to Morrow, or Next Day, to obtain Cloathing for the Reg^t if so, I shall be absent about Six Days, a disagreeable Piece of Business, as I must necessarily Expend much Money in doing the Business for the Reg^t, which will be lost, besides the trouble of following the Clothiers, whom I look upon to have been one of the Greatest Set of Rascals, the Publick have paid, tho' I flatter myself they are now much better since Congress have discharged the Head (*M^r Mease*)⁴ whom I look upon as a great Rascal. I have lengthened my Letter to such a Degree that you will be Impatient, tho' I should have gone further had not business intervened to prevent it.

¹ Battle of Rhode Island.

² Lieutenant-Colonel William S. Livingston, commanding the regiment during Colonel Webb's continued detention as a prisoner.

³ New Bedford, Mass., burned September 6 by Major-General Charles Grey, afterward the first Earl Grey.

⁴ An error. James Mease, clothier-general, offered his resignation by letter of September 19; but Congress on the 21st deferred consideration of it. *Journals*, III. 64.

Give my Respects to the Good General and his Lady, and Affectionate Remembrances to the Circle, and believe me

Your truly Affectionate Brother

EB HUNTINGTON

XXIV. TO JABEZ HUNTINGTON.

Hon^d Sir

QUARTERS WARREN 21st Dec^r 1778

For what reason I have so long Neglected to write to you, I know not. I now think it high time, and to inform you that we (the Connecticut Officers at this post) wait most Anxiously to know, what you will do, in your next Session. For your Conduct, in some measure, will Regulate ours. if you do any thing Spiritedly, we may Remain in Service, but if you do not, I believe the Greater part of Col^o Webbs Reg^t will resign, and I don't know but two thirds of them.

The People of Connecticut when at this Post, tell us, the Army must be made good, and the Country are all of that Opinion, and yet do nothing. If you mean to do anything, do it soon. Convince us you have not forgot us, which we have some reason to believe. Almost two Years have Passed, when we have been buoyed up with Promises at Loose Ends, (by the people in General). if you intend to feed us any Longer with Promises, you must at Least, have some formality in passing them. Procrastination is Dangerous, and more so at this time than Usual, we doubt the Willingness of our Countrymen to assist us. You cannot blame us. Our Money gone, our friends few, or none who will Lend money. Indeed we think hard that our Wages are not made at least so good as to Support us. The bare Idea of Fifty Dollars p^r Month is nothing, and my Wages is no More, it will Scarcely support me a Week, in addition to the Ration I draw. Notwithstanding the Money is so much Depreciated, almost everyone is lending a helping hand, while the Loss falls almost Entirely on the Army, who serve at fixt Wages, and who ought not to suffer in the Least by the Depreciation of the Currency. You Resolved in your Last Sessions,¹ that the Soldiers family should be Supplied, whether they sent Money or not, but it is not done, nor will it be done. Not a Day Passes my head, but some Soldier with Tears in his Eyes, hands me a letter to read from his Wife Painting forth the Distresses of his family in such strains as these, "I am without bread, and Cannot get any, the Committee will not Supply me, my Children will Starve, or if they do not, they must freeze, we have no wood, neither Can we get any. *Pray Come home.*" These Applications Affect me, my Ears are not, neither shall they be shutt to such Complaints. they are Injurious, they wound my feelings, and while I have Tongue or Pen I will busy myself to stir up my Countrymen to act like men, who have all at Stake, and not think to enrich themselves, by the Distresses of their brave Countrymen, in the Field. It hath been Practiz^d too long. Dont drive us to Despair, we are now on the Brink. De-

¹ See *Public Records of the State of Connecticut*, II. 134, 135.

pend upon it we cannot put up with such treatment any Longer. Spare yourselves, by Rewarding the brave.

Your Affectionate Son

E HUNTINGTON

XXV. TO JOSHUA HUNTINGTON.

Dear Brother

TIVERTON 3^d May 1779

Your favour p^r Serg^t Williams came safe to hand, as did Seven of the Eight Hams mention^d to be sent Cap^t Waterman and the bundle of Cloth; I have Settled the matter with Comm^r Southwick, and shall Inclose you his receipt p^r next Opportunity in fav^r of M^r Fanning.

I am not much disappointed in hearing of the Fate of our Privateer Trumbull, as it is my hard fate to be Unlucky in Privateering. It shall not give me a moments uneasiness, as I am in a fair way of making a fortune, If I only can Continue in the Army two Years longer, as I receive Eighty dollars in Wages and Subsistence, Monthly, and since at this post have spent it weekly. We have been without bread or Rice more than five days out of seven, for these three Weeks past, and the Prospect remains as fair as it hath been. Excuse me in giving you a list of Prices, or Account Courant. Potatoes 24 Dollars p^r Bushel, Eggs 18^s p^r Dozⁿ, Veal 5^s p^r lb, and that to be bought but Seldom, Butter 18^s p^r lb and that more Seldom than Veal. Oysters nor fish to be Purchased at Present, nor have been for this fortnight past. Rum 2 Dollars p^r Jill. The Provisions we draw hath been Chiefly Salt Beef, and that alone without bread or Potatoes is tedious. It appears to me that unless the Army is better Supplied, you had better disband them now, rather than fill the Regiments. I have been as unwilling to hear trifling Complaints as any person, but had my feelings been harden^d with Steel, they would have been soften^d, by the too Just and Repeated Complaints of those who seldom Murmur. If the Fault lies at the door of any Individual, deliver him to us for a Sacrifice, as it would be more acceptable to us, if we must be starved, first to imbrue our hands in the Blood of him who brought us to it. If it is the Depreciation of the Money you are all alike Guilty, and ought to be Slaves to all Eternity to those who dare Contend for freedom. Notwithstanding the Currency is as bad or worse than nothing, the Whole department are in Arrears for Six Months and one Brigade for Seven. Hitherto the Regiment have been kept together but I dare not be answerable till tomorrow Morn^g.

This whole part of the Country are Starving for want of bread. they have been drove to the necessity of Grinding Flaxseed and oats together for bread. Is it not Possible for the State to do something else besides Promises. Promises can not feed or Clothe a Man always, Performance is sometimes necessary to make a man believe you intend to Perform. Let us await if Possible the Event of the next Session, and Possibly Hatters and Wire drawers Can effect what wise men Cannot.

Your affectionate Brother,

E. HUNTINGTON.

I got into such a Passion that I Closed my letter before I thought of it. —I wish to know about a Horse, can you get me one at any price, nothing less than 1500 Dollars will purchase one fit to ride in this part of the World. The Evening of the 2^d Instant Eight of the Enemies Boats attempted to land about Six Miles up Taunton River, but were discover^d on which they pushed off and Returned. Nothing further worth mentioning. Love to the Circle. Yours Sincerely

EB.

XXVI. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

MORRIS TOWN 8th Feb^r 1780

Dear Sir

Your favors of the 4th and 10th Ult^a came safe to hand, tho rec^d only three days since. at the time I rec^d them I was on the lines, but have since been reliev^d.

As I have been on duty so much for four Weeks past, I have not been able to get my Hutt Compleated but am now paying my utmost attention to it and am in hopes to get it Compleated by the first of next Month, if the Weather is favorable.¹ at present I have taken Quarters in one of the Officers Hutts, where I expect to remain till my own is so far finish^d as to move into it. I observe that in your letter you mention about being Continued in the 3^d Class of the Lottery. I wish it by all means, beg you would pay attention to it for me.

I have not been able to hear a line from my good father since I left Norwich, and as I left him much unwell am very Anxious, he used to write me and as I have rec^d no line from him have Supposed that his Indisposition is greater than when I left him. I wish you would write to me particularly about him. We have nothing new in this part of the World. as to the Excursion the Enemy made at Elizabethtown, you must have had the Particulars in the Newspapers, as it hath been Published and very Exactly. Congress are now deliberating about the Reduction of some of the Reg^{ts}. what Reg^{ts} or what number will be reduc^d, I know not but suppose and wish the Greater part, as I think it very unnecessary and Expensive to keep so great a Number of Officers in Service and so few Men. Possibly I shall be one of the Number, wish it may be the Case, as I think it would be very agreeable to live at Ease, and Quietness, once more (free from the Noise and Din of Arms) and restore an Injured Constitution, too much worn in the Service of an Ungrateful Country. I think this Winter must have been a very agreeable one with you; Horses in plenty and good Sleighing, a happy Circle, plenty of the Necessaries and Comforts of life, and so free from Business as to have nothing Interfere with your Pleasures, except the Ill health of our good father should damp them.

You ask me what Number of Troops have gone from N York, who Commanded them and where bound. The Number is uncertain, Sir Henry

¹ Cf. Ebenezer Huntington's letters of January 22 and February 16 in the *Correspondence of Samuel B. Webb*, II. 242, 247.

is gone in Person, and I believe without any doubt bound to the Southward.¹

I wish my love and Respects to those with you and to whom due.

I am dear Brother

Yours Affectionately,

EBEN^r HUNTINGTON

XXVII. To—————

MOUNT PLEASANT, HUTTS 11th May 1780

Dear Sir

By a letter from Mamma rec^d some days since I find that you suppose me indebted to you for several letters, I may be for letters wrote but not for letters rec^d. I have rec^d but few letters from my friends since I left Connecticut and a *very few of them* from Norwich. I understand by a line from Brother Jedⁿ that his Waggon is to move towards Camp as soon as the Grass hath grown suff^r to subsist the Horses. I wish it may be soon, as I expect some stores in it. With an Expectation that I may have an Opportunity of getting a Hatt when made, I wish you to get me an Elegant beaver one made, by Kinsman or such other person as you may think proper, I wish it *very large and well made*, the Size of the Crown is rather smaller than Brother Joshuas, more than Commonly deep, and not Cock^d, that part I will do myself. I wish it may be done by the 1st of June. I am not entirely without Expectation of a Visit into Connecticut, if I should do it I shall spare a day for my Norwich friends.

Col^o Grovener waiting Obliges me to Close by saying that I am dear Sir

Yours Sincerely,

EBEN^r HUNTINGTON

XXVIII. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

BUSH HUTTS N. Jersey, 4 Miles from

Posaick falls, July 7th 1780

Dear Sir

I must Acknowledge some letters from my Norwich friends, among which one from you, which should have been acknowledg^d before this, but our very rascally Situation will not admit of any Conveniency for writing, this I write on my knee. We took the field the 7th of last Month, not from Inclination but from Necessity, as the Enemy moved so near our Hutts as Oblig^d us to send our Baggage into the Rear, and for want of tents, and teams to Carry them, we have lain in the Woods without any Covering but what the Almighty gives the Brute Creation to which State we verge fast. Our whole Army when Collected amounted to about $\frac{2}{3}$ ^{ds} of the force of the Enemy. When the Enemy first landed and advanced they were much harras^d by the Militia, which or some other

¹The allusion is to Sir Henry Clinton's expedition against Charleston.

reason induced the Enemy to burn wherever they went. after lying in N Jersey some time they Manoeuvred as tho' they intended a move up the N River, in Consequence of which his Excellency march^d toward W Point, with 5 Brigades, leaving behind Maxwells and Starks Brigades. the 23^d the Enemy movd from Elizabethtown (to which Place they had Previously retir^d.) towards Springfield where our troops lay except Parties advanc^d, our People fought them as they advanc^d, but when they had got to Springfield they endeavour^d to turn our left flank at the same time pushing a heavy Column towards our Centre. our troops Repuls^d them on the left, tho' the Enemy gain^d the Pass in the Centre after about 40 Minutes very heavy firing. Col^o Angells Reg^t with some small detachments from the line fought their main force during the 40 minutes. Col^o Angells Reg^t lost 41 killed and Wounded out of about 160, Officers Included. the Enemy suffer^d much by their own accounts. our troops behav^d well and receiv^d the thanks of Gen^l Green, and the Commander in Chief. about 3 o'Clock P M they retir^d, our people harassing their Rear, untill they had got within their lines which they had hove up on Elizabeth town Point. the night following they Retreated to Staten Island, and the 25th we began our March to join the Main Army which lay at Ramapough, except the Connecticut line which had moved on to W Point. We lie in the Woods as dated in the beginning of the letter, hoping to be able to have tents in a few days. The Rascally Stupidity which now prevails in the Country at large is beyond all description. they Patiently see our Illustrious Commander at the Head of 2,500 or 3,000 Ragged, tho' Virtuous and good Men, be oblig^d to put up with what no troops ever did before. Why don't you Reinforce your Army, feed them Clothe and pay them, why do you Suffer the Enemy to have a foot hold on the Continent? You Can prevent it, send your Men to the field, believe you are Americans, not suffer yourselves to be dup^d into the thought that the french will relieve you and fight your Battles, it is your own Supineness that Induc^d Congress to ask foreign Aid, it is a Reflection too much for a Soldier. You dont deserve to be freemen unless you can obtain it yourselves. when they arrive they will not put up with such treatment as your Army have done they will not serve Week after Week, without Meat without Cloathing, and paid in filthy rags. I despise my Countrymen, I wish I could say I was not born in America. I once gloried in it but am now ashamed of it. If you do your duty, tho' late, you may finish the War this Campaign, you must Immediately fill your Regiments, and pay your troops in Hard Money, they cannot exist as Soldiers otherwise.

The Insults and Neglects which the Army have met with from the Country, Beggars all description. it must Go no farther, they can endure it no longer. I have wrote in aⁿ Passion, Indeed I am scarce ever free from it. I am in Rags, have lain in the Rain on the Ground for 48 hours past, and only a Junk of fresh Beef and that without Salt to dine on this day, rec^d no pay since last December, Constitution complaining, and all this for my Cowardly Countrymen who flinch at the very time when their

Exertions are wanted, and hold their Purse Strings as tho' they would Damn the World, rather than part with a Dollar to their Army.

I will leave this page and ask your attention to the next. Inclosed you will receive an Order on Elijah Hubbard Esq^r Middletown for £3,000 which I wish to be prov^d and laid out for me in Cloathing, agreeable to following invoice. 3 and $\frac{1}{2}$ Yards Superfine Blue B^d Cloth, 7 dozⁿ best white C^t Buttons for the same, 3 Yards Superfine White B^t Cloth, Lining for two Coats, Lining for two Jackets, indeed everything to make up the Cloth for Coats and the Under dress, also white Linning, proper for 4 Vests and 4 breeches, 3 pr boot Stockings thread, the Hatt I wrote for some time since. If I have Credit or can possibly obtain it for these Articles I wish them immediately, the sooner the better, my Red Coats I Cannot wear. Pray exert yourself for them, I stand in great need of everything mentioned.

Yours &c.

EB HUNTINGTON

Make my love, Compliments &c to my friends and believe that I much wish to see them and have for five Weeks expected it, but am now induced to believe I shall not see you soon.—Adieu.

XXIX. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.¹

WETHERSFIELD 27th November 1780

Dear Sir

By a letter from Major Talmadge, we are inform^d that last Week he went over to Long Island with a Party of 80 Men, that he marched to a place called Coram about 16 Miles from where he landed, indeed twas almost across the Island, where he attack^d Fort S^t George Garrison^d with 60 Men, Carried it and took about 40 Prisoners; on his Return to his boats, he burnt a Magazine of Forage of about 300 tons of Hay and return^d safe. in taking the Fort he had one man Wounded, tho' Slightly.²

Let me tell you this Town are about Procuring two fine Shirts for each of their Officers in the Line of the Army. Pray dont be behind hand (I want a Couple) in doing good.

Congress have given, or rather resolved to give each of the Lads who took Andre, 200 dollars Annually in Specie for Life, and have order^d a Silver Medal to be given each of them, with a Copy of the Resolve in their favor. By letters from Camp, I find that I am Arranged on the New Establishment, which is by no means pleasing; I have wrote my friends in hopes to get it Altered but fear I shall not be able.

After wishing my love to you I Subscribe myself, Yours Sincerely,

EBEN HUNTINGTON

¹ Cf. letter of the same day to Webb, in *Correspondence of Samuel B. Webb*, II. 314.

² See Thompson's *Long Island*, II. 484.

XXX. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

HARTFORD 2^d March 81*Dear Brother*

Your favor respecting the State Notes was duly rec^d. at present the treasurer will not do anything about them. he says he can not untill some other business is Compleated, nor can he tell how soon it will be in his power. I rec^d a line from Brother Joshua respecting a small Bill for Paper supplied the Forts at N London, the Committee of Pay table will give no orders in Conti: for that reason I have return^d the Bill by Doctor Turner that it may be properly made in State Money as that is the only Currency which the pay table will give orders in. I have also enclosed three setts of Bills for 12 dollars each in favor of Brother Jed^b also his Certificate, which beg you to deliver him, his other Matters which he wrote me about I shall attend to. (One letter to the family must excuse me at this time). I wish Brother Joshua to raise me £50 Solid. if it can be done no other way he must sell one of my State Notes, for as much as it will fetch if it is not above £50 State Money. I must raise that sum in hand at all Hazards.

With the most Affectionate feelings to the families I Subscribe myself

Your very Humble Serv^t

EBEN. HUNTINGTON.

State Money at Hartford is two and a half for one Conti: 75.

XXXI. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.

LIGHT INFANTRY CAMP DOBES FERRY

*Dear Sir*August 2^d 1781.

Since I left Norwich, I have not been favored with a line from you, but by letters lately rec^d from Sister Nancy^t by Brother Jed^b, am inform^d my friends are in Usual health, and that no material Alteration has taken place in respect to our good Father. hope you will be able to inform me he has recover^d his Usual Health and Spirits. Nothing has happen^d lately worthy your information. Our Kingsbridge Expedition you must have long since had the Particulars of. hope soon to give you some intelligence of Consequence, altho at Present we remain very peaceable in Camp. The Enemy have no post without Kingsbridge except a small Garrison in Fort N 8, which is on (or rather near) Harlem Creek about a mile below Kingsbridge towards Morissania. they very seldom venture out more than a Mile this side Kingsbridge towards our Camp, except the Horse Thieves of Delancys.

From the Repeated Promises of his Excellency the Governor and Council to the Committee previous to their leaving Connecticut, we have from time encouraged the Officers and Soldiers to wait with Patience, and that they would without any Doubt receive some Money soon; they

^t Ann Moore, second wife of General Jedidiah Huntington.

have waited with earnestness, but are now almost outrageous. They Complain of the Ill Usage they receive from the State. the More they Suffer the More the State insults them by their Neglect, you have no right to expect their Services a Moment Longer. they have served you from the 1st of Jan^y 77 and have rec^d but just their Wages for 77. the rest is due. you Obligated them to Loan you two Years, and now withhold the Interest; They have since the Loaning of those two Years served you 18 Months, and have rec^d three months Nominal Pay in Old Continental Money (at 75 for one). we have born till we can bear no longer. you must pay us in Solids, or find other Servants, and those who ask no Wages. If we meet with such Treatment from you when our services are so much wanted, what can we expect at the Close of the Campaign (should it be Glorious) when you have no further need of our Services, but Insult and Injury, in a triplicate Proportion from what we have already rec^d should it be in your power, to inflict so great an Allowance from a Store which ought to be exhausted. We are serving with the French Army where the Officers dine in Luxury and give us frequent invitations to their tables, we can't go to them, because we can not return the Compliment. Cloath feed and Pay us and you may have any Services you wish, but you must not expect nor shall you receive but little more without. I do not aim at you personally, I can excuse you and many more, but the State at large, don't deserve freedom, nor no other People on Earth, who are neither willing to Contend for Freedom Personally, or pay those who will defend their Cowardly Souls. Think one Moment at the very time you ought to have had your troops all in the field Cloath^d and Disciplined (will say no more about pay) you are just forwarding your *three Months Men*, and these to be the Subject of the Drill during their Service.

Excuse me I am warm, and angry at the State, but still am yours Sincerely.

This letter will not be signed nor will you need any signature to know the Writer.

My Love to your good Lady and the rest of the Circle.

Joshua was to have forwarded some Salt fish and a Cag of Wine, I have hear^d nothing about them since I left Norwich tho' should be very happy to, or even to know whether they have been forwarded and are safe.

XXXII. TO ANDREW HUNTINGTON.¹

CAMP BEFORE YORK 10th October 1781

Dear Sir

Ten days since I wrote you by some Seamen bound to N London and Norwich who had been Captured at Sea by the Enemy and re-captured by our good Allies and Landed in this State, that they might

¹ Four subsequent letters (to Webb, 1782) are printed in the latter's correspondence, II. 387, 393, 401, 404.

return to their friends. at the time I wrote we had but just Disembarked in James River after coming down the Bay from the Head of Elk, since which I think I wrote, but by what Conveyance or when am not able to say. this will be forwarded to Gen^l Huntington, who takes Charge of all my letters bound farther Eastward. Since I wrote you we have removed as you see by the date of this. on our Approach the Enemy evacuated their outworks and began Strengthening their more interior ones. we have alter^d their abandoned out works, and turn^d them against York and since then run our first Parallel and built our Batteries on it and open^d them Yesterday. at present we have about 30 heavy pieces open^d on the town, but in 6 Days more unless his Lordship Complains of our fire, we shall have upwards of Ninety including Mortars to tieze him with, which must Inevitably from his Situation oblige him to Surrender.

Yours sincerely without Signature

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

European History; An Outline of Its Development. By GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, Professor of History in Yale University. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1899. Pp. vii, 577.)

THIS little book is evidently primarily intended for the use of secondary schools where about a year is given to the study of the history of European civilization, and it is probably the best of its kind. The most successful books of the sort have hitherto been written by persons who did not know much history but did know how to make a text-book. Real historians are very rarely good makers of text-books. That Professor Adams is a good historian no one is likely to dispute; that he is a good maker of text-books he has shown before. Having previous knowledge of his capacity in both respects, one cannot be surprised at the excellence of this small manual.

The plan of the book is excellent. The material is well chosen, and the apparatus for more extensive study of the subject is judiciously indicated. The style is luminous and interesting, and the faults of the book are such as are inherent to such an undertaking and to the limitations of any human intelligence. No two men would choose to select the same material in constructing such a work, but no one can doubt that this selection is on the whole satisfactory; the references to works for further study are thoroughly good, though not exactly the same that anyone else would have made.

The author in his preface expresses the hope that his book "will be found of special value by the teacher who has escaped from the bondage of text-book recitations, as fortunately most teachers of history have now done." In other words, he hopes that it will be of special use to teachers of history who know some history. Doubtless it will. While a thoroughly equipped teacher of history can get along with a very poor text-book, there is no one who appreciates a good text-book so much. But Professor Adams seems to have an undue respect for the attainments of most of the teachers in the secondary schools. It is only a few years ago that a knowledge of history was considered entirely unnecessary for the teaching of history in these schools, and this condition of things has not altogether passed away. It is still the case that "most teachers of history" are such, simply because they have some time to spare from the teaching of other things. There are now many good teachers of history in the preparatory schools, but they are still in the minority. To these this book will be of great value; to the others it will be of less use than a worse book.

To illustrate at once the difficulty of the task which Professor Adams has undertaken, and the relation of such work to the efficiency or inefficiency of the teachers who may use it, I will call attention to a singular inadvertence. The author, in telling the story of Rome, has, of course, repeatedly to refer to the Senate. Yet nowhere does he tell what the Senate was, how it was constituted, who were its members, what were its functions, and what changes it underwent. This omission illustrates the fact that one cannot write the history of European civilization in one small volume, and remember to put in everything which will explain what he does put in. It may be expected that a good teacher will notice the defect and remedy it for his pupils, although it is quite possible for a good teacher not to notice it, and to leave it unexplained, as so good a teacher as Professor Adams has done, and his pupils are likely to have a very vague notion of that difficult subject, the Roman constitution. In the hands of a poor teacher (and there are more of these than the author seems to suspect), the book would fail utterly in this particular respect.

It ought to be said that such defects are rare in the book. For the most part, such subjects as are mentioned at all are made perfectly clear, or at least as clear as the limits will permit. Perhaps this clarity is most evident in the account of the Middle Age, which is commonly to young pupils the most tangled period of all history. The illuminating work which Professor Adams has hitherto done in this field has given him peculiar fitness to tell the story fully in brief space. Altogether the book is a pleasant one to read for anyone, and probably pleasanter for those who know something of history than for those who do not.

The excellent press-work calls for notice, and the illustrations are, for the most part, well done and helpful; some of them would be more so, if there were an indication of where they came from.

It is an interesting fact, and one of great significance, that in writing the history of Europe the author has not been able to keep America out of his book. It is not only that he cannot omit reference to the more salient points of contact between the two continents in discovery, international politics and war, but he finds in the development of America and American civilization an integral part of the civilization of Europe.

THOS. R. BACON.

The Destruction of Ancient Rome. A Sketch of the History of the Monuments. By RODOLFO LANCIANI. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1899. Pp. xv, 279.)

PROFESSOR LANCIANI has written several books on Rome and it might be supposed that this handbook would traverse some of the same ground. But it not only differs from them in scope and matter: it fills, besides, a place not taken by any book yet published. It is not another description of the monuments of Rome, but a synopsis of the annals of Roman monumental criminology—virtually an arraignment in temperate and scientific

form of the centuries that successively conspired to destroy the monuments. It was something that required doing, for the vaguest and most incorrect notions are current as to what happened to the master-pieces of Roman art from the advent of Christianity to the present century.

Very little space is devoted to the transformations of Rome by reconstruction in ancient times; neither is much said of the old bugbear of the destruction of Rome by the Goths and Vandals, but what is said here ought to help to get rid of it once for all. Such passages as those in the Byzantine historian Procopius, writing in the middle of the sixth century, show how well-preserved ancient Rome then was, even to colossal statues standing in temples, streets and squares. Even early in the seventh century poets still recited, as of old, in the Forum of Trajan.

Barbarians and early Christians being almost entirely exonerated, it remained to be shown on whose shoulders rests the responsibility for the disappearance not only of most of the decorative features of the ancient monuments but of the immense masses of their masonry. In some cases several million cubic feet have disappeared, not a trace being left of such buildings as the Circus Maximus, which is reckoned to have had at least 250,000 running feet of stone and marble benches with heavy retaining walls. Professor Lanciani's book proves that the culprits responsible for these almost incredible disappearances are the Romans themselves, of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The proof is overwhelming, especially for the Renaissance, and yet we know that the author has held back the larger part of the detailed proofs, which will appear in his exhaustive volumes, *Scavi di Roma*, of which this is merely a foretaste. The summarized titles of the chapters¹ show how the material is grouped, in historic order. At the beginning of the story of destruction the book shows how the principal changes under the emperors were connected with changes of level in various quarters of the city from different causes. Sometimes, as in the gardens of Maecenas above the Esquiline Cemetery, an entire tract was covered up and raised for hygienic reasons; at other times hilly parts were cut down to secure flat building-spaces or better communications, as in the Forum of Trajan; but more often the cause was one of the destructive fires, such as those of Nero, of Titus and of Caracalla, when the remains of the damaged quarters were merely levelled

¹ I. The destroyers of Ancient Rome; II. Transformation of Republican Rome by the emperors; III. Use of earlier materials in the building of the later Empire; IV. Aspect of the city at the beginning of the fifth century; V. The sack by the Goths in 410; VI. The sack by the Vandals in 455; VII. The city in the sixth century; VIII. Burial places within and without the walls; IX. The devastation and desertion of the Campagna; X. The monuments in the seventh century; XI. The incursion of the Saracens in 846, and the extension of the fortifications of the city; XII. The flood of 856; XIII. The Rome of the Einsiedeln Itinerary; XIV. The usurpers of the Holy See and the sack of 1084; XV. Rome at the end of the twelfth century: The Itinerary of Benedict; XVI. Marble-cutters and lime-burners of medieval and Renaissance Rome; XVII. The beginnings of the modern city; XVIII. The sacking of Rome in 1527; XIX. The monuments in the latter part of the sixteenth century; XX. The modernization of medieval buildings; XXI. Modern use of ancient materials.

off and used as foundations for new streets along the same lines, on a level sometimes from ten to twenty feet higher. For instance Nero's colossal Golden House covered a mass of buildings—public and private—destroyed by his fire, and when in its turn it was damaged by fire in 80 A. D. Titus took occasion to restore part of its site to public use, and his baths and those of Trajan rested on part of it. Modern excavators find, therefore, in such sites, three distinct strata, each interesting. This practice encouraged a feature that became popular in the third century, the use of old artistic material in new buildings, especially in foundation-walls, in which statues, reliefs and decorative sculptures were often imbedded.

It was natural that the triumph of Christianity and the substitution of Constantinople and Ravenna as capitals of the late Roman and Byzantine world should have accelerated the downfall of the monuments. When the temples had lost their worshippers and the priests their revenues there was no alternative but to let them decay or transform them to some other use. It was somewhat different with civil structures, of which a considerable number remained in good repair until the disastrous Gothic wars in the sixth century, while others were preserved as churches. Professor Lanciani is not very clear or full in his treatment of the changed use of old structures, nor has he shaken himself quite free from the old idea of the damage done them by Christian fanaticism. Such adaptations should be welcomed. The best-preserved temples in Rome—the Pantheon and the temple of Faustina—owe their condition to having become churches in the seventh century. There were similar cases of civil structures—such as the Tabularium and the City Archives of Deeds—saved by use. This use alone prevented destruction at the hands of the infamous vandals of the Renaissance.

For the succeeding periods Professor Lanciani comments briefly on two interesting medieval documents, the first of which (*Einsiedeln Itinerary*) indicates the principal monuments surviving the desolation of the Gothic wars and its effects; and the second (*Itinerary of Benedict*) when compared with it shows what great changes had taken place between the ninth and the twelfth centuries, caused largely by Robert Guiscard's burning of the city in 1084. The book passes quite lightly over the wilful devastations of the Middle Ages, though it indicates the sins of the lime-burners and of the decorators who made wholesale use, for their mosaic pavements and church furniture, of the marble floors and revetments of ancient buildings, as well as of ancient columns and wall-material for their new constructions. Medieval contractors from other parts of Italy were even wont to supply themselves in Rome.

Evidently, however, Professor Lanciani proves most abundantly his contention that all the injury by the hand of man, by fire, and by the wear and tear of time, for the previous long term of some twelve hundred years, does not equal the destruction wrought by the two centuries of the Renaissance (fifteenth and sixteenth) which while fawning on antiquity most cynically wrecked it. The bulk of Renaissance buildings in Rome are made up of the material of the ancient city—from the lime produced

by its statues to the columns taken by wholesale from still-standing structures. In every large monument a lime-kiln was established until it was consumed. Says Cardinal Santori, of the great Sixtus V.: "Seeing that the Pope was quite bent on the destruction of the antiquities of Rome many Roman noblemen came to beg me to try to persuade his Holiness to abandon his strange purpose, particularly as he cherished the intention of destroying the Septizonium (of Septimius Severus), the Velabrum (arch of Janus) and the Capo di Bove (Caecilia Metella). I made this request in company with Cardinal Colonna and received the reply that he wished to remove the unsightly ruins." The most wholesale destruction took place in connection with the building of St. Peter, whose immense mass of masonry was taken almost entirely from the vitals of ancient Rome by order of the popes. Sometimes an architect received a completely free hand. The same pope, Sixtus, authorized his favorite architect Fontana to excavate, seize, and remove from any place columns, marbles, travertine, and other material. The papal example would naturally be followed by lesser ecclesiastical authorities and by the papal "nephews." Of the infamous annals of these two centuries we shall get the details in Lanciani's *Scavi di Roma*. By a broad application of his title the author includes also the destruction of the monuments of early Christian and medieval Rome. The irreligiousness and disregard of all sacred traditions of the Roman church of the Renaissance is completely illustrated by its destruction of the old basilica of St. Peter, with all its art-treasures, the centre of the Christian world. And after that as an example the architects of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not hesitate to transform the early churches into specimens of that most hideous of styles the world has ever seen—the barocco—and to make them brutal, tawdry, vulgar instead of delicate, symmetrical, and artistic.

It seems regrettable that so few illustrations accompany the text and that these are so inferior in quality; hardly a book issued in recent years has had such poor half-tones. Of course it would be possible to criticize also some parts of the text, not so much for its minor inaccuracies as for omissions which prevent its covering the ground of literary sources as well as it does that of archaeological investigation, in which the author is more at home. However, we know of no one who, on the whole, could have done the work better, if as well.

A. L. FROTHINGHAM, JR.

Italy and Her Invaders. By THOMAS HODGKIN. Vols. VII. and VIII. The Frankish Invasions and the Frankish Empire. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899. Pp. xx, 397; xii, 331.)

THESE two volumes form the conclusion of Dr. Hodgkin's great work, begun nearly twenty-five years ago, in which he has undertaken to present in a semi-popular form the history of a very obscure and difficult period. Taking Italy as the material and dramatic centre of his narrative he has given in these eight substantial and elegant volumes a review of

her fortunes from the first incursion of the German barbarians at the close of the fourth century to the establishment of the Frankish Empire at the beginning of the ninth. It was a stupendous undertaking, too large for any one man working under the demands of modern scholarship to hope to complete in that spirit of thoroughness we have learned to expect in a work of this scope. Dr. Hodgkin was in some ways conspicuously well fitted, in others equally ill-fitted for his task. He was a capable classical scholar, able to read without difficulty the text of his original authorities, on which his story must rest. He grasped from the outset the principle that contemporary witness is, on the whole, the most trustworthy and that every historian must go back again to that if he will build his foundations broad and sure. He has realized that a great part of the original material for his period was valuable only as it should be sifted by a comprehensive and intelligent criticism. He has shown us that he is not indifferent to the work of others in the same field. All these are praiseworthy traits in the historian. On the other hand Dr. Hodgkin has shown singular defects in the practical application of this respect for sources and this appreciation of modern co-workers to his printed results.

We are ready to believe that he knows German well; but he gives surprisingly little indication of it. He may be familiar with the modern literature of his subject, but his references to it are throughout meagre and far from satisfactory. He has been possessed by a demon of style, that seems to have grown more and more exacting as his work has advanced. He has been haunted by his conception of a *magnum opus* as a thing to which the grand manner is indispensable. A curiously ineffective dramatic sense, of which the title of the book and the headings of chapters are illustrations, has continually distorted the proportions of his narrative and vitiated his conclusions. An absolutely amiable spirit, a really modest judgment of himself and an undoubted willingness to accept the views of other persons have not added strength to his presentation.

These two concluding volumes exhibit all the characteristic merits and defects of their predecessors, but they emphasize unduly the defects, because here, much more than in former volumes, Dr. Hodgkin is brought into inevitable comparison with other workers in the same field. Visigothic, Ostrogothic, Lombard Italy are comparatively unfamiliar ground, but everything touching upon Frankish matters has been worked over again and again in the generation just passed. Whoever would write, with any serious claim to the attention of scholars, upon this theme must first have assured himself that no noteworthy production of recent scholarship has escaped his notice.

We realize fully that a great scholar who has completely mastered his subject may well choose to conceal the machinery by which he has amassed his learning and formed his conclusions. He is fully within his right in so doing. But Dr. Hodgkin obviously has no such purpose. On the contrary he at times almost parades his authorities. He refers, quite in the antique fashion, to "the learned" this or "the learned but obscure"

that; he is occasionally servile in his blind acceptance of leadership, as in the case of Bryce; he is frank to the extreme in his acknowledgment of pages of detail. Where he has consulted books he lets us know it, and we are therefore fairly warranted in the conclusion that where he does not inform us he has not done so. His method is here, as it always has been, to divide his work up pretty minutely into chapters, furnishing each with some heading, of which "The Great Renunciation," meaning the retirement into a monastery of Carloman, brother of Pippin, "The Final Recognition," that is the sham acknowledgment of Charlemagne's *imperium* by a desperate Byzantine usurper, and "Carolus Mortuus" meaning the death of Charles, are specimens. Then for each chapter he selects one or more "sources," giving a very brief opinion as to their value, and this source or sources he follows as closely as may be. He adds also, in each case, one or more modern writers whom he calls "guides" and whom he seems to follow with almost equal fidelity. It is not difficult to see that Waitz and Dahn are the twin stars whose guidance he accepts whenever he can without much question, and a very good guide one at least of them is as far as he goes. That may also be said for the faithful workers who have produced the series of *Jahrbücher der Deutschen Geschichte*, but it is a little surprising that in a work of this importance so many chapters should be written without other "guide" than one of this series published from forty to twenty years ago. For the chapter on the Court of Charlemagne the guides are an essay by F. Lorenz printed in Raumer's *Taschenbuch* in 1832 and a chapter in Guizot's *Civilization in France*! The dating of books referred to is, by the way, a matter of no importance to Dr. Hodgkin. Having thus mapped out his chapter he proceeds to treat it as an act in the drama he is writing, and he tries above all things to make it interesting by constantly emphasizing the dramatic points and by a liberal use of picturesque language.

In accordance with his previous usage Dr. Hodgkin gives quite as much, if not more attention to the Invaders than to the land invaded. This leads him to devote much space to the tolerably familiar story of the rise to power of the Carolingian family. He has nothing new to tell and his personal contributions are more than usually unfortunate. To describe Clovis as a "scoundrel" is as foolish as are most of our author's applications of modern ideas to the past. If we could follow the political philosophy on pp. 20 and 21 we might suppose the movement of national life to be as simple as the rule of three: a king gets tired of work and prime ministers rise to power! Because Tirol was under Bavaria in the eighth century, we must have a special foot-note on p. 63 to tell us that therefore there was good precedent for the annexation of Tirol to Bavaria by Napoleon! Perhaps after all the Merovingian line may not quite have disappeared, for "among the fishwives who dragged Louis XVI.," etc., "there may have been some men and women who might have claimed descent from Dagobert and Chlotchar" (p. 130). What can be meant by this (p. 52)? "How little most students of modern history grasp the fact that the standard of the Crescent once floated within

a hundred miles of Lake Geneva?" We had supposed this to be one of the most elementary facts of European history.

If this be thought petty criticism, let us notice more important matters. A marriage alliance between Charles the Great and the Empress Irene would certainly have been worthy of all Dr. Hodgkin's eloquence. He cites but one authority and that a Byzantine one for even the possibility of such a plan. Yet he treats it as if it had been one of Charles's most cherished ambitions, speaks of "the lady of his choice," almost finds it strange that Charles did not set out to avenge his honor and ascribes the failure of the negotiations to the accidents of a Byzantine revolution. In fact such a possibility is contradicted by every act of Charlemagne, whose chief claim to greatness is that he kept himself strictly within the limits of the attainable and never sought to extend his effective sovereignty beyond the peoples of Germanic stock.

The same futility marks Dr. Hodgkin's treatment of the beginners of the medieval Empire. He is hypnotized, as most English writers since Bryce have been, by the notion that this new institution must be treated as the continuation of the ancient empire and must, by fair means or foul, be constitutionally explained as such. A very brief study of Mr. Herbert Fisher's recent book would have given at least some food for reflection on this point. The unwary reader might easily gain the impression that the use of the word *Basileus* by a feeble Byzantine usurper who was "trembling on his uneasy throne" was the quite sufficient constitutional warrant of the *imperium* of Charlemagne (pp. 252-253). Doubtless Charles welcomed this as he did every other form of recognition, but that he had any theoretical scruples whatever on the matter is wholly disproved by every act of his imperial period. The one substantial result of the negotiations between the two courts was the rectification of boundaries whereby Charles with great wisdom let go a large territory east of the Adriatic, thus emphasizing the distinctively Germanic character of his empire.

Of social, economic and constitutional developments we have hardly a word except in the short concluding chapter. For the selections from the Capitularies and the Lombard Laws here given we are grateful, but Dr. Hodgkin's moralizing comments upon them are not instructive. In parting with this all too voluminous work may we not express the hope that some person with a less unruly imagination and a more chastened style, leaving out all the decorations and adding some adequate references to recent literature, may be allowed to condense these eight volumes into two at the most? We should thus gain what is most valuable, the general plan and the relation of the parts to each other, without wading through the mass of "literature" which now obscures them.

The United Kingdom: A Political History. By GOLDWIN SMITH, D.C.L. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1899. Two vols., pp. xi, 650; vi, 482.)

AT the age of seventy-six, Mr. Goldwin Smith has given to the world his most ambitious and most important work. *The United Kingdom* may be looked upon as containing the sum of Mr. Smith's historical philosophy and as representing his matured views upon historical presentation. Though "performed by the hand of extreme old age," as Mr. Smith says in his preface, the work is marked by a virility and spirit rarely equalled among younger writers. This strength is the more remarkable in that the work is not history as the modern student understands it—that is, it is neither an impartial narrative of events nor a logical study of causes and their effects—but is rather an exposition of the views which Mr. Smith holds upon the men and movements of English history. This fact gives to the work a definite individuality, and is its chief claim upon the attention of the reader, for Mr. Smith has, as all know, strong opinions.

After dismissing the Anglo-Saxon period in fifteen pages the author carries his discussion continuously forward to the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria. In a few instances he pursues his chronology beyond 1837 and anticipates later events, especially in the chapter devoted to the colonies, in which he continues Canadian history to 1871 and Indian history through the mutiny. He is both broad and narrow in scope; broad in that he concerns himself not with southern England, but with England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales; and narrow in that he does not follow the expansion of England into a Greater Britain. Apparently he is not influenced by the writings of Seeley and Mahan, for neither the policy of Pitt nor the Seven Years' War entices him to speak of expansion, and even when discussing the commercial war with Napoleon he does not so much as remark upon the importance of sea-power in history. He has, it is true, a separate chapter upon the colonies in the East and West, but of the influence of the colonial and commercial policy that they entailed he says nothing; and so far is he from understanding the colonial aspects of the mercantile system, that he thinks England should have let her American colonies go free from the beginning (II. 208).

Mr. Smith's method of treatment is to take each reign in its order and to deal with its various aspects in a half chronological, half topical manner. Sometimes he has followed a given subject until he has worked it entirely out; then again he has not hesitated to break his sequence and turn aside to examine some other topic that intrudes itself chronologically. Within his chosen field of politics, his range is wide, and the number of matters dealt with, large. Ecclesiastical, financial, and economic questions are also occasionally brought up for presentation, and on the social side nothing could be happier than his description of the stereotyped chivalry of the fourteenth century (I. 211). Discussing these many questions Mr. Smith does not adopt a narrative but combines description with commentary. Matters of proportion, perspective, and the relative

importance of events do not trouble him, for in his eyes the value of history is to furnish lessons for the conduct of the present and opportunities for moral instruction. While paragraphs and groups of paragraphs are consistently devoted to a given subject, yet there are scarcely any other motives for his arrangements than such as are literary and artistic, and in consequence the interest is sustained less by the subject itself than by the manner in which Mr. Smith has treated it. In the hands of a weaker man many of the chapters, such as those on the reigns of Edward III. and James I., would seem confused and chaotic. In the latter instance (Vol. I., ch. xx.), where the introductory portion has been elaborated with great care at very considerable length, the general effect may be deemed a failure. Generally, however, the firm grasp, trenchant conclusions, and picturesque style tend to hold the attention of the reader, who is interested to know what Mr. Smith is going to say next. The arrangement, though arbitrary and often artificial, does not destroy this interest, for the different chapters in reality partake of the character of essays.

In style Mr. Smith is inclined to be dramatic and rhetorical, and sometimes one's mind is kept under too persistent a strain for the effect to be agreeable. This is partly due to the author's fondness for well rounded periods and groups of dependent clauses with a suitable climax, partly to the personal and biographical character of the subjects he has selected to treat. In his characterization of historical personages Mr. Smith assigns to each individual his full quota of moral responsibility and stands at the opposite extreme from those who would explain moral effects by physical causes and reduce historical study to mere pathology. His descriptions of Becket, William Wallace, Richard II., Jack Cade, the members of the Cabal, and many others are models of literary form and expression, of graceful analysis and brilliant coloring. Models to the novelist; hardly, we think, always to the impartial historian. In the cases of Cromwell and Edmund Burke, where the character is worked out in connection with the events, in which each was a leading actor, the method is more historical and the results more true. With the treatment of the minor personages and those who, though great in other fields, were only incidentally connected with political history, Mr. Smith is equally forcible in what he says, as when he characterizes Swift as "strangely combining some of the highest gifts of human genius with the malice as well as the filthiness of the ancestral ape." Scenes full of strife and surcharged with excitement offer Mr. Smith admirable material for picture-painting, and the investiture struggle between Henry I. and Anselm, the barbaric warfare in Ireland, and the events leading to the adoption of the Grand Remonstrance are exceedingly well done.

In certain particulars Mr. Smith's partisanship assumes striking proportions. For example, the relations between England and Scotland on one side and England and Ireland on the other call forth from the author vigorous denunciation. Charging upon William the Conqueror and the Norman Conquest the severance of Scotland and Wales from England (II. 140), he loses no opportunity to censure every royal act

that does not aim at union. He cuts the Gordian knot of legal controversy by declaring that it was the right and duty of Edward I. to conquer Scotland (I. 196), which if not ripe then for union, was to be no riper "after centuries of war, mutual devastation and ever deepening hate" (I. 411). He ardently defends Cromwell's policy (I. 591) and condemns unsparingly "the ignoble policy" of the Restoration (II. 21), which reduced the land to a satrapy (23). He hails the union of 1707 as a greater victory than Blenheim, yet he does not give the slightest hint that commercial interests helped to reconcile the Scots to the loss of their independence. Such treatment as this inevitably raises the question whether English history can be justly written when other interests than the political are so completely ignored. For Ireland the attempted conquest of Henry I. was the opening of "seven centuries of woe" (I. 99). From this time forward fire and fury, blood and slaughter mingled with the author's hot words of wrath at England fill the Irish scene, relieved only by the Cromwellian calm. But Cromwell dies and leaves no heirs of his policy and the war is resumed. English corruption, a "bloated" alien church, grasping landlords are on one side, while on the other are Irish murder and arson, and Mr. Smith's burning vocabulary. In no other part of his work is Mr. Smith's vigorous partisanship more conspicuously portrayed; for with Ireland at least the question is no longer medieval but modern.

Mr. Smith uses his text as furnishing suitable occasions for brief homilies on current questions. Epigrammatic comments of this character are scattered everywhere through these volumes. Whenever he runs up against a matter touching protection or church establishment he is always ready to express his sentiment in no half-hearted way. We meet with such sentences as these: "The statute-book is full of commercial legislation mostly protectionist and meddling and therefore unsound" (I. 224); "by him as far as was possible in a perverse generation and under a reign of landlords were advanced in all directions sound economical principles, above all the principles of free trade" (II. 328.) Again concerning the Established Church he says, "The church still remains in bondage to the state" (I. 375); "On every side we are met by the consequences of the union of the church with the state, and the entanglement of the real duty of government with its supposed duty of maintaining and enforcing the true religion" (I. 423); an "ever pernicious entanglement" (I. 448), "an entanglement leading to evils and confusion" (I. 523), he elsewhere calls it. He decries the election of judges (II. 83), bewails the effect of publicity on modern orators and parliamentary debate (I. 526; II. 229), and in one passage seemingly has in mind the South African crisis when he says: "It has been truly said that the Englishmen are not at ease in their aggrandizement unless they can believe themselves to have a moral object, and that Cromwell was in this respect a typical Englishman. But the combination was more genuine, the illusion at least was easier in the case of one who served the

God of the Old Testament than it is in that of the imperialist of the present day" (I. 634).

In his arrangement of subjects, in his comments upon current questions, in his historical parallels, of which there are many, in his use of the past to illustrate the present, and in his persistent viewing of the past from the standpoint of the present, Mr. Smith represents a form of historical presentation that is rapidly passing away. He seems to scoff in passing at him whom he calls the evolutionary historian and takes frequent occasions to throw the "accidents" of history into the face of a "science of history" (I. 273, 644, II. 301). Of such "accidents" he finds many (I. 194, 343, 521, II. 74), and all concern the life and actions of the individual, a truly incalculable element in history. He does not seem unwilling, however, to confess that the importance of individuals is growing less as intelligence spreads (I. 643), but he has not acted upon his own suggestion, magnifying the biographical side of history and making the moral treatment of character his first thought. In all these particulars in which he stands opposed to the modern historical school his point of view will be understood by those who know him, and by those who do not will be interesting because of the moral earnestness which characterizes it. No reader of this work can fail to realize that he is in the hands of an uncompromising advocate.

But there is another aspect of Mr. Smith's treatment that is distinctly harmful. I do not refer to his partisanship, which tends to discount itself, but to his misrepresentation of what history is by his want of sympathy for or appreciation of the institutions of the past, and the stress which he everywhere lays upon the darker side of human character and human life. His shadows are too deep, his epithets too harsh. He can see no benefits in the Norman Conquest (I. 23, 40, 43, 61, 74, 104), though his own characterization of the reign of Henry II. belies his words (I. 69, 114); he sneers at the Church (I. 35, 37, 54, 155, 167); is hostile to Henry VIII., unfavorable to Elizabeth and all the Stuarts, and only lightens his darkness by his one really fine piece of historical writing on the Long Parliament, Cromwell, and the Commonwealth, though even here he shows animosity to the Presbyterians, whom he charges with intolerance and blasphemy. From the Restoration again all is dark: kings are debauchees or fools, men in office stupid or corrupt. Abroad the lines are even more deeply drawn. Louis XIV., Madame de Maintenon, Frederic William I., Frederic the Great, Napoleon, Metternich, and others are hated with a burning hatred. "Priestridden," "charlatan," "fanatical champion," "military maniac," "cruel and perfidious idiot," are not the harshest of the characterizing epithets. Mr. Smith cannot separate the private from the public life of an individual. He cannot separate the past from the present. He does not understand and consequently misrepresents feudalism, the medieval church, medieval monarchy, mercantilism, and the colonial system. He judges each as if it were an institution of to-day.

The inevitable conclusion is that Mr. Smith's history is but a tale of a corrupt monarchy and a superstitious church, of political jobbery, rapacity, and governmental maladministration generally; a tale, that is, of human error. Men, and women, too, have left undone those things that they ought to have done and have done those things that they ought not to have done, and Mr. Smith does not hesitate to disclose their faults. We are reminded at times of that "rigid liberalism," of which Lord Acton speaks, "which by repressing the time-test and applying the main rules of morality all round, converts history into a frightful monument of sin." It would seem at times as if the author preferred to make his delineations dark that the moral lesson might be the more strongly emphasized. But the resulting impression is wrong. History is not the tale of the vices of men, as Lingard, the French philosophers, Joseph de Maistre, and now Mr. Smith wish to make it. We admire the author's style and his wonderful command of English speech, we respect his point of view and his own chosen method of presenting the subject, but when we have reached the end of his work and look back over the path we have traversed we cannot believe that the conclusions reached and the impressions left are those that the reading public ought to have of the history of the United Kingdom.

CHARLES M. ANDREWS.

The Commune of London and Other Studies. By J. H. ROUND, M.A. (Westminster: Archibald Constable and Co. 1899. Pp. xviii, 336.)

THIS volume contains fifteen essays dealing with the Anglo-Saxon villis, the history of London, Anglo-Norman warfare, the origin of the Exchequer, the conquest of Ireland, the inquest of sheriffs (1170), the coronation of Richard I., the battle of Bannockburn, cornage, the marshalship of England, and other subjects. In fact, so many topics are examined that it is impossible to explain their purport within the limited space allotted to this review. Many of the questions examined are important, and the results attained form a welcome addition to our stock of knowledge, though they are of less general interest than those embodied in Round's *Feudal England*. Both works display the same striking merits: remarkable acuteness in unearthing new materials, masterly analysis and interpretation of charters, clearness of diction, and the accurate presentation of facts. In both works, on the other hand, the narrative sometimes lacks coherence; the author is inclined to magnify the importance of his "discoveries;" and he exhibits undue asperity in his treatment of historians whose statements he cannot accept. *The Commune of London* fairly bristles with polemical paragraphs. Mr. Round's heavy batteries are directed against Hubert Hall; but Kemble, Freeman, Brewer, Archer, Stevenson, Loftie, Oman, Miss Norgate, and other historians are also subjected to a more or less furious cannonade. With less smoke and carnage Mr. Round's merits as an historian of high rank would stand forth more clearly.

The essay which gives its title to the volume deals with the changes that took place in the municipal constitution of London in the year 1191, when the commune was established in that city. Our author maintains that, as a result of this revolutionary movement, the mayoralty of London came into existence; that the "ferm," or annual rent payable to the Crown by the citizens, was reduced from £500 to £300; and that an administrative council called the "skivins" (*échevins*), modelled after that of Rouen, was introduced. It has long been known, from the narrative of contemporary chroniclers, that there was a communal movement in London in 1191, and that John and the barons, in return for the support of the citizens against Longchamp, were obliged to recognize the commune. Mr. Round has discovered the communal oath and other documents which seem to prove that the commune was not merely recognized in theory but actually established, and he presents some new details regarding the municipal organization of London in the time of Richard I. and John. For any new light on the obscure subject of English municipal history in the twelfth century we should be grateful, and that Mr. Round has advanced our knowledge of the government of London in that century no one can deny. He has not however conclusively proved that the model of Rouen or of any other continental municipality was closely followed by London in 1191, or that the communal movement of 1191 had any abiding influence. He ignores the existence of "skivins" in the municipal institutions of other medieval boroughs of England where those officers do not connote a communal government; and his arguments in favor of the view that the commune was the germ of the London Common Council are not convincing, for they hinge mainly on the assumption that the administrative body of twenty-four mentioned in John's reign was copied from Rouen. It is indeed not certain that the council of twenty-four had any direct connection with the struggle of 1191.

That some Continental influence was exerted on English municipal life in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is probable, but that it had fruitful or abiding results in connection with a communal movement in London or elsewhere has yet to be demonstrated. Richard of Devizes was right when he said that neither Henry II. nor Richard I. would have granted the commune to London for a million marcs. It is difficult to believe that the powerful Plantagenet kings would long tolerate in England communal autonomy such as existed in France; and we know that even the communes of France were undermined or suppressed as soon as the French monarchy asserted its supremacy. Continental influence on English municipal development was probably more potent in the baronial than in the royal boroughs, but the result of that influence in the baronial towns was not the establishment of communes.

As regards matters of detail Mr. Round is usually accurate, but, like other mortals, he occasionally errs. *Seaccarium* means chess-board, exchequer-table, and exchequer, but there seems to be no authority for he meaning "chequered cloth" (p. 94). Mr. Round adheres to the

accepted view that the Exchequer derived its name from the chequered cloth that covered the table on which the accounts were audited. This view does not however receive support from a statement of William Fitz Stephen, quoted in *The Commune of London* (p. 63), that in 1164 John the Marshal was "officially engaged at the quadrangular table, which from its counters (*calculis*) of two colors, is commonly called the Exchequer (*scaccarium*)."

The counters evidently resembled *scacci*, or chess-men. Now if Fitz Stephen "knew his London well," as Mr. Round assures us that he did, why not accept his explanation of the name *scaccarium*? Fitz Neal, in his *Dialogue of the Exchequer*, gives a detailed account of the table and explains the origin of the term *scaccarium*; he speaks of a "*pannus niger virgis distinctus*," but says nothing concerning a chequered cloth. On page 201 Mr. Round informs us, on the authority of Dr. Stubbs, that the writer formerly described as "*Benedictus Abbas*" is "now virtually known to have been Richard Fitz Nigel;" and yet Dr. Stubbs presented his view merely as "a chance hypothesis," and—convinced of his mistake by Dr. Liebermann's arguments—now admits that "as a mere conjecture it is not worth defending." On page 237 we are told that "Dr. Gross . . . appears to consider these officers (the *échevins*) a purely Continental institution;" but the *Gild Merchant*, I. 26, to which Mr. Round refers in a footnote, calls particular attention to the existence of *échevins* in the gilds of many English boroughs. The fact that the charter of Henry, duke of the Normans, confirmed to the citizens of Rouen (1150–1151) their port at Dowgate, as they held it from the days of Edward the Confessor, is scarcely "unknown to English historians" (p. 246), for it is set forth in a book published by the Clarendon Press several years ago.

These errors, though most of them are of little importance, show that "absolute exactitude in statement," the lack of which among his contemporaries Mr. Round so often deplores, is difficult of attainment even by the most careful historians.

CHARLES GROSS.

Histoire de la Marine Française. I. Les Origines. Par CHARLES DE LA RONCIÈRE, Ancien Membre de l'École Française de Rome. (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie. 1899. Pp. 532.)

M. DE LA RONCIÈRE'S *Histoire de la Marine Française* belongs to the class of naval history of which Sir Harris Nicolas's admirable work is the typical example. For his opening volume, *Les Origines*, which carries us from Gallo-Roman times down to the opening year of the Hundred Years' War, M. de la Roncière could not have chosen a better model. Indeed a pleasant note that runs through the whole volume is the French scholar's frank appreciation of his English forerunner. It is equally pleasant to say that not only does M. de la Roncière surpass his model in the literary skill of his narrative passages, but also that wherever he is concerned with the elucidation of obscure points of medieval maritime

history—and those which he clears up are too numerous even to mention—his work deserves a place at least as high as that which Nicolas has long held. Where he leaves the field in which he proves himself so sound a master the result is not always so admirable. At the outset the work is unfortunately marred by an unphilosophical division of the subject. It is difficult to believe that an arbitrary chronological classification will help his task. Even if he succeeds in showing any generic difference between the naval art of the later Middle Ages and that of the early Renaissance it is certainly impossible for him to draw any distinct line between the later Renaissance and Richelieu. Scientifically the arrangement rests on no real basis. Fra Guglielmotti in his *Storia della Marina Pontificia*, a work which M. de la Roncière does not quote, has pointed out that the only sound division must be on the bases of oars, sails and steam. Even from the narrower point of view of French naval history there seems no greater reason for opening a period with the revival of Richelieu than with the revival of Philippe le Bel. It was the Protestant privateers of the sixteenth century who really opened the modern period.

In searching for his foundations M. de la Roncière digs somewhat deep and wide. He tells us at length of the two Roman naval organizations established at Marseilles and Boulogne, and a good deal of the action of their fleets, which seems hardly to fall within his province, as having had little or no influence on the true French navy. One would gladly have sacrificed the whole of the classical prelude for a clear summary of the naval lore of Vegetius, to whose deep influence on the medieval French navy he only refers incidentally. The same too might be said of the next section devoted to the navy of Charlemagne. Still M. de la Roncière has a good defence in the peculiar difficulty of his special subject. From the fact that France had two distinct coasts, as wide apart from a naval point of view as England and Venice, French naval history is necessarily highly complex. It is fed both from the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic, and so far do the two streams flow on side by side without thoroughly mingling that the duty of following up each branch seems hardly avoidable. The complexity does not even end here. For each stream is itself composite. That of the Mediterranean is composed of Eastern and Western influences and that of the Atlantic springs on the one hand from the North Sea and Baltic and on the other from the Bay of Biscay and Portugal. If M. de la Roncière does not completely fill in his design with a consideration of the African and Iberian sources he amply makes up for the defect by his masterly gathering of the threads. In the mixed Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western nomenclature in use in the *Clos des Galées* at Rouen he spreads before us the strangely woven web, and with a sure and original hand traces it back to the Norman sea kingdom of the two Sicilies. Around the word "admiral" he weaves a whole fabric of highly illuminating historical etymology. His tracing of the actual origin to the title of the naval governor of Sicily is new and convincing and leaves us in no doubt that Naples was the focus

from which modern naval nomenclature and indeed modern naval art spread out again into the corners of the South. The differentiation of course increased widely in proportion to the distance from the centre, but had M. de la Roncière happened to meet with the official vocabulary of the Anglo-Egyptian coast-guard service he would have seen the old Neapolitan medley still alive and indeed still in active growth. Basque, Iberian, Italian, Arab, Breton and Teuton, all are there in eloquent confusion to this day.

At considerable length M. de la Roncière carries us on through the Crusades, but only to show us that France had no navy. The same may be said of the War of Aragon, an excellent chapter full of interest for the general history of the naval art, though for France it tells how her first attempt to create a navy was crushed in the bud. Indeed the whole moral of these early times is the instability of naval power that has not a large commercial marine behind it. It is even true of the new era that begins from the foundation of the *Clos des Galées* at Rouen. It is from this point that M. de la Roncière would date the commencement of the French navy. But all he can tell makes it plain that it was no true French navy at all, but an exotic transplanted from Genoa, doomed to wither and fail in an uncongenial and sterile soil. The most valuable part of these early chapters is the light they throw on the tactics, shipping and seafaring life of the time, though it could be wished M. de la Roncière had devoted more attention to the essential characteristics of the various types in use. He is sometimes inclined to rely on what previous workers in the field have done. We hear of numbers of different kinds of vessels and have no help given us to conceive them except where his learning has given him reason to differ from the conclusions of other naval archaeologists. The result is a certain incompleteness, marring the impression of finality to which so important and laborious a work is entitled. Even the distinction as to whether certain vessels were oared or not is passed over with no clear insistence, though it is on this distinction that the whole history of naval tactics and strategy turns. We hear of sailing ships being used merely as transports and again we see them as at Sluys taking the leading part in an action, but for M. de la Roncière the point seems to have no importance. Again we hear continually of galleys, but are never warned of the wide difference between what was called a galley in the North Sea and Baltic, and the true galley of the Genoese mercenary and the Clos de Rouen.

One point in M. de la Roncière's arrangement deserves hearty recognition. The clumsy method of dividing a naval history into "Civil" and "Military" sections, which in England has obtained an unhappy orthodoxy, he boldly discards. Such an arrangement is no doubt easy—it removes great difficulties in the construction of the narrative—but it is slipshod, inartistic and unsound. The civil and the military history are essentially interdependent. Changes of administration are almost always either the result or the cause of new phenomena of action. They cannot be parted and M. de la Roncière is to be congratulated on the success

with which he has grappled the extremely difficult task of keeping them flowing together in one broad stream.

As M. de la Roncière gathers up his threads the work proceeds with a firmer grip and concludes with abundant promise for the excellence of succeeding volumes. Naval students no less than the general historian will acknowledge an especial debt to him for his treatment of French naval action at the opening of the Hundred Years' War, and particularly for his recovery of the attempts to relieve Calais by sea. His account of the Continental system with which Philippe le Bel forestalled Napoleon is an equally valuable contribution, besides a number of other points which are wholly new and wholly admirable. With his conclusions many will of course disagree. Like most Frenchmen he is an adherent of the *guerre de course* as opposed to the *guerre d'escadre*. At the outset of her career as a naval power France, he argues, was uniformly successful with the former, while the latter almost always brought disaster. But he gives no instance where the success of the cruising squadrons materially influenced the course of a war, and many where the victory of the main fleet entirely changed it, and rendered the cruisers practically impotent. On the whole, however, he suffers his national instincts to interfere but little with his historical judgment. Only once or twice is the scholarly effect marred by rhetorical exaggeration—as for instance where he says, “au moindre signe de lui [Philippe le Bel] huit cents vaisseaux de guerre jetteront cent vingt mille hommes dans l'île [England].” Does he seriously mean that at this time France had eight hundred vessels of war capable of transporting each one hundred and fifty men besides crews, horses, and stores? Another instance of a similar looseness is where, on page 14, he mistakes Selden's doctrine of the *Mare Clausum* and cites a French admiral's action off Cape St. Vincent as a refutation of it, although Cape St. Vincent is not in the Narrow Seas. Such blemishes however are few and do little to detract from the value of M. de la Roncière's work—a work which, it is not too much to say, amounts to a resurrection of French naval history, long dead and neglected. A series of excellent reproductions of contemporary shipping pieces forms a distinct addition to the value of a volume which should bring the author the gratitude of foreign students in a scarcely less degree than that of his own countrymen.

JULIAN S. CORBETT.

La Désolation des Églises, Monastères, et Hôpitaux en France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans. Par le P. HENRI DENIFLE, des Frères Prêcheurs, Correspondant de l'Institut. Tome I.: Documents relatifs au XV^e Siècle. Tome II.: La Guerre de Cent Ans jusqu'à la Mort de Charles V. (Paris: Picard. 1897, 1899. Pp. xxv, 608, xiv, 864.)

THE idea of undertaking this remarkable contribution to the history of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries came to its author in the course of

his long researches in the Vatican archives in quest of materials for the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, and it is to be regarded as "a kind of recreation" from the more serious labors of preparing that monumental work. But Father Denifle seems to take his pleasures seriously—if not sadly, after the manner of Taine's Englishmen—for this product of his leisure already occupies two stout volumes and promises to fill two more. The first volume is given over entirely to the publication of documents, to the number of more than a thousand, illustrating the sufferings and losses of ecclesiastical establishments throughout France during the first half of the fifteenth century. Preceding publications have been used, but most of the texts are new, having been drawn from the registers of papal letters and the still richer series of petitions to the Pope (*regesta supplicationum*), which contain the information upon which the Pope's action was based. The documents are arranged by ecclesiastical provinces and dioceses, with the material of a more general nature massed at the end. That the work of editing has been well done, every one familiar with the *Chartularium* will take for granted. In the author's original plan, the second volume was to contain only the general introduction and indexes, but as the work advanced, it was found necessary to go back and do for the fourteenth century what had been done for the fifteenth. Furthermore, in the absence of any recent history of the Hundred Years' War, the author determined to put together a consecutive account of the military operations, based on a wide examination of the printed sources and monographs as well as on his own gleanings from the Vatican. The result is an extended narrative of the general course of the war down to 1380; the succeeding volumes will utilize the matter published in the first and carry the account to the close of the war.

The second volume, which from the period with which it deals should naturally be the first, is much the more compact of the two. Of the two thousand new documents which Father Denifle has found bearing upon the first forty years of the war, much the greater number are given in the notes rather than in the appendix, and ordinarily in the form of a brief extract or a mere citation. The narrative, too, though often detailed, is never diffuse or wandering. The style is direct and sober, and the French (it is not the author's native language) is, while not elegant, at least clear and correct. There is also much less of the polemical spirit which is so marked a characteristic of the learned archivist's earlier writings. The first six hundred pages are devoted to an account of the military and diplomatic history of the war down to the death of Charles V. It is not a narrative for the general reader—the work as a whole is not for him—but it will be indispensable to the student, because it offers a scholarly summary of special studies that have not before been co-ordinated, and also throws new light on important phases of the war. Henceforth these chapters will be necessary for an understanding of the preliminaries of Poitiers, the history of the Great Companies, the character and career of the "Arch-priest," Arnaud de Cervole, the intrigues of Charles the Bad, and the efforts of Innocent VI. to secure peace. Here, and in numerous lesser

matters, Denifle supplements and corrects writers like Luce, Moisant, and Chérest—and not always simply by the aid of unpublished texts. French writers upon this period have strangely neglected the English chroniclers, even where the Rolls Series has made them easily accessible, and one of the chief merits of the present study lies in its careful sifting of the English and Flemish as well as the French evidence. Industrious use seems also to have been made of the material scattered in town histories and local publications of every sort, as well as of the monographs dealing more especially with the war itself. The second portion of the volume, dealing with the depopulation of France and the destruction of its ecclesiastical establishments under Charles V., is entirely new. It consists mainly of a résumé by dioceses of the information gleaned from the Vatican, where it is preserved in the papal account-books as well as in the petitions and registers. Many details of the same sort are also scattered through the earlier chapters. The distress seems to have been greatest in the region of Quercy, as we learn, not merely from requests for aid, which might easily exaggerate the need, but from an inquest made by order of the papal *Camera* and published in full in the appendix. From this it appears that out of somewhat more than a thousand benefices in the diocese of Cahors toward the close of the fourteenth century, two hundred and fifty were absolutely valueless because the land had been entirely deserted by its inhabitants, four hundred yielded less than half the sum necessary to support a priest, ten or twelve only had not materially suffered. The papal collectors report a hundred and fifty ecclesiastical establishments in the diocese as unable to pay their dues. In 1382 they could get absolutely nothing from the whole diocese of Tulle.

We must however turn to the first volume for a more complete picture of the ruin wrought by the Hundred Years' War in France. The desolation was greatest in the South, but the author concludes that there was not in the whole kingdom, in the fourteenth century, a church, monastery or hospital that did not suffer more or less from the general disorder. Almost every diocese is here represented, some very fully, and the documents collected illustrate every phase of the war and its results. It is clear that small respect was shown for the churches or their property. Naturally the destruction was greatest in the case of the monasteries and parish churches of the open country, but severe losses fell likewise upon the mendicant orders, whose houses were generally outside the town walls, upon the hospitals, and often upon important cities like Orleans or Carcassonne. At Lihons three hundred of the parish of St. Médard were burnt in the church (No. 21a); at Silliers four hundred lost their lives in the same way (No. 13); at Milly the women and children perished under the molten metal of the church tower (No. 95). The monastery of St. Martin at Séez was pillaged five times within fifty years, and in its final destruction a hundred and ninety-four persons were killed within its walls (No. 237). In the province of Rheims twenty-six monasteries, and in the province of Sens twenty-five, are mentioned which had been abandoned or entirely destroyed; in many

others only the abbot or abbess was left. By the close of the war, out of a thousand churches in Quercy, not more than four hundred were left in which service could be held (No. 600). Still more significant as showing the ravages of war are the evidences of the enormous decline in ecclesiastical revenues; not only had the property of the churches been devastated and their lands abandoned, but the peasants were no longer able to make their usual offerings. As instances may be cited the collegiate church of St. Omer, whose income fell from fifteen hundred livres to twenty-five (No. 55); the archdeaconate of Tours, from a hundred and fifty livres to ten (No. 245); the monastery of St. Vincent at Le Mans, from a thousand livres to forty (No. 291); the cathedral of Périgueux, from six thousand florins to three hundred livres (No. 395); the monastery of St. Sernin at Toulouse, from sixteen thousand florins to one thousand (No. 492); that of La Grasse, near Carcassonne, from thirty thousand florins to six hundred (No. 534); the cathedral of Chartres, from between eight and ten thousand livres to only seven (No. 962).

The decline in revenues and the disturbed condition of the country could not fail to affect seriously the discipline and life of the French church. In a great number of benefices it was no longer possible to support a priest, and it was alleged that this state of affairs had become common in several dioceses (Nos. 25, 135, 150, 172, 733, 994, 1014). Sacred edifices were occupied by troops or turned to secular uses; the bishop of Périgueux complains that the churches of his diocese have become as dens of thieves (No. 394), while the monks of Déols can neither meditate nor pray with a quiet mind because of the cries of the women and children who live in their church (No. 573). The bishops were unable to make their regular visitations; indeed non-resident prelates seem to have become the rule rather than the exception (No. 1029). Again and again priests appear as serving in the army and committing various depredations. The disorders among the regular clergy were quite as serious. It was impossible to keep up the machinery of general and provincial chapters and regular visitations. Unable to live from the resources of their monasteries, the monastic communities were broken up and the monks and nuns scattered over the country. A curious example of the dangers to which they were subject is seen in the petitions of the Premonstratensians of Boulogne and the Cistercians of Ourscamp to be allowed to adopt a black habit, on the ground that their prescribed dress offered too shining a mark to wandering soldiers (No. 1044).

It is easy to multiply quotations from such a mass of interesting material, but perhaps enough has been said to show the importance of the documents here published. Besides the light they throw on the ecclesiastical and social conditions of the whole country, they are of much value for local matters, such as the succession of bishops and abbots, the history of church edifices, the current traditions concerning saints, etc. Tales of relics there are, too; we learn that at least five different places in France claimed to possess the relics of Christ's circumcision (No. 414)!

According to Father Denifle, the archives of the Vatican contain information of the same sort concerning the religious establishments of Bohemia in the time of the Hussite wars and those of Scotland during the border conflicts. Certainly this and the texts relating to other European countries in this period ought to be published. The effects of war and pestilence contributed so largely to the decline of the church in France in the fifteenth century that one is naturally led to inquire whether, in other parts of Europe as well, the disorders of the age were not responsible for some of the evils which are usually attributed to the inherent defects of the medieval ecclesiastical system. Be this as it may, we certainly need much fuller knowledge than we have of the conditions which prevailed under this system in parish, monastery, and hospital. Every year brings new material from local archives, in the form of visitations, bishops' registers, court records, account books, and the like; but there is also much of value at Rome, and if we are ever to understand the medieval church, we must draw largely upon documents such as Father Denifle has here given us, published, as he edits them, without suppression and without apology.

CHARLES H. HASKINS.

Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. By EPHRAIM EMERTON, Ph.D., Winn Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University. ["Heroes of the Reformation" Series.] (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1899. Pp. xxvi, 470.)

THE reviewer of Professor Emerton's volume on Erasmus is beset at the start by a temptation so serious that he must claim credit for even partially resisting it. "Why should Erasmus be ranked among the 'Heroes of the Reformation'?" This question, which immediately leaps to the lips, might be debated at such length that little space would be left for the discussion of any other topic. We pass it by, with two comments only. Professor Emerton has a witty reference in his preface to the seeming contradiction and, secondly, the title of a comprehensive series can hardly be accurate in all its applications. We shall not cavil at the inclusion of Erasmus among the "Heroes," nor even grudge Cranmer his place in the same list. The main fact is that this study is restricted by the nature of the general scheme into which it enters. It is less an independent sketch of character, pursuits, purposes and results than a striking essay on one aspect of a many-sided life. Professor Emerton has shown more conscience than is displayed by the majority of contributors to works of literary co-operation. He conforms to the aim of the enterprise, and does not go beyond it either for the sake of airing a hobby or for mere display. He is concentrated, direct and effective.

Why is Erasmus viewed with admiration by so many persons at the present day? Since the seventeenth century his books have been read by the learned alone. He founded no sect or school. He was not a man of daring or of uncommon generosity. To be sure, he enjoys a

reputation for humor, but though Bailey's translation of the *Colloquies* was reprinted not many years ago, it can be bought cheaply from the second-hand dealers. Yet who has not heard the remark thrown across a dinner-table: "If I had lived in the Reformation, I should have sided with Erasmus?" And such speeches do not come simply from those who have but a general knowledge of the period. A scholar like Charles Beard can say: "Nothing can well be more unjust than to find fault with Erasmus for not being Luther, or even for unwillingness to place himself at Luther's side." Indeed, while Erasmus may not yet have joined the "Heroes," he has, in an age of tolerance, become one of the most popular of historic figures.

Upon the rosy view which invests Erasmus with the wit of More, the calmness of Castellion and the disinterestedness of Spinoza, Professor Emerton's book will come with a shock. We have said that it is not primarily a character sketch. "Its function," runs the preface, "is to deal with Erasmus as a factor in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. With the very peculiar and often elusive personality of the man it has to do only in so far as it serves to suggest an explanation of his attitude towards the world-movement of his time." Still Erasmus was fifty years old at the date of the Wittenberg theses. His habits, methods and opinions were, broadly speaking, fixed, and his relations with the Lutheran Revolution were determined by his temperament. Professor Emerton is not in the strict sense a biographer but he must, perforce, give up a great part of his space to personality. And it is his revelation of faults, foibles and insincerities which will produce the deepest impressions.

Professor Emerton judges Erasmus not by the opinion of his contemporaries—still less of later writers—but by his own works, and most of all by his letters. It must be admitted that the truth is not always obtainable from this vast bulk of correspondence. For instance, Erasmus often calls Paris "that Gallic dunghheap" and in the *Colloquies* assails the Collège Montaigu most bitterly. But when Budaeus invites him to join the circle of scholars which Francis I. is forming, he remarks, without committing himself to an acceptance: "I will only say at present that Paris was ever dear to me on many accounts." But while Professor Emerton shows that the word of Erasmus cannot be trusted where the writer is an interested party, a careful comparison of the letters will yield the means of testing his straightforwardness, honesty of friendship, gratitude, independence and other essential traits of character. Such was the bitterness of the Reformation age, such its rashness of invective that a sympathizer with Erasmus might be little moved by the attacks of Luther, Scaliger or even Ulrich von Hutten. Of all possible blows at his reputation the most damaging one is Professor Emerton's use of the "deadly parallel."

Admirers have never denied Erasmus's lack of physical courage, but many will grieve to know that he is now made out by the revelation of his own words a liar, a self-advertiser, an ingrate, and a persistent beggar

if not a "sponge." Proof of shortcomings is not Professor Emerton's real aim, and so the accumulated illustrations which he gives must be passed over. We will only say that Erasmus could tax the patience of a generous and true friend like Colet (p. 196). We now come to the central question of the book. Having examined the nurture and devious methods of Erasmus, it must be asked, "How did he view the moral and religious questions of his revolutionary age? How far was he intellectually and personally honest in his dealings with Reformers and Romanists?"

Professor Emerton does not, we judge, doubt the existence in Erasmus of a true reforming instinct. He distinguishes between a best self and one which, by implication, is considerably less than best. The inferior Erasmus praises Leo X. during his lifetime but slights his memory during the pontificate of Adrian VI. The same man when stirred by his higher impulse writes the *Enchiridion*, incurs blame of great churchmen by the *Praise of Folly* and, more important still, edits the *Greek Testament*. "It was clear to him that his age had wandered far from the foundations of these [existing church] institutions. His remedy was to point out to men how widely they had erred, and to show them once more in plain and direct language the true foundations of a Christian life." He avoided a quarrel with institutions, not simply because he dreaded the consequences to himself, but because he believed that the root of the evil lay in wicked men rather than in the systems with which they are connected. Fiercely as he assailed monks, he could praise the life of contemplation and admit the existence of many good Christians among the regular orders. Long before the appearance of Luther he had acquired the habit of looking at things from every point of view, and regarded particular circumstances with the acuteness which the Jesuits soon after put into their casuistry. What Professor Emerton calls "the Erasmusian If" was not developed through a sense of time-serving in the early days of the Reformation. It is traceable to original disposition, long habit and mature conviction.

Erasmus refrained from accepting the advice of Albert Dürer and did not secure the martyr's crown. The most that Professor Emerton can say on his behalf is that he followed the law of his nature and intellectual temper. Accordingly, he was not, in the main, dishonest. But was he praiseworthy? For Professor Emerton's opinion at this point we must turn to his comment on Hutten's *Expostulatio*: "Although called out by a personal attack, the *Expostulatio* keeps itself throughout on higher than personal grounds. It is not an apology for Hutten; it is a fierce outburst of honest indignation against a man who seemed to be throwing away a noble mind and conspicuous gifts through lack of courage and simple honesty. . . . If Hutten made the mistake which so many have made since his time of asking from Erasmus a kind of service for which he was by nature unfitted, it was a mistake which honors him who made it. The time for balancing good and evil had gone. If anything was to be done, it must be by the united action of all who were in substantial agreement upon the great essential questions of the hour." Professor

Emerton does not judge Erasmus, after 1517, by a standard of ideal excellence to the neglect of his previous career and sentiments. He only laments that he should not have risen to the height of his chances. Incidentally he did much for the Reformation, but with greater robustness of soul—not body—he might have done so much more!

We have tried to define Professor Emerton's attitude towards two or three of the main problems which are raised by mention of Erasmus's name. A word should now be said regarding the palpable merits of this study. One must not only have steeped himself in the ten folios of the Leyden edition before he writes of Erasmus. He needs clearness of thought, a systematic knowledge of the Reformation period, and a ready wit. Professor Emerton possesses the qualifications which have just been mentioned to a quite remarkable degree. His lightness of touch is equally unusual and attractive in its application to such a theme. Law and theology are not supposed to be the two most vivacious subjects in the world, but Madame du Deffand could criticize Montesquieu's masterpiece in the phrase, "de l'esprit sur les lois." One does not slight Professor Emerton's erudition in saying that he has written of the part which Erasmus took in the Reformation with a brightness which is due to Erasmus and which is seldom seen in treatises on the Reformation.

Calendar of Letters and State Papers (Spanish) relating to English Affairs. Vol. IV. Elizabeth, 1587-1603. Edited by MARTIN A. S. HUME. (London: Printed for Her Majesty's Stationery Office by Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1899. Pp. lxviii, 782.)

THE documents in this volume are, the editor informs us, chiefly derived from "the correspondence and reports of Spanish ambassadors, agents and other officers, existing in the Archives at Simancas and amongst the papers abstracted therefrom, and now preserved in the Archives Nationales in Paris, with the addition of a few documents from the British Museum and other national depositories." In nearly every case the original MS. has been transcribed by the editor's own hand and care has been taken "to retain almost literally everything of importance likely to interest students of English history." The reports of Mendoza on English affairs, less direct and doubtless less valuable since his expulsion from England, cease altogether in the spring of 1591, the year in which his stormy life ended, so that the "invaluable and copious Spanish diplomatic correspondence, which has done so much to illuminate English Tudor history, was practically suspended from 1590 to 1603." The documents relating to the closing years of Elizabeth's reign, though of great importance, yet lack, as Major Hume complains, "the continuity and completeness which characterize the correspondence up to the end of 1590."

It is but justice to call attention to the cleverness and life of Major Hume's translations and paraphrases, to the helpfulness of the footnotes and to the energy and patience required to select, translate and edit the enormous number of documents in the four volumes of this Elizabethan

Calendar. The present volume alone contains 746 documents, a lavish feast for the student of the time. The papers are not all unknown. Some of them may be found in Teulet and Duro, while extracts will be familiar to readers of Motley and Froude. The more Spartan type of investigator will not forget that Major Hume's documents are translations and will doubtless, in dealing with some of the riddles of the period, wish occasionally to see the original of a crucial phrase. But the whole object of the *Calendar* was of course to make the Spanish material available to a wide range of English readers.

The volumes of this *Calendar*, with their masses of historical information and the editor's brilliant introductions, are already so well known that it is scarcely necessary to emphasize their importance. This fourth volume is no exception. Indeed there are reasons which make it the most interesting of the series, since it deals with the many-sided history of the Armada period and with the years between the Armada and the Queen's death, that uncanny gap between the end of Froude and the beginning of Gardiner, across which some modern historian, helped by Major Hume's materials, would perhaps do well to build a solid bridge. One is disappointed, however, not to find in this volume more documents relating to the continuation of the naval war after 1589, especially perhaps to the great English expedition against Cadiz in 1596. The editor could no doubt give satisfactory reasons for thus disappointing us. Some of the documents relating to the naval history of this period are used in the third volume of Duro's *Armada Española*, which, however, very probably appeared after Major Hume's volume had been sent to the printers.

The interest of the volume centres chiefly, however, in the Armada, which from the political standpoint may perhaps fairly be called the culmination of the reign. To be sure the history of the Armada can with little exaggeration be said to include the political and religious history of the whole reign, the history, that is to say, of the slowly evolving struggle between England and the powers of the Counter-Reformation, of which Philip II. gradually secured the supreme direction, emerging after many years from the dark confusion of plotters as the one great foeman. Yet the present volume is a focus of slowly converging rays which shed a full light upon the most conspicuous national event of the period. The year at which the volume opens, hardly less tragic than 1588, saw the execution of the Queen of Scots, which flung defiance in the face of Catholic Europe, and the descent of Drake upon the coast of Spain, which showed that England had the spirit and the strength to answer for the deed with her sword. To our information regarding the actual fighting against the Armada, in the next year, Major Hume adds not very much that has been hitherto absolutely unknown. The most vital documents were already available in Duro, while several of Major Hume's documents, omitted by Duro, had been used by Froude. Those, however, who have not the time nor the zeal to consult the originals, will find here in lively English the Spaniards' own version of their defeat. The

documents in this *Calendar*, however, not only give English readers the Spanish side of the story, told from the English point of view by Laughton's *State Papers*, but will help them toward a solution of many important historical problems, which present themselves in connection with the events of 1588, such problems as the attitude maintained toward the Enterprize by the Guises, the Pope, the King of France, and the Duke of Parma. This volume also illustrates the peculiar relation in which Philip stood to Mary Stuart and also the behavior and plans of the Scottish Catholic nobility in reference to the Spanish invasion of England. It illuminates, and perhaps solves, the further question whether Stafford, the English ambassador in Paris, was a real traitor, a question of far more than merely biographical interest.

Though the Armada is the culmination of the volume, as in a sense it was the culmination of the reign, it caused no sudden break in the plans of the morbidly tenacious old hermit king. The great struggle for the supremacy of Spain and Spain's religion continued everywhere; the Enterprize of England was a dream still cherished. Indeed the failure of the Counter-Armada of 1589 gave Philip some reason to believe that Heaven had not "for his sins" deserted him. But Spain's efforts were but the flaring of a dying fire. Even her successes were but the negative successes of defence. There was much talk in the late years of Philip and even after his death, of renewing, with better fortunes, the undertaking against England, but the new Armadas perished as hopelessly as the first, although the Spaniards effected an alarming junction with the forces of the rebel Tyrone.

For five years after Philip II. had sunk baffled and beaten into his orthodox grave the great heretic queen, who, with her hardy, sacrilegious islanders had done so much by sea and land to shatter his power and awaken him with cruel relentless buffetings from his dazzling dreams of empire, clung half unwilling to life. With her death the great struggle closes. Though the affront to Catherine of Aragon and the Church, and the blows dealt by the daughter of Henry VIII. and Anne Boleyn to the Spaniards' hopes of subduing the world to God and their king were unavenged, peace reigned at last between the world-wide empire of the past and the world-wide empire of the future.

W. E. TILTON.

The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven.

By CHARLES SANFORD TERRY, University Lecturer in History in the University of Aberdeen. (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1899. Pp. xix, 518.)

FROM the frontispiece of this substantial volume looks forth a man's face of a type quite different from that of his master in the school of war, Gustavus Adolphus, whose medallion hangs upon his breast. A distinctly gross figure, lacking dignity except as clothes may give it, and with a face indicating common origin and one would almost say, an in-

clination to cruelty. Part of the story told by the portrait is true; part of it is not. Alexander Leslie was the illegitimate offspring of a cadet of an ancient race; his mother was a "wench in Rannock." Born in 1582, in an age when "men fought for the love of fighting," if ever there was such an instinct, he early drifted to the Continental scenes of war, and eventually to the field where the great Swede was later to save Protestantism. Possessed neither of exemplary virtue nor of glaring vices, he was a canny Scotchman with his own way to make, who sought for a training in war unknown to the England of that day and, as was natural, when the time came made his profit thereby.

Leslie's early career is obscure, but in 1605 he had risen to be a captain in a Dutch regiment; he later entered the service of Sweden, and in 1628 made himself a name by his obstinate defense of Stralsund against Wallenstein. Though he was not of those who rose to great distinction under the Protestant Hero, Leslie's services were highly esteemed by the King; and he remained six years in Swedish employ after Gustavus's death at Lützen. With true Scotch thrift, after thirty years' labor as a soldier of fortune, Leslie was able to return home with abundant means.

Rather than what its title indicates, this volume is a detailed narrative, from original documents largely, of nine years of Leslie's career—1638 to 1647. In this period, however, fall Newburn, Marston Moor and the sieges of York and Newcastle, so that much interest attaches to the minute account of this part of his life. The book, however, deals more extensively with politics than with warfare.

With the wealth and the experience of war he had acquired, Leslie returned to Scotland. The one served to buy an earldom, and the other to place him in high military command during the interesting period when Charles, the Parliament and Scotland each maintained an army on British territory. From the First Bishops' War to the surrender of the King by the Scots, Leslie played a highly respectable rôle. Nothing about the man savors in the remotest degree of the divine afflatus which we look for in the captain; neither had he a weighty voice in the political imbroglios; but he won a complete, if easy, victory at Newburn, where he outnumbered the English at least three to one; at Marston Moor he not only marshalled the allies but yielded distinct help towards winning the battle which gave the name of "Ironsides" to Cromwell's troopers; while at Dunbar he recognized plainly that he was beaten, and decamped in good season from his encounter with Cromwell, whom long before he had shrewdly discovered to be his superior.

Marston Moor is treated much at length by Mr. Terry, without, however, giving a very distinct picture of the battle. An archaeologically interesting chart of the battle (Prince Rupert's own sketch) somewhat confuses the narration; for while it shows how the troops were paraded for battle, it interchanges the points of the compass. To be readily understood by the reader, battle charts should be drawn, as maps are, north and south. Now Rupert's army faced substantially south, and in the sketch it is shown facing up the page, *i. e.*, north—a natural method

of placing troops by one who has himself commanded them, but puzzling to the average reader.

Newburn was but a skirmish and a rout. Marston Moor was a battle with heavy loss, and some notable feats of arms; for Cromwell's brilliant conduct on this field is not in its way superior to the splendid gallantry of Newcastle's White Coats, who, like Fuentes' Spanish "battle" at Rocroy, stood their ground until a bare thirty of them were left. The Royalists, out of 17,500 men, lost some 3000 killed—largely by this massacre. The allies' loss was trivial. Mr. Terry claims for Leslie a marked credit in Cromwell's work. No doubt this credit is fairly awarded; it is, however, certain not only that the initiative which won the battle was Cromwell's, but that Leslie had no such *coup d'œil* or *go* in his make-up.

The chapter detailing the surrender of Charles to the Scotch, and their subsequent sale of their king to the Parliament for six months' pay, is a sad page in English history. Our modern advocate of British games will however be interested in knowing that the Earl of Leven, who was in constant waiting upon His Majesty, helped to enliven the King's and his own tedium by many a game of "Goffe."

Leven's later years are dismissed in a short chapter. The volume indeed gives scant notice to Leslie until as Field Marshal he reaches Scotland, an "old, little crooked souldier" of fifty-six years; nor is much more awarded to the Earl of Leven as Lord General from the age of sixty-five until he died at seventy-nine.

Leven was never long out of the harness. At seventy he asked to be relieved from command, pleading "waiknes, the unseparable companion of old aige," but was persuaded to remain "to be only redy to geive his best advyse." In 1651 he was captured by a raid of Monk's cavalry, sent to London and confined in the Tower. Queen Christina interposed in his favor and he was three years later restored to his estates.

To Leslie war was a trade and not, as to Cromwell, a means to a political end. Few soldiers of fortune accumulate wealth. He did, and by many contemporaries he was accused of questionable methods. His conduct also was impugned at Marston Moor and Dunbar by some of his enemies; but no man lacking courage could so long have served under the earnest eye of Gustavus Adolphus.

There is much between these covers which adds to our knowledge of the troublous period from 1638 to 1647; but the volume is scarcely a Life of the Earl of Leven. Nor could it fairly be claimed that Alexander Leslie is deserving a book of 500 pages.

The type and the general get-up of the volume are excellent. More than half the contents consists of extracts and letters, of varying interest, but valuable. The style is direct, but necessarily interrupted by these inserts. As a contribution to the political history of the nine years it covers it shows a perfect *raison d'être*. As a contribution to military history it shows less.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

The English Radicals, an Historical Sketch. By C. P. ROYLANCE

KENT. (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1899. Pp. xii, 451.)

MR. KENT dates the beginning of Radicalism in England at 1769, and carries his sketch of the development of the Radical party down to the Reform Act of 1885, and to the beginning of the new Radicalism—the Radicalism which as he clearly shows has so little in common with the Radicalism of which, in the last three decades of the eighteenth century, Wilkes and Horne Tooke, Priestley, Jebb, and Paine were the foremost exponents.

The introductory pages of Mr. Kent's book are a little unfortunate in that they give the impression that he had fixed a certain year as that in which Radicalism first began to be a force in English political life, and had then pushed forward his research with but little regard for the political history of England prior to the interesting and eventful period with which he is concerned. With the enormous mass of literature of the period between 1769 and 1885, and especially with that from 1769 to 1832, he shows a most thorough acquaintance, and has turned the sources available to scholarly account. It is hardly possible to name a memoir or a volume of letters covering the period between the American Revolution and the Corn Law movement on which Mr. Kent has not drawn. About the only conspicuous omission from his authorities is Mrs. Grote's *Life of Sir William Molesworth*. That book was privately printed; and soon after it was distributed, the friends of Sir William Molesworth made great efforts to possess themselves of all the copies, and with so much success that it was not until about 1896 that a copy found its way into the British Museum Library. A reading of this biography would have helped Mr. Kent to a better estimate of Molesworth's place in the Radical party as it existed from 1832 to 1840, and he would have learned that Molesworth became a Radical not from any appreciation of Radical principles or Radical aims, but to revenge himself for social rebuffs.

Mr. Kent does not cite either Hansard's *Parliamentary History* or Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates* among his authorities. Familiarity with Hansard's *Parliamentary History* might have made him a little more exact in dealing with Lord John Russell's bills for parliamentary reform between 1819 and 1822; and might have altered his estimate of English journalism in the early years of this century. He asserts that at this period parliamentary reporting was very poorly done. Hansard's *Parliamentary History* was compiled from the newspaper reports of this period; and twenty or thirty years before the imprisonment of Burdett and John Gale Jones in 1819, men in public life famous as letter-writers, who usually wrote fully to their correspondents, excused themselves from writing of Parliament because the newspaper reporters were then giving all there was to be told of the proceedings at Westminster. Parliamentary reports were not nearly as full as they are today; but the reports which appeared

in the *Morning Chronicle* for instance, during the many years when Perry was editor, could not be described as being poorly done.

There are several statements in Mr. Kent's introductory pages which warrant the impression that while he read forward with all possible care and diligence from the time when the Radicals came on the scene, he took small account and made but a limited research into the parliamentary history of England prior to that time. He states that before the Revolution of 1688 the Crown despised the House of Commons, and disdained to buy its votes by bribery and corruption. There never was a time from the period when the House of Commons controlled supplies when it was neglected or despised by the Crown. Had the Crown despised the House of Commons it would never have interfered in elections as it did for a century and a half previous to the Revolution. George III. is described by Mr. Kent as "an excellent country gentleman." He was much more than a country gentleman. He was one of the best political organizers of the eighteenth century. He was one of the shrewdest and most able bosses who ever sought to control the House of Commons; and unlikeable as a boss may be either in this country or under the old parliamentary system of England, it has to be said of George III. that he was an eminently successful boss; and to be a successful boss demands unflagging industry, and abilities not usually to be found in an excellent country gentleman. With the mass of material now accessible for forming a judgment of George III., there is little excuse for repeating the long outworn story that he was "only an excellent country gentleman who had been called by fate to rule an empire."

Again, Mr. Kent makes the statement that the efforts of the earliest Radicals were directed not against the House of Lords nor even primarily against the Crown, but against the House of Commons. It was the power unconstitutionally exercised by the Crown over the House of Commons which made the agitation for parliamentary reform general about the time of the American Revolution, and by no one was the nature of this movement better understood than by the King himself. Boss-like he opposed the uprooting of any corruption which would have lessened in the least degree the control he exercised over the House of Commons, whether it was the abolition of redundant and useless offices; the constitutional method of bestowing the Chiltern Hundreds; the removal of the determination of controverted election cases from recklessly and notoriously partisan tribunals to Grenville Committees; or the movement for the general reform of the electoral system. Mr. Kent furthermore overlooks the part which the American Revolution had in originating the movement for economy and parliamentary reform. Radicalism of the period later than Wilkes's conflict with the House of Commons and the controversy over the publication of parliamentary debates centered about these two movements; and the direct influence of the American Revolution in the origin of both these agitations cannot be ignored in a history of Radicalism.

When Mr. Kent settles down to his special period nothing but praise can be meted out to the style in which the book is written; to its arrange-

ment; and to the way in which he has handled the vast amount of material which he had at his command. He divides the century and a quarter covered by his survey into three divisions. The first period is from 1761 to 1789, from the beginning of the reign of George III. to the French Revolution. The second is from the French Revolution to the Reform Act of 1832; and the third from the first reformed Parliament to the Reform Acts of 1884 and 1885.

In the first period the exponents of Radicalism were Wilkes and his associates of the City of London; Horne Tooke, Mrs. Macaulay, Jebb, Price, Priestley, and Cartwright; and in this period the aim of Radicalism was popular control of the House of Commons. During this period it was a middle-class movement, in the hands of a few outspoken and daring men. There was then very little public speaking. The orator was not yet prominent among the radicals; and the master minds of the first period of Radicalism were pre-eminently pamphleteers. In the second period Paine, Godwin, Hardy, Thelwall, Holcroft, Bentham, James Mill, Ricardo, Grote, Burdett, Hume, Place, Cobbett and Hunt were the foremost Radicals; and Radicalism still concerned itself with electoral reform and economy. In this period it was a more popular force than from 1761 to 1789; and it was during this period that the Radicals dissociated themselves from the Whigs. The third division of Mr. Kent's study, from 1832 to 1885, covers the period when the political England of the nineteenth century may be said to have been in making. In this period the leaders of Radicalism were John Stuart Mill, Roebuck, Attwood, Lambton, afterwards Lord Durham, Sir. J. C. Hobhouse, and T. S. Duncombe; Feargus O'Connor, James Bronterre O'Brien, Ernest Jones, Thomas Cooper, and William Lovett of the Chartist movement; and Cobden, Bright, Gibson, Villiers, Stansfeld, and Potter, of the Corn Law movement and of the Manchester school.

Mr. Kent gives brief but vivid pictures of all the prominent men of the three periods of Radicalism, and from their writings or speeches brings out what each stood for in the particular phase of the Radical movement in which he had a part. He brings out with admirable clearness the altering character of the movement; and shows also how from the time of Wilkes the locality of the strongholds of Radicalism changed. The City of London was its stronghold in the time of Wilkes. Later on when Burdett was so much to the fore, and Place was so continuously active, Westminster was the stronghold of Radicalism. In the closing years of the long agitation for Parliamentary Reform the centre was shifted to Birmingham; and finally it moved to Manchester, which may not inaptly be described as the last home of the Radicalism with the history of which Mr. Kent's book is concerned.

It is not possible to credit Mr. Kent with entire accuracy of statement, even in the period to which his study has been most closely devoted. At page 159 he writes of Fox as a member of the Society of Friends of the People. Fox was never of the Society. At page 192 he states that at the time Bentham was writing, serious books were little read

in the United States. He gives no authority for this statement, which is not in keeping with the comparatively large importations and the frequent reprinting of books covering the field of political science, which marked the intellectual life of this country from the Revolution until well on towards the middle years of this century. At page 311 Mr. Kent states that Lord John Russell moved his resolution that corrupt boroughs be disfranchised and that the great towns and counties should be more fully represented in the same year, 1819, in which Sir Francis Burdett unsuccessfully moved for an enquiry into the state of representation. In 1819 Lord John Russell introduced his bill for the disfranchisement of Grampound; but it was not until 1822 that he laid his larger proposals before the House of Commons. Again at page 430 Mr. Kent states that "the Compensation for Accidents Act" was passed in 1896. The Workmen's Compensation Act was passed in 1897.

Mr. Kent is at his best in reproducing the spirit and color of the literature of the Radical movement; and his survey of this field, and his excellent presentation of the position of the several schools of Radicalism, and of the individual positions and opinions of the foremost exponents of these schools, would alone make his book of great value. There was a distinct place for the history Mr. Kent has written. The only books hitherto published treating of the history of the Radical party were Harris's *The Radical Party in Parliament*, and Daly's *The Dawn of Radicalism*. Neither of these covers the entire field. Mr. Kent's *English Radicals* does. It covers the movement in and out of Parliament; its literature; its journalism and its agitations; and it covers it in a way that cannot fail to be helpful and satisfactory to students of English party history since the middle years of the eighteenth century.

How England Saved Europe. The Story of the Great War, 1793-1815. By W. H. FITCHETT, B.A., LL.D. Vols. II., III. and IV. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1900. Pp. viii, 326; ix, 419; viii, 435.)

IN these volumes Dr. Fitchett brings to a close his work on the English wars in the period of the French Revolution and of Napoleon. Volume II. deals professedly with the naval operations from 1801 to 1808. It opens with Bonaparte's flight from Egypt to France and his establishment in the Consulate in 1799, but the narrative in the second, third and fourth chapters turns aside to English military operations on the Continent and in Egypt from 1799 to 1801. The relevant portion of the fifth chapter is largely a repetition of the first. The sixth summarizes the European situation in 1800. In the seventh chapter the reader first reaches the real topic of the volume in the Baltic operations against the Armed Neutrality. Apparently this unhappy arrangement is due in part to what has been a fruitful source of other defects in this work: with his history of the war the author, unconsciously perhaps, has attempted to combine a biography of Napoleon. The result is neither a

history nor a biography; it is proof that two paintings upon a single canvas are equally impossible in literary and pictorial art. This disarrangement in Volume II., aside from any question of its origin, is a typical instance of the disorder which characterizes Dr. Fitchett's work. Volumes III. and IV. are entitled respectively, "The War in the Peninsula" and "Waterloo and St. Helena," yet the first six chapters (78 pages) of the latter treat of the Toulouse campaign in 1814. Again allusion is frequently made to events as yet unnarrated; in fact general conclusions based upon these usually introduce the narration and are repeated at length and at random throughout it. Unfortunately these generalizations are not always trustworthy. At several points in this struggle Dr. Fitchett believes that a slight variation of the existing circumstances would have permanently affected subsequent history; on the contrary this entire contest is a striking proof that individuals and single circumstances even of the highest importance may retard, or hasten, but cannot alter the trend of history.

The grotesqueness in diction noted in the criticism of Dr. Fitchett's first volume is considerably abated here without disappearing entirely. To describe General Cuesta, Wellington's Spanish colleague in the Peninsular command, as having "all the obstinacy and not quite the intelligence of a Spanish mule," seems a trifle severe, and one can only imagine with what trepidation a respectable peninsula, such as the Peniche, will learn that it is jutting out from the mainland "like the bulbous nose on a drunkard's face." In allotting space to individual topics, a point distinct from the ordering of the narrative, the author appears to have been guided rather by a patriotic instinct than by reason. Twenty pages are devoted to the first bombardment of Copenhagen, in 1801. Of the second, in 1807, Dr. Fitchett is not equally proud: it is dismissed with two notices at an interval of twenty pages, the first of eleven, the second of thirty-eight lines, and ten of these record the trivial circumstance that the horse which carried Wellington at Waterloo was born on this expedition. The touch is characteristic. For the sake of an anecdote Dr. Fitchett interrupts at any moment the narrative proper.

In general one may say of this work that its author, as an historian, has many faults and some virtues. He brings enthusiasm to his task, and he is not consciously unfair—he gives the Prussians considerable credit for the result at Waterloo; but he is careless in composition, his judgment is perhaps rather hasty than superficial, and he is a victim of exaggeration and of prejudice. His work is an arsenal of anecdotes which may amuse. It is not history, and the vain-glory which it breathes and will inculcate, is not the spirit which has created the British empire and alone can preserve it.

H. M. BOWMAN.

The Collapse of the Kingdom of Naples. By H. REMSEN WHITEHOUSE. (New York: Bonnell, Silver and Co. 1900. Pp. 372.)

THIS is a work which should interest the general reader not less than the professed student of history. For while it is written in popular style,—occasionally, indeed, one might object to a too journalistic phrase,—it gives, for the first time in English, an excellent epitome of much diplomatic and political history. The decay and downfall of the Neapolitan Bourbons pointed one of the most solemn morals which this century has had unfolded to it, and the new generation needs to be reminded that internal corruption much oftener than external violence brings ruin to states. Mr. Whitehouse, after a brief survey of affairs in Naples down to the Revolution of 1848, tells the story of Bomba's reactionary government between 1850 and 1859, when year by year the growing prestige of Piedmont formed a growing menace to the very existence of the southern kingdom. He shows how Naples, not less than Piedmont, had a chance to take the lead, but through blindness threw it away; and then how, during the first year of the brief reign of Francis II., Naples might have become joint leader with Piedmont, but again threw away her opportunity, with the speedy collapse and extinction of that Bourbon house. Mr. Whitehouse draws well the picture of the irresolute Francis II., and of his incompetent advisers and the all-powerful Camarilla. The clearness with which he unravels many tangled diplomatic threads, gives his work even more distinction as a contribution to history. In 1860, Naples was the centre where the dynasty was trying to maintain itself, whilst Napoleon III. intrigued for a Muratist restoration, Cavour for the ascendancy of Italian Liberal principles, the Sicilians for Home Rule, the Garibaldians and Mazzinians for various shades of republicanism. To trace the interaction of these various conspiracies—for such, in truth, they were,—required an unusual historical gift.

Mr. Whitehouse sticks so honestly to his subject, that he does not allow even Garibaldi's expedition, so rich in romance and adventure, to lure him from it. He keeps the decadence of the Bourbons in the foreground, and treats all other events bearing on it as subsidiary. He would have done well to have included an account of the Camorra in his general survey of Bomba's government, for the Camorra was actually behind the police, the army, the judiciary, and the cabinet, and reached to the King himself. Only in New York City under Tammany and Platt has civic and criminal corruption been so perfectly organized as under the Neapolitan Bourbons. Mr. Whitehouse, however, has no desire to be sensational. Even of Bomba he can speak with evident fairness, and he does not fall into the common habit of describing the Neapolitan Liberals as all heroes and the other parties as all cowards or miscreants. If he had cited his authorities his work would have a better chance of gaining the immediate attention of readers who judge histories by their foot-notes; but those readers who know the authorities will not need to be told that Mr. Whitehouse has used them to good purpose and has pro-

duced a work worthy of serious attention. We cannot excuse, however, the lack of an index.

W. R. T.

Child Life in Colonial Days. By ALICE MORSE EARLE. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1899. Pp. xxi, 418.)

OUR accomplished author has carried her studies of our early history into an interesting as well as instructive field. In her own attractive way she sets forth a mass of information gathered from the scattered records and memorials of child-life in the first two centuries of American and especially of New England experience. The book is mounted elegantly, and is amply illustrated in every pictorial detail.

The most interesting pictures are the so-called portraits of children. Labelled from two to thirteen years, they often put forth the adult expression of twenty to thirty years. Childhood by all canons properly consists in a beginning or even suggestion of knowledge and experience. On the contrary, these owlish creatures have the look of a sawed-off shotgun. They seem to have begun life at the wrong end. Something of this is due to the conventional methods of local artists. But the processes of education and discipline revealed in these pages would indicate deeper reasons for introverted innocence in tender years. As might be expected, Copley's portraits are much the best, and they occasionally put forth a gleam of actual childhood.

A few boys' letters—among which John Quincy Adams's are excellent examples—reveal true life. Why do boys write better letters than young girls? The diaries are, as usual, meagre and frigid representations of the experience treated by the writers. There is one happy exception in the work of Anna Green Winslow, a maiden of twelve years in 1771. Her sensible aunt had prescribed that such misses "cant possibly do justice to nice Subjects in Divinity." The consequence of this sagacious advice was an actual account and picturesque expression of girlish life. In the miniature, her expression does not differ from others, except in dainty breeding. A face of twenty-eight years looks out from beneath an enormous head-dress or "notions" thus quaintly described (p. 59): "Aunt put it on and my new cap on it; she then took up her apron and measur'd me, and from the roots of my hair on my forehead to the top of my notions, I measur'd above an inch longer than I did downwards from the roots of my hair to the end of my chin."

Locke's political and social influence, though perceived, has not been appreciated sufficiently in rendering the life of New England. It would be interesting to trace out, wherein this sturdy rationalist served to rescue Puritan life from its own excesses, and to open the way toward a broader culture. Mrs. Earle found abundant evidence (p. 24) that his *Thoughts on Education* was "the most universally circulated and studied of all eighteenth-century books save the Bible" in New England. Her whole treatment of education and discipline, with the illustrations of horn-books, primers, stories and needle-work, is thoroughly interesting, and

brings up the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in a vivid and lucid way. The tyranny of the discipline was something incomprehensible to us. When slates came in a master (p. 81) wanted string to hang twenty or more about the pupils' necks. An innocent boy—not the cute adults of these pictures—brought out his best fishing-line. It was sacrificed remorselessly to this occasion.

The definite accounts of precocity in numerous instances are frightful. The "pious and ingenious Mrs. Jane Turell" (p. 179), in her second year, knew her letters and could relate many stories out of the Scriptures, and the next year recited most of the Catechism. At the age of four, "she asked many astonishing questions about divine mysteries." The mournful experiences with his children, told by Judge Sewall in full detail, show the fruits produced by this sort of culture.

An occasional error creeps in, as in Wynkoop's age (p. 352). Skates of the forties in this century (p. 346) hardly illustrate colonial life. The "homespun flannel sheet spun of the whitest wool into a fine twisted worsted" (p. 21) was excellent as flannel. Flannels were not made of combed worsted.

The book justifies itself and will be read by adults, if not by children, as the author hopes. It becomes a necessary adjunct of history.

WILLIAM B. WEEDEN.

Letters to Washington and accompanying Papers. Edited by STANISLAUS MURRAY HAMILTON. Vol. II., 1756-1758. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1899. Pp. xviii, 409.)

THE second volume of this correspondence of Washington covers only two years, but carries Washington through a long and trying experience on the frontiers of Virginia, into the House of Burgesses, to which he was elected by a good vote in July, 1758. The letters are bristling with the necessary detail of an ill-conditioned service, and contain few items of real value to the history of Virginia. The personal element is, on the other hand, of high importance, for it is easy to recognize how great an influence these years of thankless labor exerted in moulding the character of the Washington of the Revolution and the presidency. The loyal devotion of his officers, the control he held over his somewhat disorderly troops, and his judgment in matters of doubt or in times of danger, are fully displayed, and give a note higher than the petty annoyances and ignoble differences which were inseparable from the service. Whether it was a provincial or a royal officer, Washington commanded his respect and confidence, even though he never appeared to have been on terms of free intimacy. His friendships were few, and the letters contain little of that freedom which is expected among associates and equals.

The grades of intimacy and respect are not without their interest. It was with George Mercer, Joseph Chew and John Kirkpatrick that he was most free, if the tone of their letters to him are any true indication. The first two named became loyalists in 1774, and Kirkpatrick, who had

served as his secretary, returned to Scotland and disappeared from view. With Dinwiddie he had some disputes and entertained unjust suspicions of his motives; but with Stanwix and Bouquet his intercourse was proper, as it was with the man who was to suffer so in his opposition, Thomas Gage. In Virginia he naturally had many correspondents, like Robinson, the Speaker of the Burgesses, William Fairfax, Richard Bland and Dr. Craik, the last of whom was a lifelong friend. The letters from his under officers, like those of Bullitt, Stewart and Peachey, are naturally taken up largely with matters of detail and discipline.

Mr. Hamilton's treatment of these letters still calls for some criticism, though no little improvement in accuracy over the first volume is shown. To know the full relations of this correspondence the editor must at least be familiar with the colonial history and geography of Virginia. Otherwise, it is the blind leading the blind. He repeats an error committed in Vol. I., and gives an impossible spelling, *Conogockuk*, on p. 325; *Thurston* is given no less than three times on two pages (290, 292), where *Thruston*, a well-known name, should occur; he retains the *ff* in a proper name, although the double letter was the conventional sign of a capital; and he prints no less than five letters from Bosomworth as coming from *Botomworth*. These are but examples of easily avoidable errors, and must be charged to the account of the editor. Mr. Hamilton's insistence in defending certain palpable misreadings in the former volume induces caution in calling attention to similar slips in this volume. But it would seem as though *scene* is printed for *service* on p. 139; *Walker* for *Waller*, on p. 373; *cilitations* for *cilicitations* or *cilisitations* on p. 57; and *mederes* for *medals*, on p. 80. Again I give only examples. Comment could be made on the omission to supply the missing parts of the Dinwiddie letters (see note on p. 43), and on the bad appearance of pages where the oddities of the writer of the letter are sought to be reproduced in formal type.

WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD.

A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania. By ISAAC SHARPLESS, President of Haverford College. Vol. II., The Quakers in the Revolution. (Philadelphia: T. S. Leach and Co. 1899. Pp. vi, 156).

THIS is the second and concluding volume in President Sharpless's study, the *History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania*. In the former volume he dealt with the colonial period down to 1756, when the Friends surrendered their control of the Assembly; in the present one he pursues the subject forward to the Revolutionary cataclysm, and adds a chapter describing the protests of the Pennsylvania Friends against slavery, in the period immediately after the Revolution.

If we were inclined to be critical, it might be said that the general title which is given to this work is a misnomer as to events after 1756—all those, indeed, included in the present volume. The Friends did not

"govern" Pennsylvania in any proper sense of the word after they gave up the Assembly; and while until the Revolution they retained a considerable influence upon public affairs, this was extinguished altogether in 1776, when the popular convention at Philadelphia overthrew the colonial system, and set up the new and eccentric state constitution.

The principal theme of the present volume is that well debated question, What did the Quakers do in the Revolutionary War? The discussion of this is usually of a sort calculated to muddy the water rather than develop the truth, but President Sharpless has now made a contribution which will help toward reasonable conclusions. He has availed himself of the records of the Friends' meetings, and has drawn liberally upon the private correspondence of the Pembertons of Philadelphia with their friends in England. The Pemberton brothers, Israel, James and John, were the most conspicuous, and among the most able, of the Pennsylvania Friends, and for thirty years—say 1745 to 1775—they not only stood at the front of the Society, but bore an important part in all public activities. Their letters, cited by President Sharpless, are largely to that distinguished Quaker physician of London, Dr. Samuel Fothergill, though some are to David Barclay, the merchant and banker, grandson of Robert Barclay of Ury, the Quaker "Apologist." For a considerable time before the fighting actually began Fothergill and Barclay were hard at work in London, with Benjamin Franklin, in an effort to moderate the British demands and calm the American feelings. They had strong hopes for a while that a breach might be avoided. Dr. Fothergill's letter to James Pemberton, January 3, 1775, cited in the present volume, is a fine presentation of the views of an earnest and honest English freeman in that crisis. He says:

"I am afraid they [the ministry] will pursue in one shape or other, the same destructive plan . . . that no abatement of any consequence will be made—no material alterations or concessions. Of course if you are as resolute as we seem, unhappily, to be firm, dissolution must follow. . . . For my own part, having from my early infancy been attentive to America more than many others [and having been acquainted] with some of the most sensible, intelligent, and judicious persons in that country, of every party, denomination, province, and situation, I cannot give up on slight grounds the opinions I have formed of them, of their rights, and of their power likewise. . . . Had our greatest enemies the direction of our counsels they could not drive us to a more dangerous precipice than that to which we seem to be hastening."

The attitude of the Pennsylvania Friends, from the time when the differences became acute to the end of the Revolution, is easily explained; the facts are not really an occasion for controversy. The rule of the Friends was that of Peace; they held, under the teaching of the Head of the Christian church, that wars are unlawful. They were naturally lovers of liberty. Since their first controversies with crown authority and arbitrary rule, represented by Blackwell and Fletcher, three-quarters of a century earlier, they had stood firmly for the rights of popular government. In the pinch of 1765-83 these two principles, opposition to war,

and desire for freedom, had both to be respected. They are, of course, not antagonistic. The plan of the Friends was to support those efforts for the preservation of the popular rights which did not include, or plainly lead up to armed resistance. They therefore joined earnestly in the opposition to the Stamp Act, signed the Non-Importation Agreement, and connived at the repulse and return of the tea ship.

But when the war began they could not maintain an unbroken front. They very soon formed three classes. One, and by far the largest, took no part, and passively resisted all efforts either by the royalists or by the revolutionists to draw them into the fighting. A second class took up arms for the revolt, and the list of names which can be given of these is remarkable, both for size and significance. A third, and by far the smallest class, went with the King, and either took up arms or so far committed themselves that when Howe left Philadelphia in 1778 they did not dare to remain.

President Sharpless estimates that about four hundred Friends were "dealt with" and "disowned" by their meetings for joining the revolutionary army, accepting civil positions under the revolutionary government, or taking an affirmation of allegiance to it. He estimates, also, that "perhaps a score" were similarly dealt with and disowned for active adherence to the royal side. These estimates are entitled to respect, and they show very fairly the relative strength of the active American and "Tory" classes among the Friends—about twenty to one. There are very few names of Pennsylvania Quakers in Sabine's lists of the Loyalists, and all the searching of the records will not develop any considerable number more. The fact is that in the country outside of Philadelphia the sympathies of most Friends were with the revolt, and in the city at least half were on that side. That they were able to maintain their ground—to avoid falling into the royalist movement without sacrificing their testimony for peace—goes to show that they had a greater share of both consistency and tenacity than the average man who approves of Christian doctrine except when applied to a particular war.

As was said of President Sharpless's first volume, the student of Pennsylvania history cannot safely overlook this one. Its citations from original documents, its simplicity of form, its candor of statement, and its judicial temper, unite to give it a special value.

HOWARD M. JENKINS.

A History of American Privateers. By EDGAR STANTON MACLAY.
(New York : D. Appleton and Co. 1899. Pp. xl, 519.)

MR. MACLAY is the author of a *History of the United States Navy* in which he endeavored, successfully, to show that our maritime forces were a most powerful factor in the attainment of American independence. In this new volume he proves that our privateers had even more to do with the establishment of our sea power and with the destruction of English commerce, in both our wars with the mother country, than the vessels

of the regular navy. The government vessels, all told, including even the flotilla on Lake Champlain, numbered only 64 in the Revolutionary War. They captured 196 vessels valued at \$6,000,000. In the same war 792 private armed vessels took 600 British vessels valued at \$18,000,000. Our regular navy of 23 vessels captured 254 ships valued at \$6,600,000 in the War of 1812, while the 517 privateers (of Mr. Maclay's preface) took 1300 prizes valued at \$39,000,000. The "few petty fly-by-nights," at which the English journals sneered in 1776, so effectually alarmed England as to deter English merchants from shipping goods in English vessels. Escorts were demanded even for the linen ships crossing the Irish Channel, and in a few weeks forty French ships were loaded with English freight in London. When the second war began English papers recalled to mind these dismal facts and predicted the disasters that were afterwards experienced.

Plainly a book which sets forth the story of these things must be well worth reading, and Mr. Maclay tells his tale in a very interesting way. He is the first writer to attempt an account of the privateers of two wars. Coggeshall wrote only of the War of 1812 and his work, as Mr. Maclay says, is "far short of a standard history."

The more ambitious volume before us is divided into two parts. The first deals with the vessels of the Revolution; the second is devoted to the War of 1812. The author shows what admirable training-schools for our regular navy the decks of the privateers of the Revolution furnished. It is only necessary to mention the names of such graduates as Barney, Talbot, Truxtun, Decatur, and Porter to emphasize this fact. Captain Barney's prison experiences are related in full as well as the usual tale of his exploits. One chapter is devoted to Captain John Manly. Another is given to Jonathan Harraden of Salem, the author's "ideal privateersman," and the story of the fight off Bilboa between the *General Pickering* and the *Achilles* of London in sight of thousands of spectators upon the adjacent cliffs is told in a fascinating way. In the second part excellent accounts are given of almost all the privateers with which we have become familiar. A glance at the index shows us all the well-known names. Our ships were bent on profit not on fighting, and yet when the necessity came they fought magnificently. The *General Armstrong* at Fayal is a case in point. Not so well known is the *Decatur* of Charleston, S. C., Captain Diron. Her fight with the *Dominica* was one of the most bloody contests of the war. Out of 191 men on the two ships 88 were either killed or wounded. The ships of Salem are duly noted and so, incidentally, is the career of the *Invincible Napoleon*, a craft so badly handicapped by her name (she was originally a French privateer) that she was captured no less than five times. The career of the *Yankee* of Bristol, R. I., shows the possibilities for gain that lay in the business. This fortunate vessel captured property amounting in value to a million of pounds and netted a million dollars profit from her six cruises.

Yet the historical student will lay this volume down with a keen sense of disappointment. It must be said of it as its author says of Coggeshall's

work, "it is far short of a standard history." It deals with two wars only. The chapter on colonial privateers is given up for the most part to accounts of pirates like Kidd. If the author had turned his eyes toward Narragansett Bay he would have learned that some of the men who took part in the "affair of the Gaspee" (which he describes) had sailed upon colonial privateers. The Wanton family of Newport, which gave four governors to the colony, were famous privateersmen. Private armed vessels from the Bay participated in all the wars in which the colonists were involved by reason of their English allegiance. No less than forty vessels of which the names, and the names of their owners and masters, are preserved sailed out from Newport to fight in the War of the Austrian Succession. In the Seven Years' War no less than fifty-seven privateers were fitted out in Rhode Island. Their names can easily be ascertained. In 1759, according to Arnold's *History*, one-fifth of the adult males were on private armed ships. If so much has escaped notice in the case of one colony what may we not conjecture concerning the others? Mr. Maclay moreover is not always correct in his statements. To illustrate: On page 69 he credits Rhode Island with six vessels,—eight pages later gives the names of seven. If he had examined the Bristol records a little more closely (Part II., Chapter IV.) he would have learned that Bristol alone sent out six, possibly nine, vessels besides the famous *Yankee*—a number much larger than that he assigns to the whole state of Rhode Island. He would moreover have escaped some errors of statement concerning the *Yankee* herself. Singularly enough, in his summing up on page 506, he does not credit Rhode Island with sending out any vessels at all in the War of 1812. But the crying evil of the volume is the careful suppression of almost all mention of the sources whence the information was derived. The reader is frequently referred to Maclay's *History of the United States Navy*, but aside from that there are hardly a dozen references to authorities in the whole work.

WILFRED H. MUNRO.

History of the Civil War, 1861-1865. Being Vol. VI. of History of the United States of America under the Constitution. By JAMES SCHOULER. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co. 1899. Pp. xxii, 647.)

MR. SCHOULER is to be congratulated on the completion of this supplementary volume, which rounds out his work to the utmost limit that he ever contemplated as possible. A history must stop somewhere, and few will deny that for a work like Mr. Schouler's the end of the war is on the whole a more satisfactory stopping-place than the beginning. More than this, the present volume embodies a singularly well-proportioned narrative of the four eventful years of which it treats. This fact alone is a sufficient cause for its existence, and must assure to the author the favorable judgment of the reading public. For we are in the full tide of revelation as to the inner facts of war-history: official records,

memoirs, diaries—all forms of material are flooding the field, and it requires a clear head and a sound judgment to see and keep to the way, and avoid being swamped. A history of the war in one volume that is neither a bare sketch nor a hopeless jumble, is a genuine achievement.

Assuming, then, that Mr. Schouler has not been permitted, by the scope of his work, to contribute largely to the mere facts of the period, nor to offer elaborate discussions of doubtful or controverted matters, the character of his narrative can best be indicated by reference to his point of view in respect to the familiar features of the history which he presents.

First, as to the nature of the secession movement. Mr. Schouler's general position is that the secession was the result of a "conspiracy" of leading Southern politicians, which had for its ultimate purpose the construction of a government in which "slavery should forever dominate." This is a view which had great vogue in the North in 1861, and is still maintained occasionally by persons who have not given careful study to the period. Mr. Schouler shades down the statement of this position so as to reveal the modifying influence of time on his thought. The conspiracy becomes with him "something of a conspiracy"; and the blood-curdling propaganda of the "Knights of the Golden Circle," which loomed so large and definite in the exciting days of secession, is dismissed with a reminiscent allusion, to the effect that the part played by the order in the disunion movement is not known (p. 52). In pointing out that state secession was a mere legalist expedient for the accomplishment of sectional secession, Mr. Schouler is on firm ground. But it is at least a generation too late to talk of the purpose of the slave-owners to "dominate." That this, rather than self-preservation, was their leading hope, is a view that belongs in the same category with that other, expressed in Mr. Schouler's preceding volume, that John Brown, after murdering in cold blood several unoffending inhabitants of Harper's Ferry, was "not a felon."

The author's general tendency to be severe with the secessionists leads him to a position in respect to the Confederate constitution that is rather surprising in a trained lawyer. He censures the Southerners for not putting in their constitution stronger expressions of state sovereignty, instead of tamely appropriating the Constitution of the United States.

"Now, unquestionably, was the occasion to have declared in express terms the pet dogma of secession, of the right of sovereign states to nullify, at the least, any act of Congress; but no assertion of the kind is hinted at. Nothing whatever did state sovereignty gain in this new instrument . . . but a bald avowal in the preamble that each state . . . acted in a sovereign and independent capacity" (p. 55).

But Mr. Schouler must see that it would have been self-stultification for the Southerners to change the wording of the Constitution when they had so long contended that their views embodied the only rational interpretation of the words as they stood. The declaration in the preamble was all that they needed, if they needed anything at all, to render abso-

lutely complete their reasoning. The author is clearly at sea in the passage quoted; and conspicuously so in the opening sentence, which, if it means anything, identifies nullification with secession—a confusion which the logic of Calhoun so incisively repudiated.

Mr. Schouler's estimate of the prominent personalities involved in the struggle illustrates again the conventional type of his thinking. Lincoln is a hero unqualified, with whose eulogy the volume begins and ends. Jefferson Davis is a gloomy despot. McClellan is little above an imbecile. Lee is a good man, handicapped by the "fatal error" of going with his state. Grant is the paramount military hero, whose failure to destroy Lee in 1864 is rather skilfully glossed over. What one misses in the author's judgment is the note of qualification that marks the unbiassed historical temper. It is not at all essential to Lincoln's claims to pre-eminent statesmanship, that he should be represented as a civil-service reformer. Nor, in view of the anxious inquiries which preceded the appointment of Grant to the command-in-chief and of Chase to the chief-justiceship, can it be truthfully maintained that Lincoln was not concerned, as his re-election approached, to "shut out rivals from the suffrage of the people" (p. 628). Again, in dealing with McClellan it would be no more than just to note that his persistent overestimate of the forces opposed to him rested, not on the original and inherent perversity of the general's intelligence, but on the unvarying reports of the secret-service department of the army. And it ought to be remembered, also, in any comparison of McClellan with other generals, that he alone has been afflicted with the publication of his letters to his wife. A study in comparative uxoriousness might, if properly documented, shake other reputations as well as his. And finally, it was hardly worth Mr. Schouler's while to emphasize his depreciation of McClellan by lamenting, even in a note (p. 242), that the general "was never to be seen charging or directing gloriously in battle, but kept at some secluded occupation." One hardly expects to find in a serious historical work published in 1899 that conception of an army commander which is expressed in the ancient three-color prints of a foaming "charger" standing on his hind legs while the epauletted rider personally decapitates the chief of the opposing host.

Mr. Schouler's narrative of military and political operations is as a whole well-balanced and as full as could be expected in the space. Some statements appear, however, which are clearly and surprisingly erroneous. On page 190 the *Monitor* is endowed with "nimbleness of motion"—a quality which her officers never discovered. The blowing-up of the *Merrimac* is said in a note to have been "a Union exploit"; though in fact it was performed by Commodore Tatnall and his Confederate crew. "The British House of Commons" did not, as Mr. Schouler says, "make remonstrance" against Butler's woman order in New Orleans, though individual members were fierce enough in denunciation. It would appear from the account on page 426 of the detention of the Rebel rams by the British government, that they were stopped as a result of Minister Adams's threat of war. But in fact, as Mr. Rhodes clearly shows

in his last volume, Earl Russell ordered the detention of the vessels before he received Adams's famous despatch. Throughout the discussion of our relations with Great Britain Mr. Schouler's view of Earl Russell is widely at variance with that of Mr. Rhodes, representing the English statesman as a rather hateful exponent of the extreme pro-Confederate feeling, though in fact he seems to have been disposed to do full justice to both sides. Vollandigham was buried in the gubernatorial election in Ohio in 1863 not, as Mr. Schouler says, under "one hundred thousand adverse votes," but under a hundred thousand adverse majority. Finally, Early's force in the Valley in 1864, so far from being "about the same" as Sheridan's (p. 517), was in fact less than half as large, or about 15,000 to 40,000 (cf. *Battles and Leaders*, IV. 524, note). In view of this disparity the result of the campaign can not be ascribed off-hand to "the superior fighting capacity of Sheridan."

In Mr. Schouler's narrative of the non-military history of the times the government's policy and practice of arbitrary arrests receives very inadequate treatment. The subject is indeed dismissed with a half-dozen bare allusions, except for the *cause célèbre* of Vollandigham. This is certainly a grave distortion of history; for, with the exception of emancipation, no feature of administration policy in non-military affairs had so important an influence on public opinion as that touching civil rights in the loyal states. The failure to give due prominence to the facts of this matter is the most serious defect in the plan and execution of Mr. Schouler's volume.

WILLIAM A. DUNNING.

Charles Francis Adams. By his son, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. [American Statesmen Series.] (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1900. Pp. vii, 426.)

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS stepped out into national politics in 1848, a few months after the death of John Quincy Adams. Those who had never admired the moral combativeness of the father now pretended to have great respect for his memory, and referred to him as "the last of the Adamases," so as to ridicule the son, who was the Free Soil candidate for the vice-presidency on the ticket with Martin Van Buren. Not until about fourteen years later did it become certain that this third Adams in direct line was to make a brilliant public record. The fact was recognized during and after the war period, but this biography is the first attempt to describe the Adams whose chief fame was won in the field of diplomacy.

In this family, independence seems to be a trait, which is stronger in the fourth than in any previous generation. The present biographer soon wins the reader's confidence by the impartiality with which he sides at one time with John Quincy Adams and at another with Charles Francis Adams. The lives of the two men, between 1830 and 1846, were inseparably interwoven with each other, and the memorable record made

during these years by J. Q. Adams "would not have been possible had it not been for the co-operation and quiet support he received from his son." We are also told that the son so strenuously disapproved of the ex-President's return to public life that the two were for a time not on terms of cordiality. The importance and picturesqueness of John Quincy Adams's service in the House of Representatives causes our author, who has a keen sense of humor, to remark: "The elder man, however, bore up bravely; and, from the spring of 1835, affairs gradually assumed a more cheerful aspect. . . . He had demonstrated that he was right—that he understood himself and the situation. So far as he was concerned the problem of what we are to do with our ex-Presidents did not call for further consideration." When the contests over the right of petition waxed hot and John Quincy Adams took the lead, the son recorded in his diary, as we are informed, a "despairing groan," lamented that his advice had not been accepted, and added, "But, as he [John Quincy Adams] is in it, I must do my best to help him out." Then with quiet sarcasm the biographer remarks: "This resolve on the part of the son was certainly commendable; though it is to be feared that, if the father had been able to find no other resource in the difficult position in which he had then placed himself, his danger would have been extreme." It would be easy to give many more illustrations of remarkably spicy candor.

The first time Charles Francis Adams attracted public attention by any extraordinary ability was when he spoke in the House on the state of the country early in 1861. A committee of one Representative from each of the thirty-three states had been considering the problem of preventing an outbreak of hostilities between the sections. Adams believed with Thurlow Weed and Seward that the South could be reconciled without granting her enough to imperil the legitimate advantages of the Republican victory; that at least it would be best to make all reasonable concessions, so as to show that the secessionists were contending, not for constitutional rights or even a preservation of slavery as it existed, but for its extension or the establishment of an empire where it should be the corner-stone. The Republicans were to be powerless until after Lincoln's inauguration, March 4, 1861. Buchanan's annual message of the previous December was the strongest evidence that he would not adopt a vigorous policy of repression. The conservative Republicans undertook to delay, and if possible, disorganize the secession movement. It is now indisputable that Adams's plan was a wise one, although, as we are told, "the course was at the time distinctly opportunist,—a course in which, amid changing circumstances, but always in the presence of a great danger, he felt his way from day to day." The biographer describes with extraordinary lucidity the particulars of the problem the Republicans in Congress had to deal with. During the period of cabinet-making Adams was much talked of for the head of the Treasury Department; but Lincoln generously offered to let the Vice-President-elect, Hamlin, have the chief influence in naming the representative from New England, and other

circumstances made it desirable that the one selected should come from the Democratic rather than the Whig wing of the party. So the choice fell upon Gideon Welles, who became Secretary of the Navy. It had also been Lincoln's plan to send Dayton as minister to Great Britain and Frémont as minister to France. But Seward was a close friend of Adams's, and practically insisted that if he was not to come into the cabinet, he should have the most important of the foreign missions. The President yielded in a good-natured way.

When Adams went to England, in May, 1861, it was the all but unanimous belief of the Republicans that Englishmen would sympathize with the North. When Great Britain issued her proclamation of neutrality, which recognized that the Confederates were belligerents, it was erroneously inferred that this was an act distinctly friendly to the South. For a time Adams shared in the general irritation on this account, but his biographer does not hold the same opinion; he thinks it fortunate that Great Britain did not wait until after the first important Confederate victories, a little more than two months later, for then a recognition of belligerency would probably have been accompanied by that of independence.

Before the proclamation of neutrality had been issued, but after the war had commenced and the blockade had begun, Seward instructed the United States ministers in Europe that the government was now ready to accede to the Declaration of Paris, of 1856. All the powers signing this declaration stipulated that among themselves privateering was and should remain abolished; that neutral goods in an enemy's ship, and an enemy's goods in a neutral ship (contraband of war excepted in each case) should be free from confiscation; and that blockade in order to be binding must be effective. As will be remembered, the United States had in 1856 declined to become a party to this agreement. Undoubtedly the original aim of the American Secretary of State was to relieve the members of the British government especially from all fear of injury from privateers, and, as far as possible, to remove all excuses for British or French interference in American affairs. But there is little room to doubt that, after the proclamation of neutrality, his purpose was just the reverse—that is, after the United States should become a party to the declaration, to call on Great Britain and other powers to help to suppress Confederate privateering. Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, was the first to suspect Seward's design and was instrumental in having the British and the French governments join in saying that the accession of the United States would be acceptable only on condition that it should be expressly stated that the agreement should not apply to the Confederacy. This took the spring out of the trap. So Seward was the first one to throw it aside, and he and Adams became very indignant that the powers had insisted on such a precedent condition. Dayton, the United States minister to France, did not agree with them. Our author holds that Lord John Russell missed a great opportunity to commit the United States to the declaration, and adds: "Immediate complications

might have grown out of the American Civil War, and those he could in some way have met as they presented themselves; but, so far as the larger and more remote interests of Great Britain were concerned, the case was clear, and he had the game in his hands" (p. 207). Thirty-nine years have elapsed since that day, and the United States have not cared to use privateers in the two subsequent wars. The present biographer is the one that has shown most clearly how Seward made repeated efforts to stir up trouble with Great Britain, and how Russell had a correct, although vague, notion of the aims of the American Secretary of State. Instead of having missed a great opportunity, we think that Russell's action is one of the best of the many examples of his sober judgment and wise resolution to steer clear of danger and to proceed slowly.

In regard to the numerous issues with which the American minister had to deal later, this narrative is highly pleasing on account of both the method employed and the originality with which facts and earlier opinions are treated. The chapter on the Trent affair contains some sharp ridicule of the supposed importance of preventing Mason and Slidell from reaching Europe. Great Britain's demands and preparations for war at that time have usually been very strongly condemned by American writers, but it is the opinion of the writer that when compared with the attitude which the administration of Benjamin Harrison assumed toward Chili, "the course taken and the language used by the government of Great Britain, in December, 1861, and January, 1862, stand amply justified" (p. 235). Over-zealous and ignorant naval officers and scheming politicians are not likely to get what they claim as an unalienable right—to go into history as wise patriots—until such men as this author are burned at the stake. The discussions of the problem involved in the cotton famine, the attempts to ward off British intervention, and to prevent the departure of Confederate warships from English ports, are all fresh, vigorous, and instructive. Without any exaggerated claims they explain the value of Charles Francis Adams's services. He was unlike most men in that his judgment was best when the danger was greatest. His responsibility and success in connection with the Geneva arbitration have never before been so fully described.

It is pleasing to know that the author is not to quit this field, but that the volume before us is regarded as merely "a preliminary study, and in part a condensed abstract of a larger and more detailed work already far advanced in preparation." In the future work the diary, letters and papers of the elder Charles Francis Adams are to be given a large proportion of the space.

The Life of Abraham Lincoln, drawn from Original Sources and containing many Speeches, Letters and Telegrams hitherto unpublished. By IDA M. TARBELL. (New York: Doubleday and McClure Co. 1900. Two vols., pp. 426, 459.)

Abraham Lincoln, the Man of the People. By NORMAN HAGOOD. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1899. Pp. xiii, 433.)

BESIDES the monumental work which Nicolay and Hay properly entitled "A History," Lincoln has been the subject of many volumes; but we think they will nearly all be found to be contributions to his biography and to the history of his time, rather than symmetrical, proportioned, and harmonious works, the literary analogue of the painted portrait which hands a great man down to posterity. Most of the books we have in mind make Personal Recollections either the chief or the sub-title, thus disclaiming the purpose to treat Mr. Lincoln's life as a unit or to present the whole of it with well-considered relation and subordination of parts.

Miss Tarbell's book has grown out of two series of successful papers which she contributed to *McClure's Magazine* and which embodied the results of an extensive and well-organized search for new material. The first series related to the early life of Lincoln and brought to light evidence which fairly modifies and corrects some of the rather extravagant stories which have been current regarding the penury and the lack of educational and social advantages of his childhood. It also developed with some success an intelligible account of the unfolding of his powers and qualities in his early manhood, and removed the air of miraculous growth which hung about a career sufficiently remarkable. The second series dealt with his mature life, for which full data were already published, and where the author could only glean here and there, collecting the recollections of a wider circle of witnesses and the correspondence of persons more or less well acquainted with Mr. Lincoln. The whole has now been brought together, the story of the life has been made consecutive, compilation of accepted facts and anecdotes from published authorities has been added, even the minuter and less important of Lincoln's letters and dispatches have been collected and added. The result is a popular life of the man, well calculated to have vogue among the people at large. From the point of view of students of history its chief importance will be found in the field the author originally worked,—the addition to our store of materials of varying importance touching Lincoln's career, especially his childhood and youth, and that of his parents.

Mr. Hagood makes no claim to original research. His aim is, however, more ambitious as literature. He uses the collected materials of others, and seeks to draw for us a portrait in the realistic style which shall make us feel its verisimilitude in all the phases of Lincoln's wonderful history. He gives us the key to his purpose by saying "The biography of such a man can afford honesty." So it can; but what is honesty in portraiture, whether with brush or pen? Other biographers, whom he criticizes, would probably assert the principle as earnestly as he.

There are misleading disclosures as well as honest reticences. Every situation in nature has an infinity of detail. We must choose and reject, and the result will be judged by the success with which we have chosen the important and so made them dominate in a harmonious whole as to give assurance of a character equal to the work the great man actually accomplished. If, when we study the portrait, we cannot fit his character and career to the figure and features, it is a failure as a portrait, whatever it may be as a *genre* picture. Treating a biography as a literary work of art, if it does not subordinate the transient to the permanent, the trivial to the important, accidents to characteristics, the body to the soul, it lacks "honesty" in the right sense of the word, which is essential and harmonious truth.

Mr. Hapgood says "Let us not try to make our great man like other great men. Let us allow him to reach as high as the saints in one direction and as high as Rabelais in another. Let him be the prairie male as well as the sage and martyr; the deft politician as well as the generous statesman. Paint him as he is." If this means that we want characteristic truth in the portrait, we are all agreed. If we object to a conventional toga-clad figure, it does not follow that we must present our hero in the nude. Our rule should be found in Niebuhr's fine saying which Keller quotes: "It is not well that the world should see a man through and through; there are decent clothes of the soul that one should no more strip off than those of the body."¹

Mr. Hapgood's book is not so startling as his portentous preface might lead us to expect. His scheme seems to be to connect, as nearly as may be, samples of Mr. Lincoln's homely but apt illustrations with the acts and scenes of his life, all the way through. He must appear "in character" at each entrance. With the author's lively and vigorous style a book is made which will no doubt have greater popular favor than if it conformed more closely to the ideal of truth and honesty which we are trying to present. There is very little that is offensive in the anecdotal part of the biography. Our criticism is, rather, that the total effect produced is that Mr. Lincoln was an amusing person. The author assures us, in "asides," that he was really a great man, that he had the most earnest and serious purposes, that his nature tended to pathetic sadness, but the effect remains. This is because strong colors and high flavors have a way of asserting themselves unduly. A very little garlic in a salad is plenty: a very little more makes it all garlic. A few witty speeches by a public man will give him the name of the "Wag of the House," and many an able man has bewailed the fact that after this he could never make his audience take him seriously. The ideally "honest" biographer will use effectual means to correct the false impression. That Mr. Lincoln was taken seriously whenever he chose to be, is itself the proof that the humorous vein in him was not prominent in his public appearances, but was,

¹ Keller's *Life of Bächtold*, preface. "Es sei nicht gut dass die Welt jeden bis ins Innere kenne; es gebe Kleider der Seele, die man ebenso wenig abziehen sollte, wie die des Körpers."

in the main, kept for the enlivening of social intercourse. If we are made to expect amusement whenever he appears, we are misled as to the man.

Nearly all the published stories concerning Mr. Lincoln which have jarred upon good taste, have related to his youth. The escapades or the ludicrous experiences of a boy have no claim, in themselves, to a place in the biography of an important personage. To entitle them to it, they must be so connected with his development that the matured character cannot be understood without them. Writing an amusing book about a man should never be mistaken for writing his biography. The biographer profits by the study of much that he does not put into his work. He is, at his best, an artist, full of knowledge of his subject and sure in his command of his art. He knows how to exhibit a noble character so that its nobility shall inspire awe, whilst its individuality is still distinct and unmistakable. If a subordinate, trait, a wart on the face, a drawl in the voice, a limp in the gait, is made impertinently self-asserting, the result is only an amusing or an odious caricature.

Childhood and youth are marked by one's progress from the innocent animality of the new-born babe toward the rational self-control and conscientious obedience to an ideal of right which ought to mark the moral maturity of the man. A skillful, brief sketch of the fun-loving, mischievous boy helps us to understand the task he mastered in overcoming the temptations to idle amusement, and in working honestly for mental discipline and furnishing. To describe all the practical jokes, the awkward, ungainly actions, only fastens to the great man's name a series of pictures exhibiting him as an object for derisive laughter. The laughter, in such cases, gets much of his pleasure from a feeling of superiority to the object of his amusement.

In Mr. Lincoln's case, candid study of his youth shows an early and strong attraction toward intellectual pursuits and moral development. In spite of his fun, his copy-books show a hand-writing that was formed for life, several years earlier than is usually the case, even with boys who have the best educational advantages. This implies a good deal of practice in writing, with a steady purpose. His arithmetic showed easy mastery of accurate calculation, with precision of statement and of process. The implication here is of clear comprehension of the logic of mathematical reasoning. Unconscious taste made him form and stick to a simple and very direct style of speech, with transparent clearness of meaning. There was no reason why he might not have formed as showy a rhetorical method as Douglas or other political orators of the state who grew up with him in the same community. He not only chose his style intentionally, but loved to emphasize the difference with others. In his professional work he preferred a colloquial phrase to a technical one, if it were as clear and free from ambiguity. Verbal fluency which covered inaccurate thinking he despised and would ridicule by purposely opposing to it a real thought in commonest idiom.

His moral nature was also sensitive and alert, and though, like notable examples before him, when he would do good, evil was sometimes

present with him, he gives abundant evidence that in such cases his conscience goaded him and that he was never deaf to its voice. There is a touch of pathetic humor mingled with self-judgment, even in the childish jingle he added to the inscription of his name in his copy-book, "He will be good, but God knows when." This sensitive conscience was joined to a tenderly sympathetic spirit which made him instantly respond to appeals for help or pity. To cause misery in another was a double misery to himself, and the apprehension that he had done so was the explanation of conduct, eccentric almost to the point of derangement, in one or two crises of his young life.

The anecdotal biographies produce an untrue effect by the very means that makes them amusing reading. The high-colored stories blind us to the tenderer tints of the life. Every picture-gallery bears witness to the fact that a canvas in a high key kills its near neighbor in a quieter one; still more is it ruin to force such contrasts in the same work. Lincoln's life was in real harmony from beginning to end, for it was the constant evolution of a rare nature. The rude surroundings of his childhood were not vicious. Frontier life was full of rough experiences, but the frontiersmen were of the most enterprising civilized stock, whose energy was bounding forward to create in a single generation the Illinois of 1860. The log cabin was not of kin to the wigwam: it was the temporary camp of a race that could build cities in a day, and was all astir with the energy inspired by the dim vision of what was soon to be accomplished. The boy Lincoln was the child of such a community, born to be its leader and the leader of the nation. The broader view is the truer one, and we miss it if we dwell too minutely on the puncheon floor and the scanty furniture of the cabin, or if we make too much of his rail-splitting and the first groping steps toward education and an intellectual life.

When his prenticeship has been served and we find him a member of the legal profession, his importance grows as we discern that his fellow lawyers on the circuit not only enjoy his company at the tavern, but try their cases before him by consent, in the absence of the judge. Another step is taken when, in a great political struggle in his state, the public men and lawyers who know him best, from the great city as well as from the country village, turn spontaneously to him to champion the cause of free labor against the unquestioned leader of the opposition, a man of national renown. Did they do it because he made them laugh in the careless group around the court-house door?

Again, with all his homeliness of form and feature he comes before a great metropolitan audience, and keenest critics, used to measure the foremost men of the time, forget everything but the great ideas they are listening to, the invincible logic, the powerful array of facts, the seer-like views of the nation's destiny, and the patriot's faith in the triumph of right. They go away to bear witness to the wisdom, the logic, the persuasiveness, the deep conviction which is contagious, the lofty moral tone which is inspiring, and with one accord proclaim that they have heard a

master-piece of successful advocacy. If the biographer does not make us forget trivialities, grotesqueness and awkwardness, as the Cooper Institute audience forgot them, he has not presented the man, but only accidental adjuncts of the man, the material part that clogs his soul. From such a picture we may turn to the statue that looks upon Lake Michigan from the park that bears his name, and standing before it reverently, we shall feel that genius can be true to form, and without disguising native proportions or softening the ruggedness of a single feature, may yet quicken the whole as the indwelling spirit was wont to do when rising to the dignity of its mission on earth. Cannot the written biography do the like? May it not make Lincoln's place in history from 1858 to his deplorable taking-off completely dominate the preparatory years? May it not make sympathy with his task, love for his human charity, admiration for his lucid intellect, worship for his patriotism, so mingle with our pity for his sadness and his death, that amusement will hardly tinge our emotions, but dwindle to the humorous single touch of human nature that makes us kin?

The shiftiness of the politician making appointments to placate faction or to carry an election, will be so covered by the sincere meekness of his response to the implied rebuke of a man like General Sherman, that we shall lay the fault to the political habits and methods of the time which he sadly admits and does not justify. As we go on with him toward the end, the will of a great ruler is more and more felt behind the simple-hearted amiability which superficial observers took for lack of grasp and of purpose. He has bent statesmen to his plan. He has shifted the commanders of great armies till those are found who can lead the armed nation in the stubbornest of campaigns. He has taught the necessity of continuous, unrelenting struggle till great columns, East and West, make no halt for winter or for summer, for storm or flood or weariness or hunger. Yet he hates the butchery of war, holds no malice in his heart, plans no vengeance, and unfeignedly sighs for peace, amnesty, freedom and brotherhood. When we stand in awe before the full revelation of such a character, we chide ourselves for our tardiness in recognizing it, and confess our fault in letting the outward form obscure the great soul within.

Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest. By JOHN ALLAN WYETH, M.D. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1899. Pp. xx, 656.)

WYETH'S *Life of Forrest* is a valuable and unusually interesting contribution to the literature of the Civil War in America. The author has industriously and carefully selected his material, and has used it judiciously and effectively. The biographical passages of the book fitly accomplish the purpose to which, in a work chiefly intended to be historical in his character, biography should be directed. Without exceeding due limits, the anecdotes related of Forrest's boyhood and the account

given of his *ante-bellum* life, serve very well to illustrate the personal traits of the man whose conduct as a soldier and commander the book is written to commemorate, and assist the reader to understand his really extraordinary career. The author has justly portrayed the chief characteristics of his hero, the qualities which made him so formidable and successful in war; and the popular estimation in which Forrest has always been held, and the impression he produced on his military contemporaries, both comrades and enemies, are abundantly justified by Dr. Wyeth's admirable narrative.

There was never a more perfect example than Nathan Bedford Forrest, of that type of self-taught soldier, of which this country has produced so many specimens; men to whom war seems to be a normal condition, so intuitively have they comprehended its requirements. It may be due to the versatile and inventive energy with which the American is accredited, or to inherited instincts stronger and more active in generations just succeeding the pioneer periods, or it may have been purely accidental; but it is indisputable that in the Revolutionary struggle and in our Civil War an unusually large number of men appeared who, lacking alike the training of the schools and previous military experience, nevertheless exhibited a capacity for command which only the educated or experienced soldier had been supposed to possess.

Forrest, almost without education of any kind, was utterly without military education or experience when he began his career. He was a self-made soldier, and what he did was wrought by strong sagacity and clear judgment; his success was the product of a natural military aptitude, a will which compromised with no difficulty, and a temper as nearly fearless as is ever given to human nature. From his first combat at Sacramento to his last battle at Selma, the latter quality distinguished him, beyond even the most daring of his followers; and Dr. Wyeth relates with as much satisfaction the frequent exhibitions he gave of personal prowess, as the greater actions which attest his ability as a general.

Enlisting at the beginning of the war, Forrest very soon recruited a battalion of cavalry consisting of eight companies. Like the horsemen recruited and trained by Morgan, and indeed all of the mounted Confederate commands of the West, these troops were accustomed to fight habitually on foot, using the rifle and revolver, while a few picked companies, using only the revolver, fought mounted. This method of fighting was in a measure hereditary with the Kentuckians and Tennesseans. Their pioneer ancestors had used very much the same tactics under Shelby and Sevier, Logan and Harrod.

Forrest's first opportunity for the display of the ready appreciation of a military situation and promptness of decision for which he was so distinguished, was afforded at Fort Donelson, when it became apparent that the Confederate works could not be held against the superior numbers of the enemy directed by the energy and determination of Grant. It will be conceded that the author of this book, however unjust to other officers he may be in his account of the surrender of the Confederate

forces at Donelson, is correct in his statement that Forrest exhibited not only vigor, but wisdom in insisting on withdrawing his own command, and that he had reason for the opinion he urged that a large part of the infantry might escape by the route which he himself was about to take. He escaped with his entire command and reached General Albert Sidney Johnston's army in time to take part in the Battle of Shiloh, where his conduct increased his already excellent reputation.

Early in June, 1862, he was ordered to Chattanooga with instructions to organize a brigade of cavalry for services in that department. He was permitted to take with him only a very few of the troops which he had already organized and trained, and which under his leadership were already veteran and formidable. Indeed, Forrest suffered in this respect more, perhaps, than any other cavalry leader on the Confederate side; and more than once after this, was required to part with men whom he had enured to war and accustomed to victory, and recruit and train new commands. He was fortunate, however, in securing the famous Eighth Texas, the most efficient body of men for purely mounted service, perhaps, in the Confederate army.

General Kirby Smith, a very able officer, was then in command of the department, and realizing how much could be accomplished in that way was vigorously preparing for the systematic employment of cavalry against the Federal forces occupying Tennessee and Kentucky. Relying implicitly on the intuitive strategic skill of his ardent and enterprising lieutenants he gave only general instructions and permitted them to execute his orders to capture and destroy depots of supplies and break lines of communication after their own fashion. Morgan marched from Knoxville on the 4th of July, and swept central Kentucky as far north as Cynthiana, within sixty miles of Cincinnati, capturing or dispersing every garrison on his route. On the 6th of July, Forrest marched from Chattanooga into middle Tennessee, and reached McMinnville, forty miles from Murfreesboro, on the 11th. An immense amount of supplies of all kinds had been accumulated at Murfreesboro, guarded by two regiments of Federal infantry and a considerable force of cavalry, with four pieces of artillery. To capture this place was the chief object of the expedition, and Forrest's command numbered about 1500 men. He had no artillery. Dr. Wyeth gives—as he does of all such affairs—a very graphic and interesting account of the combat at Murfreesboro. Forrest dashed upon the enemy at daybreak and after stubborn fighting, in which the killed and wounded were about equal on both sides, captured more than eleven hundred prisoners, a large quantity of stores, four guns and a large number of small arms with ammunition. He remained in Tennessee, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the enemy to drive him out, doing active and efficient service until Bragg's army, *en route* for Kentucky, arrived, and he reported to General Bragg at Sparta on the 3rd of September. He accompanied the army into Kentucky, where he was again deprived of his brigade and ordered back to Tennessee to recruit and organize another.

Early in the winter of 1862 he was ordered to cross the Tennessee river and operate upon Grant's lines of communication between Corinth and Columbus. To properly understand the purpose of this expedition, some explanation should be given of the then military situation in Tennessee and Mississippi, and of its relation to other Confederate cavalry operations of the same date.

The army of Tennessee, under General Bragg, occupied Middle Tennessee, south and east of Nashville, with its headquarters at Murfreesboro. The Federal army (of the Cumberland), numerically superior, held Nashville, with strong detachments and garrisons in the fertile region of Middle Tennessee, north of the Cumberland, and strongly guarding the Louisville and Nashville railroad. General Grant's army held Memphis and all of West Tennessee, with strong garrisons along the Mobile and Ohio railroad. Grant was also pressing down the Mississippi river toward Vicksburg; and Northern Mississippi was occupied by Federal troops. Rosecrans was about to attack Bragg, and Bragg hoped, by an active use of his cavalry, to prevent the outlying Federal detachments in Northern Tennessee and Kentucky from taking part in the anticipated battle and also to so impair the Louisville and Nashville railroad as to delay reinforcements and supplies sent to Rosecrans. It was quite as important to also harass and retard Grant, and thwart a simultaneous movement of the Federal armies which might, at the same time, drive the Confederates out of Tennessee and capture Vicksburg.

On the 7th of December, Morgan defeated and captured the Federal garrison at Hartsville, 2500 strong, and on the 22d broke into Kentucky, wrecking the railroad from Bacon Creek to a point within forty miles of Louisville. Van Dorn, with the cavalry of Pemberton's army, on the 20th of December attacked the Federal garrison at Holly Springs, in North Mississippi, Grant's chief depot of supplies for that region, defeating it and capturing all the stores and 1500 prisoners. On the 17th of December, Forrest crossed the Tennessee river at Clifton, a point about twenty-five miles north of the Tennessee line, with 2100 men and seven pieces of artillery. He defeated a considerable force of the enemy at Lexington, and then marched straight on Jackson, the most important post occupied by the enemy on the Mobile and Ohio railroad. He made no attempt to take this place but while threatening it broke the railroad south of it, between Bolivar and Corinth, and north as far as Moscow, in Kentucky, capturing the garrisons at Carroll's Station, Trenton, Humboldt, Kenton's Station and Union City. Returning he made his way through heavy forces of infantry and cavalry, and safely recrossed the Tennessee at Clifton. This expedition greatly hindered General Grant's operations.

After the battle of Murfreesboro and when General Bragg had fallen back to Tullahoma, Forrest was busily employed in Middle Tennessee, and was conspicuous in the numerous cavalry battles which were then fought in that region. His pursuit and capture of Streight, one of the most exciting episodes of his career, furnishes material for, perhaps, the most fascinating chapter of the book. At Chickamauga he rendered un-

usually valuable service; for which he was rewarded by deprivation of his command while he was in hot pursuit of the enemy.

In November, 1863, he was again ordered to West Tennessee with leave to act independently. He took with him less than three hundred men, and found less than four hundred organized troops in the region where he was to operate; but he recruited so vigorously and his presence roused such enthusiasm that in a few weeks he had more than three thousand men in ranks, although many were imperfectly armed.

Heavy forces were at once directed against him, and in December he was compelled to retreat into North Mississippi. This movement, successfully accomplished when surrounded by four times his number, and hemmed in between swollen rivers, was a masterpiece of strategy.

In the following summer he defeated and routed the superb cavalry corps sent, under Generals W. S. Smith and Grierson, to destroy him. Then followed in quick succession a number of brilliant combats, the capture of Fort Pillow, and the termination of his service in that field with his wonderful defeat of Sturgiss.

He actively participated in General Hood's advance on Nashville, and covered the retreat, when Hood fell back, with a skill and desperate tenacity in holding men to such dangerous and demoralizing work, unequalled in the history of the war.

In the last days of the Confederacy he was pitted, with a depleted and dispirited command, against the best troops and by far the ablest opponent, General James H. Wilson, he had ever encountered; and exhibited in his reverses even grander courage than had won his victories.

Dr. Wyeth's style is attractive, and his narrative, notwithstanding the amplitude of detail and incident, is extremely clear. He tells the story well, and vividly paints the scenes of his hero's campaigns; and Forrest stands out from the canvas, audacious and energetic, yet vigilant and cautious; vehement but clear-sighted and prescient, the incarnation of dauntless, sagacious, indomitable leadership.

The Making of Hawaii: A Study in Social Evolution. By WILLIAM FREMONT BLACKMAN, Professor in Yale University. (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1899. Pp. xii, 266.)

America in Hawaii: A History of United States Influence in the Hawaiian Islands. By EDMUND JAMES CARPENTER. (Boston: Small, Maynard and Co. 1899. Pp. xi, 275.)

The Real Hawaii, its History and Present Condition, including the True Story of the Revolution. A Revised Edition of *The Boston at Hawaii*. By LUCIEN YOUNG, U. S. N. (New York: Doubleday and McClure. 1899. Pp. xiii, 371.)

THERE is a fascination about the history of the Hawaiian Islands which owes its power to many causes: the political situation which they

occupied as (virtually) our one real colony, the dramatic events attending President Cleveland's attempt to reinstate the deposed queen Liliuokalani, their religious interest as the scene of the most rapid work of evangelization that has ever attended our modern missionary work, and finally the anthropological interest in the islanders and their primitive society and its institutions.

From all these standpoints, Mr. Blackman has treated the Hawaiian Islands, and in doing this has produced a really model historical and sociological monograph. His description of the people and their earlier institutions leaves nothing to be desired. Out of a great mass of material he has gathered what is reliable and important.

A number of problems bearing upon the development of society arise at once in the study of such a people. What seems to have been the origin of their religion? Two strains are traceable here. One, which the author regards as the most important, indicates ancestor-worship and is associated intimately with the primitive conception of a "double" self which is strikingly illustrated in the ideas and customs of the Hawaiians. There is beside this an indication of a conception of higher powers connected especially with the heavens and the processes of the heavens that led Fornander to find in this phase of their mythology indications of the Christian Trinity. It would be well to follow out these different lines and find how far they may be associated with different stages of social organization. Certainly the organization of religion along the lines of magic—related to the fetish and idol—gave the opportunity for the development of the Kahuna—the medicine-man—and of a priestly power, which assisted in the growth of the feudal powers of the chiefs and ultimately in the political organization of the whole group by Kamehameha. In political institutions we see a quite unique development of a comparatively highly organized state in a society which had little in industrial and commercial organization to suggest the political movement.

The Hawaiian marriage has been made the basis of a complicated theory by Westermarck. Mr. Blackman shows that Westermarck's assumption of a primitive communal marriage out of which the so-called "punaluan" family (that in which brothers and sisters to some extent shared their respective husbands and wives) goes far beyond the simplest interpretation of the facts. There is nothing in Hawaiian society to indicate that the primitive family was not generally monogamous. Meanwhile the absence of metals placed a restriction upon industrial development which did not however involve the restriction of social advance to phases which are ordinarily associated with the stone age.

The author pays an eloquent tribute to the social and intellectual qualities of this Melanesian race. Their geniality, dignity, grace and even nobility of temperament, their quickness and adaptability within certain limits, their courage and eloquence and political ability are all attested, but make only more impressive the practical extinction of the race, their institutions, and industrial and social capabilities which has followed upon but a century's contact with Western civilization.

The causes of this extinction are well stated: disease primarily, lack of ability to fit into the stress and strain of Western industrial life, change of habits in dress and food, the ravages of intemperance and the removal of most of the motives for effort and activity which had given them stimuli for life and continuous interest in it. There is hardly anything more pathetic than the rapid action of these forces upon a race gifted in many ways, kindly and hospitable to the civilization that has nearly erased them. At first came the two extremes of Western social life—the missionary representing its ideals and the sailor and wandering adventurer representing its worst vices. Neither of these helped toward the building up of the vitality of the race. The missionary brought rigid conceptions of morality that were too far distant from the social organization they attempted to reform, to accomplish what they should. Still the missionaries were practical men and brought schools as well as the gospel. They brought the trades also, but they did not preserve the industrial activities of the people, and they were powerless over against the other forces that crowded in with the whale-ships and later with the sugar industry. Those natives not killed by disease were crowded out of the life of the community by the industrious Oriental. Even the native industries of making poi—the national food—and of fishing have passed largely into Chinese hands. The native has never been trained to continuous toil and is psychically incapable of working in the cane-field. In activities where sudden bursts of action alternate with comparative quiet he has always excelled, *e. g.*, as a sailor. But in the main he has been shoved to one side, and mercilessly destroyed by the germs of disease and decay which the white man has brought with him. Out of an estimated population of from 300,000 to 400,000 at the beginning of the century there are but some 30,000 left and there is little prospect that this remnant will survive.

Notwithstanding this gloomy result the work that the missionary did cannot fail to call forth admiration. It is especially his political skill that shows the stuff he was made of. The adaptation of Western institutions which the missionaries made for the native kings, their efforts to convey social and political education with the religious, the respect and affection which they enjoyed from the monarchs and the people, are parts of a chapter out of our own social life and show the characteristics of independence, self-reliance, social and political intelligence and fundamental righteousness that have made the American nation what it is. The description of this work of the missionaries is perhaps the most valuable part of Mr. Blackman's book. Finally one must comment upon the simple and clear style on the one side and the admirable presentation of bibliography, authorities, and statistics on the other which make the work almost perfect in its kind.

Mr. Carpenter's *America in Hawaii* is a correct and condensed statement of the political relations of the two countries culminating in the treaty of annexation. It contains a very admirable account, with numerous quotations, of the state papers which indicate the consistent attitude

taken by the various administrations at Washington toward Hawaii. No one can go over these without appreciating that the annexation was but the natural culmination of our policy, nor without being impressed by the evident anticipation of this by many of the men who have held the place of Secretary of State. The reader will also understand with how much surprise the Americans in Hawaii met the opposition that flamed up in some quarters against this step when it had become necessary for the continued existence of the American colony in Hawaii. Perhaps the most interesting chapters will be those describing President Cleveland's attempt to seat the deposed queen again upon the throne, and the course of the men-of-war, the *Philadelphia* and *Adams*, then stationed at Honolulu. No one in Honolulu knew how far President Cleveland had instructed his representative to go. That he wished to overawe the Provisional Government with a show of compulsion there is no doubt, for the ships cleared for action and gave the inhabitants of Honolulu reason to anticipate the forcible carrying-out of the President's policy.

"At this juncture an officer's gig was seen to put out from the ship, rowed by four sailors. In the stern was seated a junior officer of the United States Navy. Coolly and calmly, and apparently oblivious of all the excitement, he headed his boat toward the shore, landed, made his way through the throng upon the wharf, and passed along the crowded streets of the city to the dwelling of a prominent citizen and one of those most closely in touch with the interests of the Provisional Government. Alone with his host, the officer, to the surprise of the first, introduced the subject uppermost in the minds of all, and in allusion to the situation of the hour, remarked: 'We have not yet received our final orders, and we do not know whether or not we shall receive orders to land and place the queen on the throne by force. We of the navy have no desire, of ourselves, to cause bloodshed. I perceive that you are well prepared to resist an attempt on our part to land. I think that, if such orders shall be issued to us, and our boats, with armed marines, shall put out from the ships, if you should fire a charge over our heads we should be obliged to put back and abandon our purpose'" (p. 223).

This occurrence, which the reviewer knows from his own conversation with gentlemen in Honolulu to have been a fact, is an excellent illustration of the fatuity of the whole attempt which Mr. Cleveland made to deal with a situation with which he was too little conversant.

The book as a whole is an excellent *résumé* of these first steps which we were unconsciously taking toward the East. The facts are far too little known and the history of America in Hawaii contains so many proofs of the intelligence and sagacity of our citizens when thrown under strange conditions upon their own resources that it is to be hoped it will be widely read.

Lieutenant Young's book is an enlargement of *The Boston at Hawaii*. It contains an interesting account of the landing of the marines from the *Boston* in 1893 when Liliuokalani was deposed and the Provisional Government was formed. The statement of the situation out of which this revolution arose is in the main correct, though it is the opinion of the

reviewer that far too much stress is laid upon the supposed intrigues of the English. Though England would gladly have taken possession of the islands, and though she would have been glad to see a government formed which would have strengthened ties with England, and though the British subjects there undoubtedly were working in this direction, still there has never been a period since England restored the sovereignty of the islands after the unjust aggression of Lord George Paulet in 1843, in which she has not recognized the paramount rights of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands or has been willing to take advantage of any intrigues which her subjects or others might instigate looking toward British supremacy. The reviewer feels also that the author does not do justice to the effect which the landing of the men from the *Boston* had in expediting the revolution. The attitude taken by Captain Wiltse was theoretically correct. His troops were landed, ostensibly, to protect American property, and he assured the marshal that he would remain neutral, though fighting in the streets was to be checked. On the other hand there can be no question that, in the minds of the native supporters of the Queen and even in her own mind, the moral force of the United States and probably the material force of her man-of-war was on the side of the revolution. Yet no one who was acquainted with the character and determination of the men behind the revolution and understood the cause which they supported could question that they would have carried through what they had undertaken without assistance material or moral. It is hard to say that the minister, Mr. Stevens, was not justified in view of these circumstances in calling upon Captain Wiltse to land his men. A great deal of valuable material has been piled into this book. But it is not very satisfactorily arranged or digested, and the tone of much of it is too belligerent and at times even flippant.

History of American Coinage. By DAVID K. WATSON. (New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1899. Pp. xx, 278.)

IN the expanding literature of money one is naturally compelled to ask of any new book its *raison d'être*. A welcome would be granted to the work which should present new material for testing old principles, or old principles in new lights, or even give a glimpse of new principles. But good paper and type ought not to be used to multiply the same statements of familiar facts which have already been long before the public. A new treatise on a hackneyed topic should have a commanding quality arising from exceptional brilliance of exposition, or the variety of new points of view, to make it welcome. It is not sufficient that it is the honest effort of an "earnest worker."

The title of the book is misleading. It is not a thorough-going, or even popular, treatise on American coinage; it does not give matters of coinage technical treatment, nor even any preponderant attention. In reality it is a history of monetary legislation and policy in the United States relating to gold and silver. And some excellent features are to be

found in the carrying out of this purpose. The style is generally clear, the exposition orderly, and the materials are treated intelligently. But one reads on to the end of the book somewhat impatiently—always looking to find out why the book was written, and never getting an answer. The first chapter seems wholly useless. It gives no results of new research on colonial coinage, such as appear when Professor Sumner gives a new chapter to the public; nor is there anything in it bearing on present problems. And the last chapter on the "Lesson of the Century" ambitiously faces the larger questions of monetary policy without giving any penetrating study of the problem. It is eminently respectable, but also eminently commonplace.

In a lucid way it travels over the old path of Hamilton's *Report*, the acts of 1792, 1834, 1837, 1853, 1873, 1875, 1878, 1890, 1893, and 1898 in a general fashion. But it cannot be said that the treatment is free from errors; although no writer on the subject is likely to escape all the pitfalls. It is hardly correct to say (p. vi) that gold coins disappeared before 1834 "by reason of gold having been undervalued by the Act of 1792," when in 1792 the market and mint rates closely coincided. Nor should it be said (p. vii) that silver certificates are "not legal tenders," if they are lawful money for many purposes. Of course, they are not legal tender for as many purposes as the United States notes. An inexcusable error is the author's confusion of gratuitous coinage with "free coinage" (p. 47). The absence of the charge for the expenses of coinage commonly known as the seigniorage should not be confounded with the freedom to the citizen of bringing bullion to the Mint to be turned into coins (whether a charge is made for the expenses of manufacture, or not). On page 149, the author uses "free coinage" in the usual sense, but elsewhere he strangely announces that the Act of 1792 allowed gold and silver bullion to be "assayed and coined free of expense, and this is the origin of the term 'free coinage,' which means to coin bullion without expense to the owner" (p. 54). This is certainly a discovery!

When he points out that Hamilton adopted the ratio of 15 : 1 because "he concluded that 15 : 1 was the market ratio" (p. 71), what does he say as to Hamilton's admission that he did not know what the market ratio of the world was? Also, he assigns the beginning of the "derangement" of the bimetallic system to 1820 (p. 78), when it began many years before. A slip of the pen probably accounts for his saying that the Act of 1834 "so changed the market ratio [*sic*] between the two metals that it resulted in changing their legal, or coinage ratio" (p. 86).

Another confusion arises from speaking carelessly of "the standard," when the author means "standard metal" (p. 98). The standard weight includes the pure metal and the alloy. It is also misleading to say that the Act of 1837 made the "first reduction in the weight of the silver dollar" (p. 98). Since the change in alloy did not change the quantity of pure silver in the dollar, it is not a matter of importance. The same mis-emphasis appears in speaking of the Act of 1853: "It was the first

time in the history of the country that the government exercised the right to control the coinage, and to deny to its citizens the free coinage of their bullion" (p. 106). Inasmuch as, under the Act of 1853, the free coinage of both gold and silver (dollars) remained to all citizens, it is not clear that the matter of a token silver coinage is ground for this statement. Again, one questions the wisdom of writing the weights of silver subsidiary coins under the Act of 1873 in grains, when the law specified grammes (p. 138).

Since the author emphasizes the Act of 1890, and studies its operation, it is a serious omission to say nothing of the phrase in the Act by which any Treasury notes when redeemed in silver are cancelled and disappear. Very soon we shall have no Treasury notes of 1890.

A book on sound money which is inclined to meet a demand of the free-silver party for more money by the admission that their theory is right may not, after all, be so very sound. The author seems to really believe in the *per capita* fallacy (p. 198) when he crushes the enemy by pointing out our large *per capita* circulation. As if a more expensive machinery of exchange were not rather a mark of medievalism!

While there are inaccuracies, such as have been pointed out, one must not overlook the good points. One of these appears in the writer's explanation that the Act of 1873 never demonetized the silver dollars (pp. 118-119). He is quite right in saying "It in no way affected them." The change occurred from another source: "In the revision of the Federal Statutes in 1874 a clause was inserted limiting the legal tender power of the silver coins of the United States to five dollars. This, of course, included the silver dollar, and it was this act, and not that of 1873, which affected the legal-tender power of that piece."

J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN.

Professor George Barker Stevens's *The Messages of Paul, arranged in Historical Order, analyzed, and freely rendered in Paraphrase, with Introductions* (Scribners, pp. xiii, 268) is a volume in the same series with *The Messages of the later Prophets*, by Professors Sanders and Kent, reviewed in our last number (pp. 608, 609, *supra*), and has the same merits. The volume contains paraphrases of the following epistles, in the order named: 1 Thessalonians, 2 Thessalonians, Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians, Philippians, the other Pauline epistles being apparently left to be grouped with Hebrews and those of James, John and Jude. Dr. Stevens, professor of systematic theology in Yale University, prefixes to the volume an excellent general introduction, and to each epistle an introduction more special; while an appendix contains a good, but very brief, bibliography. The body of the text is reproduced without much alteration from Dr. Stevens's *The Epistles of Paul in Modern English*, 1898.

We have explained in a previous issue (pp. 162, 163, *supra*) the plan of the volumes of *Letters and Papers relating to the First Dutch War*,

1652-54, which Dr. Samuel Rawson Gardiner is editing for the Navy Records Society. The second volume (London, the Society, pp. xvi, 388) follows the same plan, with similar completeness in the presentation of English and Dutch documents, derived from much the same sources as before. Two episodes divide the volume between them. The first half is occupied with the movements of Ayscue and Ruyter in the Channel in July and August, 1652, and with the fight of August $\frac{1}{2}$ between the Ile de Batz and Plymouth. Many excellent documents are given, yet the tactics of the battle perforce remain obscure. The second portion (Part VI. of the whole work) is devoted to the movements of Blake and De With in the North Sea in September and October, with the battle of the Kentish Knock, September 28 (October 8). In this latter division the most interesting documents are the journal of De With himself, Ruyter's log, and letters of General Blake and Vice-Admiral Penn. A very early use of the word "cartridge" (in Dutch, in one of De With's letters of October) is noted on p. 330. The volume contains a detailed map of the mouths of the Scheldt.

The Navy Records Society has inaugurated a new work, of great interest and value, though of course so technical in its bearings as to be caviare to the general, by issuing Vol. I. of *Logs of the Great Sea Fights, 1794-1805*, edited by Rear-Admiral T. Sturges Jackson, R.N. (London, the Society, pp. xvi, 345). The present volume covers Lord Howe's actions of May 28, May 29 and June 1, 1794, and the battles of St. Vincent and Camperdown. The plan is, to present the text of the log of each vessel engaged, for the day or days concerned, together with the signal logs of the flag-ships. The collection is surprisingly complete. In nearly all cases where the log of a particular vessel is missing, or was left imperfect by reason of the master's being killed in action, Rear-Admiral Jackson has been able to find some substitute, either a detailed journal kept by some officer or a long letter which an officer wrote immediately after the fight. Thus, in the case of the *Queen*, whose master was killed in the action of May 28, the editor substitutes a careful private journal kept on board that ship by Lieutenant S. J. Ballard, accompanied with nine excellent diagrams by that officer, which give much help in understanding the truly "elegant solutions" which Lord Howe gave to his problems of May 28 and 29, as well as the fight of the *Glorious First*. The legends upon these diagrams, by the way, when combined with the observations of Captain Schomberg of the *Culloden* and some other indications, make it clear that, in the opinion of the officers of the fleet best qualified to judge, Lord Howe made a mistake in calling off the *Thunderer* and the *Culloden* at the end of the fight; they might without serious difficulty have made the victory considerably more complete by securing the remainder of the dismasted French ships. Rear-Admiral Jackson prints the text of Lord Howe's signal-book, from the copy carried by the *Culloden*, with colored plates illustrating a part of them. Howe's cumbrous style, and the fact that the copies carried on board

different ships varied somewhat, help to explain some peculiarities of the actions. In fact there must be few essential details of any of the battles for which this admirably executed volume does not provide adequate and authentic information, unless it be in the case of Camperdown. There, from the nature of the case, Duncan's formation of his line of battle remains obscure. It is difficult to get a precise notion of it, because it was not precise. Moreover, the logs of the masters in the North Sea fleet were not so well kept as those of Howe's and Jervis's. However, comparison of one with another makes the tactics of the fight sufficiently clear. As for St. Vincent, the evidences here furnished leave nothing to be desired; none of the logs are missing, and almost all are clear and instructive. Especial interest of course attaches to the evidence respecting Nelson's action in wearing the *Captain* at the critical moment of the fight. It appears that James's statement, that Nelson did this in obedience to a signal from the flag-ship, rests on the sole authority of the log of the *Prince George*; but there is abundant evidence to show, when due comparison of time-entries is made, that no such signal was made before he wore, and that he acted in "glorious disobedience."

The scope of "The Story of the Nations" series is too well known to require restatement, and to say, therefore, that Professor Pietro Orsi, in his volume on *Modern Italy* (Putnam, pp. xviii, 404) conforms to the plan of being popular but accurate may give most readers a general idea of his book. Professor Orsi does not write for the specialist, but for the intelligent reader—once called "gentle"—to whom he offers a clear narrative of events, with suggestions of the philosophic or political significance of the main current of his story. In range, this book covers a larger period than the other single-volume works in English with which it may be compared; for Professor Orsi starts in 1748 and ends in 1898, whereas Countess Cesaresco's *Liberation of Italy* deals strictly with the *Risorgimento*, 1815–1870, Probyn's earlier book stops at the death of Victor Emanuel in 1878, and W. J. Stillman's unreliable *Union of Italy* runs from 1815 to 1895. Why Professor Orsi chose the middle of the last century as a starting-point, and continued his narrative a generation beyond the redemption of Rome, he does not explain. For symmetry, one must keep within the well-defined limits of the *Risorgimento*; but if symmetry be disregarded, it matters little what bounds one keeps.

And after all, there are many readers who will be glad to get the information contained in the earlier chapters of this book about the benevolent despots of the eighteenth century—a period not easily accessible to the English-reading students. Not less may be said of the closing sketch of contemporary Italy, including brief mention of a host of writers, painters, musicians, and other local celebrities. Professor Orsi has a compliment for each of them, and if it were not evident that he has exchanged criticism for politeness, we might imagine that Italy swarms to-day with scores of geniuses of the highest rank.

In the body of his work, devoted to the *Risorgimento* proper, he car-

ries his desire to be fair to every one so far that at times we wonder whether there were only saints and heroes concerned in the making of modern Italy. Nevertheless, the book may be recommended to persons who wish to break ground in this field and have not access to Countess Cesaresco's much better volume. One merit Professor Orsi has which no foreigner can have—he writes as a native, and accordingly he presents, often unconsciously, the point of view of a large majority of his countrymen. The translation might have been better, and so might the illustrations, which are well chosen but poorly printed.

Bulletin No. 9 of the Bureau of Rolls and Library of the Department of State, dated October, 1897, but just issued, contains, in curious juxtaposition, thirty pages of extremely miscellaneous index to a few of the papers of the Continental Congress and 922 pages constituting Vol. III. of the *Documentary History of the Constitution*. Vol. I., it will be remembered, contained the journal and some other papers of the Federal Convention, together with some preliminary records; Vol. II. consisted in the main of the official records of the ratifications of the Constitution by the states and of the proceedings relative to amendments actually adopted. Vol. III. consists of Madison's record of the debates in the Philadelphia Convention, printed from the original manuscript. An official transcript of this invaluable record, executed with the greatest pains, is, it is needless to say, a great boon to scholars, especially to those who are occupied with minute researches in constitutional history. But the fifth volume of Elliot's *Debates*, though doubtless not so accurate, will still remain more convenient for ordinary uses. It is indexed, and it is of a more manageable size. Moreover, the mode in which erasures and interlineations in the manuscript are presented in the new text makes it very hard reading. That they should have been preserved in Vol. I. was important, often exceedingly so. Their preservation in the present volume is much less important, for most commonly they are not instructive; but probably the editor saw no intermediate course. A note in a previous volume expressed regret that the facilities at the disposal of the Department did not permit the use of erased type. The form which the text takes on in the absence of these may be shown by reproducing the first few lines, the beginning of Madison's introduction to his record:

[“Preface to Debates in the convention of 1787” stricken out]

A [“jour” stricken out] sketch never finished nor applied.

[“added to natural propensity” stricken out] an

As the weakness and wants of man [^] naturally lead to [^] asso-
under

ciation of individuals, [“and” stricken out] a common
have

authority, whereby each may [“be under” stricken out] the
protection of the whole, etc.

It is obvious that while this edition will be the ultimate authority, Elliot or Gilpin will be that ordinarily used.

We make but one criticism, relating to this same preface by Madison. As printed by Elliot, this occupies thirteen pages, V. 109-122. Only the first quarter of it appears here. The editor states, in his introductory note, that, of the two copies of the preface deposited by Mrs. Madison, one was withdrawn sixty years ago by the Library Committee of Congress for official publication. "The remaining copy, preserved with the original manuscript, is given as it appears, and is but a fragment." To leave off the rest (much the most valuable part) merely because it is not now in the Bureau, is, we think, to adhere too rigidly to a rule for which there are, in ordinary cases, excellent reasons.

No. 7 of the *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society* (pp. vii, 134) is entirely occupied with the record of the trial of a young boy, Gabriel de Granada, in 1642-1645, by the Inquisition in the City of Mexico, on accusation of having been converted to Judaism by his mother and grandmother. It is a document which shows with great completeness the procedure of the Holy Office, and which also develops much human interest of a decidedly moving kind, as we follow the mental effects of imprisonment, terror and unscrupulous cross-examination upon the boy, who finally involves in his confessions most of the members of his family and acquaintance. The text as printed is that of a translation made by Colonel David Fergusson of Seattle, who once possessed the original manuscript, since destroyed by fire. Notes are supplied by Col. Fergusson and by Dr. Cyrus Adler.

No. 8 of the Society's *Publications* is more nearly of their usual type, a composite of various essays. Some are amateurish, some more substantial. Mr. Leon Hühner discusses with much care the career of Asser Levy. Mr. A. M. Dyer returns to the subject of the site of the first synagogue in New York. Rabbi David Philipson's sketch of the Jewish pioneers of the Ohio Valley we have found especially interesting. Rev. W. Willner gives some interesting notes on the Jews of Newport, from the diary of Dr. Ezra Stiles. Under the title "Some Early American Zionist Projects," Mr. Max J. Kohler unites a consideration of some early Jewish projects for settlement in America with that of schemes more properly to be called Zionist. In an appendix he prints a document, which has been commented on before, found among the Egerton manuscripts in the British Museum, and entitled "Privileges Granted to the People of the Hebrew Nation That Are To Goe To The Wilde Cust," *i. e.*, to Guiana. This document, it may be pointed out, bears relations so close that they cannot be accidental to the "Conditions for Colonists, provisionally adopted by the West India Company (Zealand Chamber), October 12, 1656," printed in Dutch and English in the *Report of the Venezuela Boundary Commission*, II. 113-117. The document is an important one. Whether it emanated from the British government for Surinam, or is an English translation of a Dutch decree, is uncertain; we are inclined, with Mr. Kohler, to think it is the latter.

The Past and Present Condition of Public Hygiene and State Medicine in the United States. By Samuel W. Abbott. (Boston, Contributed to the United States Social Economy Exhibit by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1900, pp. 102.) This monograph contains an account of the action of the federal and of the state governments respecting the matter of public hygiene. The subject is touched upon from numerous standpoints. Climate, burials, sewerage, quarantine, food inspection and inquest systems are some of the topics under which it is considered. The sketch of the development of the state boards of health has historical as well as economic interest. The first of these established in the United States was that of Louisiana, in 1855. A National Board of Health was not constituted until after the cholera and yellow fever epidemics of 1872 and 1873, and 1878. The establishment of quarantine regulations is also taken up historically. The first instance on record of the enforcement of marine quarantine in this country seems to be that of the ship *Dorothy*, at Philadelphia, from England, in 1728. The book contains numerous maps illustrating comparatively the conditions in respect to these matters, of different parts of the United States. There are also tables of statistics which bear gratifying witness to the progress made in the matter of public sanitation in recent years.

Nancy Hanks; The Story of Abraham Lincoln's Mother. By Caroline Hanks Hitchcock. (New York, Doubleday and McClure Co., pp. xxii, 105.) This little volume is the forerunner, the author announces, of a larger one, the genealogy of the Hanks family in America. Its interest and value consist in its presentation, for the first time, of documentary evidence as to the parentage of the mother of Lincoln. The idea that she was illegitimate has been very generally entertained, and while no one has had anything definite to say to the contrary, Herndon has plumply and expressly asserted it in his *Life of Lincoln*, and Mr. Morse, in his work in the "American Statesmen" series, has accepted Herndon's statement (which the latter professed to have derived from Mr. Lincoln himself) as conclusive, and has repeated it concisely and emphatically.

The fact is, as Mrs. Hitchcock's researches most gratifyingly show, the story of Nancy Hank's illegitimacy is altogether a calumny. There is no truth in it whatever. She was the daughter—not of "Lucy Hanks," as several of Lincoln's biographies say—but of Nancy or Nanny, Shipley, the wife of Joseph Hanks, being the youngest of their eight children. Her father died when she was nine years old, and her mother not long after, and she was therefore taken to be "brought up" by her aunt, Lucy (Shipley) Berry, her mother's sister, the wife of Richard Berry. It will be recalled by those who have observed the bond given by Thomas Lincoln, before his marriage to Nancy Hanks, that his surety on the bond was Richard Berry.

Mrs. Hitchcock's "find" is the will of Joseph Hanks, of Nelson County, Kentucky. It is dated January 9, 1793, and was probated May

14 of that year. It names his five sons, Thomas, Joshua, William, Charles, and Joseph, and his three daughters, Elizabeth, Polly, and *Nancy*. All these people are distinctly identified, and there is not any doubt that this *Nancy Hanks* is the one who married Thomas Lincoln. She and he, it may be remarked, were first cousins, their mothers being sisters; he the son of Abraham Lincoln and Mary Shipley, and she the daughter of Joseph Hanks and Nancy Shipley. Joseph Hanks, the younger, fifth of the sons mentioned in the will, was the carpenter at Elizabethtown, with whom Thomas Lincoln learned his trade.

Mrs. Hitchcock prints the will in full, of course, and she also gives it in photographic facsimile. The evidence of the legitimate parentage of *Nancy Hanks* is certainly as perfect as could be desired. She gives also a line of descent for Joseph Hanks from an immigrant ancestor, Benjamin Hanks, who is said to have come from England, probably from Malmesbury, in Wilts, about 1699, to Massachusetts, and to have settled in Pembroke, in Plymouth County. As to this ancestral line more definite evidence is desirable, and perhaps Mrs. Hitchcock will supply this in her larger volume. She gives no record evidence which can be regarded as satisfactory between the birth-date of William Hanks, son of Benjamin, Massachusetts, 1704, and the will-date already mentioned, Kentucky, 1793. It has been a supposition that the Hanks family of Kentucky were derived from a Hank or Hanke family of southeastern Pennsylvania, and Nicolay and Hay, in their *Life of Lincoln*, and other biographers as well, have recognized or distinctly accepted this theory. It is rendered plausible by a number of facts which do not need recapitulation here, and can hardly be regarded as disposed of adversely, as yet. The Lincolns of Pennsylvania had a neighborhood connection with the Hanks of that state, it is certain, and some of the latter went, as John Lincoln, grandfather of Thomas Lincoln, did, to the Shenandoah Valley country in Virginia, whence they may have gone, as John Lincoln's son Abraham did, into Kentucky.

The evidence presented in the will of Joseph Hanks, and in the explanatory and corroborative family data published by Mrs. Hitchcock, will compel a revision of most of the biographies of President Lincoln, and this ought to be made at once. To continue to print the calumny on his mother would be unpardonable.

HOWARD M. JENKINS.

The Puritan as a Colonist and Reformer, by Ezra Hoyt Byington. (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1899, pp. xxvi, 375.) The author is his own authority that the book is required to complement his previous volume on *The Puritan in England and New England*. Here, he states his views thus: "It is true, the Puritans were not in all respects consistent with their own principles. They were not as tolerant as they should have been. Yet they were the leaders, in the seventeenth century, in securing freedom for the people, in the Church and in the State. We owe much of the progressive spirit of our time to their foresight, and to their

strenuous endeavors" (p. viii). If this be an intelligible view of that strenuous purpose called Puritan in religion and that resolute endurance both named and misnamed Puritanism in politics, there must be intelligences to which it commends itself.

The well-known story of the Pilgrims at Plymouth and of the Puritans at the Bay is told in a graphic manner. The distinction between the Pilgrims as Independents and Separatists and the Puritans as conserving constructors is recognized, though it is not clearly stated. The claim that the "Greater New England stretches from ocean to ocean" (p. 200) is neither historic nor logical. Such exaggerations rather reflect upon the work actually accomplished by New England, which has been very great. There is a good account of John Eliot and his devoted work among the Indians. The decline of the religious life of New England in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth century is well treated, and it affords a proper background for the great personality of Jonathan Edwards. The concluding chapter on Shakespeare should have no place in the volume, and its merits or demerits need not be considered.

Though he is a Calvinist, Byington is not as strict a Puritan as Palfrey. The Puritan of the middle nineteenth century loved the faults of his ancestors as well as their strength and virtue. In this book opposing views are treated with the greatest courtesy; and in expression, it is charming. It appears in the solid form characteristic of the old publishers, so well known, and with the tasteful execution of their modern and vigorous representatives.

WILLIAM B. WEEDEN.

The recent volumes of the *New Hampshire State Papers* have been devoted to town charters and allied documents. Grants from the provincial authority of New Hampshire came first; lately those from the Masonian Proprietors to whom Robert Tufton Mason sold his rights in 1746. Vol. XXVIII. (pp. 532) completes the material presented in Vol. XXVII. by covering the Masonian towns from N. to W. The editor in a brief introduction supplies the necessary information as to the association of proprietors, while, in case of each town, notes are prefixed to the documents, sufficient to exhibit its constitutional history in outline or to point to other sources of information. There are many maps and plans. Most of the material for this volume and its predecessor is derived from the great mass of Masonian papers which came to the state on the death of Robert Cutts Peirce of Portsmouth in 1891. The same is true of Vol. XXIX. (pp. xv, 678), though apparently no effort has been spared to give this volume completeness by additions from other sources in this country and England. The papers relating specifically to individual Masonian towns having been printed in Vols. XXVII. and XXVIII., the last volume has been devoted to an ample and thoroughly prepared collection of documents illustrating the whole *general* history of the Masonian grant and the Masonian proprietors. Part I., beginning with the charter to the Council for New England, presents the documen-

tary evidences for the origin of the Masonian claim, the long history of its prosecution in provincial and English courts, its descent, its status and character as a factor in the history of politics and business in New Hampshire, and its relation to other titles. Part II. gives at length the records of the meetings of the Masonian proprietors, kept by their clerk from 1746 to 1807, with a final record made in 1846. Carefully sought out and arranged and elaborately indexed, the materials contained in the volume form a most valuable addition to the printed sources of New Hampshire history.

The first volume of the *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts* appeared in 1896, and was noticed in this REVIEW, II. 374. The second volume, then announced as intended to contain the commissions and instructions of the royal governors of the province, has been delayed by various causes, among them the desire of Mr. A. C. Goodell, its editor, to add the commissions of vice-admiral issued to the several royal governors of New England. Meanwhile Vol. III. (pp. xxiv, 577) has lately appeared. It contains the "transactions" from January, 1895, to April, 1897. The book is a very handsome one, prepared with great care, and containing several excellent engravings. The index, composed with extraordinary elaboration, fills no fewer than eighty-five pages; a fourth of the remainder is occupied with the commemoration of deceased members.

New England history has been so much studied that it has in our day attained a height of special scholarship and of minuteness in antiquarian research almost comparable to that expended on the medieval history of Germany. Yet the members of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts have found several important new subjects to treat, or subjects susceptible of a fresh mode of treatment. A specimen of the former sort is presented in Mr. Andrew McFarland Davis's paper on the case of *Frost vs. Leighton*, of the latter in his instructive paper on Provincial Banks, Land and Silver. Attention should also be called to Mr. John Noble's notes on the Trial and Punishment of Crime in the Court of Assistants, his account of the libel case of Admiral Knowles against the historian Douglass, growing out of the naval impressment by Knowles's fleet at Boston in 1747, and his description of the Early Court Files of Suffolk County. Mr. A. P. C. Griffin's bibliography of the historical publications of the New England states is of permanent utility. Mr. Robert N. Toppan has a brief but interesting paper on the Failure to Establish an Hereditary Aristocracy in the Colonies. He is, we think, in error in saying, p. 413 *note*, that the Maryland manors appear to have been tracts of land so designated without possessing any special privileges. Some of them certainly had their own courts baron and courts leet. Of the original documents printed in the volume by far the most interesting is a letter of Henry Dunster, first president of Harvard College, which by a marvellous chance has escaped till now the notice of historians of the institution, and which, being Dunster's reply to ques-

tions as to his administration, raised by the General Court, is of much value.

Mr. E. O. Randall's *History of the Zora Society* (Columbus, Ohio, pp. 105) is marked as the second edition, the first presumably having been that which appeared in the quarterly publication of the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, of which Mr. Randall is secretary. Though lacking in orderliness of arrangement and in finish of style, Mr. Randall's monograph presents a decidedly interesting and instructive study of this communistic experiment, from its inception to its conclusion. Zora is a village in Tuscarawas County, Ohio, in which a body of Separatist exiles from Württemberg, led by one Joseph M. Bäumlér (anglicized into Bimeler), settled in 1818. In 1819 they established community of goods, and they prospered as long as Bimeler lived. He died in 1853. Since then these blameless but unprogressive people have found difficulty in maintaining their experiment in the face of increasing competition and contact with the world's people, and in 1898 the communal property was distributed. Mr. Randall supplements his book with legal documents and pleasing pictures.

The latest publication of the Filson Club, No. 15, is a monograph on *The Battle of Tippecanoe* (pp. xix, 158), by Captain Alfred Pirtle, printed in the club's usual sumptuous style. The president of the club, Colonel Reuben T. Durrett, contributes a lucid introduction, in which he sets in a clear light the general relations of the conflict to the history of the West. Captain Pirtle's narrative makes no pretensions to novel researches. It is based on the materials discovered or used by his predecessors; but he gives, in simple style and with great fairness and good sense, an adequate account of the campaign and of the battle. Part II. contains specimen narratives and letters reprinted from the contemporary issues of the *Kentucky Gazette*, *Frankfort Argus* and *Lexington Reporter*. Part III. contains a roll of Harrison's army, copied from Beard's *The Battle of Tippecanoe*. The volume is illustrated with plans, with portraits, and with excellent photographs of the site of the battle, executed by the author.

Builders of Nova Scotia. By Sir John G. Bourinot, K. C. M. G. (Toronto, The Copp-Clark Co., 1900, pp. x, 197, vi.) We welcome this new volume by so competent a scholar on so important a phase of Canadian history. It is an enlargement of an earlier paper read, at different times, before the Nova Scotia Historical Society and Acadia College; as well as before leading citizens of Sydney, C. B., the author's native town. The separate edition before us is an advance publication from the forthcoming volume of *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* for 1899. It is the result of years of study and investigation by one of Canada's best living historians, whose chief aim has been "to recall the names and services of men who did good work for their country,

in the most critical periods of its history." He has divided his work into three parts, and has supplemented his own text by adding eleven appendices which take up half of the volume. This documentary portion comprises extracts from publications by Lescarbot, the Bannatyne Club, Akins, Haliburton, etc., and, of course, any errors which they contain, particularly Akins and Haliburton, are reprinted.

Bourinot's text deals with the "Origin of the People of Nova Scotia"; the "Establishment of the Great Churches"; and "Reminiscences of Eminent Nova Scotians for over Forty Years." He sketches briefly the early settlers of the French period, and the coming of the Germans, New Englanders, Irish and Scotch, prior to the advent of the United Empire Loyalists. With the latter he deals at greater length, and it may not be amiss to point out here that too great dependence should not be placed on Sabine's work—now out of date. A new treatise on the American loyalists is a desideratum. The original papers in England relating to their claims for reimbursement of losses are in course of transcription for the New York Public Library, and thirty-two folio volumes have thus far crossed the Atlantic. They go far toward unravelling the mysteries surrounding the personal history and migration of these sturdy sons of the British crown.

The author's sharp but just criticism (p. 24) of Richard's *Acadia* is well taken, and his own deductions about the expulsion of the Acadians are particularly lucid and impartial. On p. 63, speaking of Judge Haliburton's *History of Nova Scotia*, he says: "the first volume is open to the charge of plagiarism." But we are able to add that this charge may well extend to the second volume also. The short histories of townships which Haliburton prints in the latter volume, are taken almost literally from the third Charles Morris's *General Information Book*. We have a manuscript which Morris prepared for Sir George Prevost about 1808 or 1809, which first led us to investigate this matter. The same information, virtually, was printed in an *Appendix to Report of Lieut.-Col. Cockburn, on the Subject of Emigration*, 1827, and in this shape can be investigated by anyone.

There are about fifty illustrations in Bourinot's volume, more than half being portraits. Those in half-tone are generally good, while the portraits in the text are usually poor. His index (5½ pp.) is not exhaustive; but that charge, unfortunately, can be brought against most books. Misprints are rare. The author is to be commended both for his material and for his method.

VICTOR H. PALTSITS.

A Hand-Book of Practical Suggestions for the use of Students in Genealogy. By Henry R. Stiles, A.M., M.D. (Albany, Joel Munsell's Sons, pp. 55.) Dr. Stiles showed many years ago that he knew how to write a genealogy, but this volume does not give any very clear reason for its existence. Undoubtedly the author's remarks are just, but they open up no royal road to a beginner, and in fact they hardly rise above the level

of gossip. The advice given is only such as a schoolmaster might give orally to his class, impressing upon them the necessity of care and attention to details, but we fail to find any information as to sources of information not generally known.

It seems superfluous to tell any student that he must go to original authorities, that he must consult town and county records and family Bibles, that he must be patiently inquisitive, but judiciously sceptical, and that above all he must be methodical and careful. The bulk of Dr. Stiles's book might pass muster as a lecture or "smoke-talk," but it hardly seems to be worth putting into book-form.

In fact there is nothing simpler to write than a genealogy, if the writer adopts the standard form of arrangement; but its interest will depend entirely upon the material collected. Therein the author is helpless; if his subjects have led uneventful lives, he cannot supply the interest, and he can only hope to make his record indispensable to the immediate family.

Dr. Stiles very properly refers to some of the current fables of genealogy, the three brothers, the great English fortunes, and the noble ancestry of our first settlers, but these have certainly been falling into disrepute of late years. With the great increase in the number of genealogies now printed yearly, there seems to be no need of a manual on the subject of preparing such books; the intending author had better visit the nearest library, and after examination of the volumes and with the advice of the librarian decide upon some good example as his guide.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

Minutes of Abolition Conventions, 1794-1829

THE *Minutes* of the successive sessions of the "American Convention for promoting the Abolition of Slavery and improving the Condition of the African Race" are rare. Apparently a complete set cannot be consulted in any one place; the closest approach may be made at Providence, in the adjoining library buildings of the Rhode Island Historical Society and of Brown University, but the largest single collection appears to be that of the New York Historical Society. Miss Alice Dana Adams, of Radcliffe College, having made a careful search for these pamphlets in the course of investigations into the history of the anti-slavery movement, kindly contributes the results to this REVIEW in the following list, extending from 1794 to 1829. The letter A indicates the presence of a copy in the library of the Boston Athenaeum; B, in the Boston Public Library; Br, in the library of Brown University; C, in that of Cornell University; Cl, in the Congregational Library at Boston; Co, in the Library of Congress; J, in the library of the Johns Hopkins University; M, in that of the Massachusetts Historical Society; N, in that of the New York Historical Society; P, in that of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania; R, in that of the Rhode Island Historical Society; Ri, in that of the Library Company of Philadelphia, Ridgway Branch; W, in that of the American Antiquarian Society, at Worcester; Y, in that of Yale University.

First	Convention, 1794.	B., Br., Co., J., N., R., W., Y.
Second	" 1795.	B., M., N., R., W., Y.
Third	" 1796.	B., J., N., R., Y.
Fourth	" 1797.	B., J., N., R., Y.
Fifth	" 1798.	Br., J., N., W.
Sixth	" 1800.	Br., J., N.
Seventh	" 1801.	J., N., R.
Eighth	" 1803.	N.
Ninth	" 1804.	J., R., Y.
Tenth	" 1805.	B., N., R.
Eleventh	" 1806.	B., N., R.

Twelfth	"	1809. N., P., R., W.
Thirteenth	"	1812. Br., C., N., P., R.
Fourteenth	"	1815, adjourned to 1816. Br., N.
Fifteenth	"	1817. Br., Cl., P., R.
Fifteenth	"	1818, adjourned session. A., C., M., N., P., Ri.
Sixteenth	"	1819. Br., C., Cl., P., R., W.
Seventeenth	"	1821. Br., N., P.
Eighteenth	"	1823. B., Br., N., P., R.
Nineteenth	"	1825. B., Br., C., Co., J., R.
Nineteenth	"	1826, adjourned session. Br., P., R.
Twentieth	"	1827. Br., Co., J., P.
Twentieth	"	1828, adjourned session. B., C., J., N.
Twenty-first	"	1829. Co., N., R.

Miss Adams has also been seeking for a complete set of Benjamin Lundy's *Genius of Universal Emancipation*. A nearly complete set is in the Boston Public Library. It lacks the third and ninth volumes. The ninth, from September, 1828, to the end of that year, she has found in the Birney Collection at the Johns Hopkins University. The third, from June, 1823, to October, 1824, she has nowhere found. Miss Adams, whose address is 93 Hancock Street, Auburndale, Mass., would be greatly obliged for information as to where this volume may be found; and also for similar information respecting (1) a pamphlet against slavery by Dyer Burgess, published at Ripley, Ohio, in 1827; (2) *Dialogues on Slavery*, by James Gilliland, published at Ripley, Ohio, in 1820; and (3) a book entitled *Involuntary . . . Slavery Examined*, published at Paris, Kentucky, in 1815.

NOTES AND NEWS

Rev. Dr. Richard Salter Storrs, formerly president of the American Historical Association, and for many years an eminent clergyman and honored citizen of Brooklyn, died on June 5, at the age of seventy-eight. He was the author of a book on *St. Bernard of Clairvaux*, and of many historical addresses.

Professor Julius Schvarcz of the University of Budapest died recently, at the age of sixty. He had been a university professor since 1894 only, having previously had a notable career as a member of the Hungarian Parliament and as chairman of the committee on education. His works on the history of democracy, *Die Demokratie in Athen*, 1882, and *Die Römische Massenherrschaft*, 1893, aroused much interest and controversy by their bold and original views. He had just published a general history of Greece in Magyar, in one large volume.

Professor Frederick J. Turner of the University of Wisconsin has been made the dean of a School of History recently established at that institution. During the ensuing academic year he has leave of absence.

Dr. Merrick Whitcomb of the University of Pennsylvania has been elected professor of history at the University of Cincinnati; Professor Edmund C. Burnett of Bethel College professor of history and philosophy at Mercer University.

The American School for Study and Exploration in Palestine, projected by the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis and subsidized by the Archaeological Institute of America (to which its relations are much the same as those of the American schools at Athens and Rome), will go into operation next October, in Jerusalem, under Professor C. C. Torrey, the recently appointed professor of Semitics at Yale University, as its director. Inquiries may be addressed to Professor J. Henry Thayer of Harvard University.

A fund of 30,000 marks has been entrusted to Professors Haeckel of Jena, Conrad of Halle, and Fraas of Stuttgart, by an anonymous donor, for the bestowal of prizes for the best works on the question: "Was lernen wir aus den Prinzipien der Descendenztheorie in Bezug auf die innerpolitische Entwicklung und Gesetzgebung der Staaten?" The first prize is to be of at least 10,000 marks, the second and third of at least 5000. The essays are to be written in German, and to be given to Professor Haeckel before December 1, 1902.

Dr. W. Simon of Königsberg has given the Prussian Academy 7500 marks, for two prizes of 5000 and 2500 marks respectively, for the best

work on the history of autobiography, memoirs excluded. The essays may be written in German, Latin, French, English or Italian, and are to be handed in to the bureau of the Academy before December 31, 1905.

With the aid of a committee of scholars, Professors Cauchie and Ladeuze of the University of Louvain propose to conduct a *Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique*, to be published at Louvain (address, Rue de Namur). Its scope is to embrace the whole field of the history of the Church; the plan includes "body-articles," a full bibliography of current publications, reviews of books, and notes. The promoters of the enterprise are mostly graduates from the historical seminary of the University of Louvain.

The *Jahresbericht der Geschichtswissenschaft* for 1898 has lately made its appearance (pp. 136, 562, 334, 365). The section devoted to the United States is now prepared by Dr. E. C. Richardson, librarian of Princeton University; that relating to Canada by Mr. H. H. Langton, librarian of the University of Toronto.

Father C. Sommervogel's monumental bibliography, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus* (Brussels, Schepens) having reached the end of the alphabet in a volume of two thousand pages, Vol. VIII., a supplementary volume is now in active preparation.

Mr. Raoul Renault of Quebec has begun the issue of *North American Notes and Queries*, a monthly repertory formed on the plan of the *Notes and Queries* of London, and intended to contain, in each issue, a few brief historical articles.

With a view to the manner in which ecclesiastical property may be dealt with in the Philippine Islands, Mr. Henry C. Lea, in a brief pamphlet, *The Dead Hand: A Brief Sketch of the Relations between Church and State with regard to Ecclesiastical Property and the Religious Orders* (Philadelphia, W. J. Dornan) discusses historical precedents.

ANCIENT HISTORY.

M. Camille Jullian reviews recent French works on Roman history in the May number of the *Revue Historique*. In the same number Professor Adolf Bauer completes his survey of recent German and Austrian contributions to Greek history.

The first instalment of Dr. Rudolf von Scala's *Die Staatsverträge* (Leipzig, Teubner) presents the text, where it is extant; and in all cases the full literary evidence of 218 treaties between independent states of ancient times, extending from 1450 to 338 B.C. The Greek texts are given in the original, with critical and explanatory notes. The early Roman treaties are to follow in the next instalment.

Dr. Paul M. Meyer of Berlin has just brought out (Leipzig, B. G. Teubner) a valuable treatise on *Das Heerwesen der Ptolemäer und der Römer in Aegypten* (pp. x, 231), a subject upon which, as he rightly says, the recent discoveries of papyri have furnished a large additional body of material.

The Macmillan Co. have in press a new work by Professor Henry S. Nash of the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge on *The History of the Higher Criticism of the New Testament*.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: G. Porzio, *Concetti Greci nelle Riforme dei Fratelli Gracchi* (Rivista di Storia Antica, 1899, 4); P. Alard, *Julien César; Les Débuts du Règne* (Revue des Questions Historiques, April).

MEDIEVAL HISTORY.

Abbé Ulysse Chevalier has published the third part of his *Répertoire des Sources Historiques du Moyen Age, Topobibliographie* (Montbéliard, Societe Anonyme d'Imprimerie), extending from E to J and completing the first volume. The fourth and fifth parts are promised for the present year, without the delays which have occurred hitherto, and the completion of the whole work may be looked for in 1901.

With the last number of the *Analecta Bollandiana*, XIX. 1, is presented the beginning of an extensive supplement to Abbé Ulysse Chevalier's *Repertorium Hymnologicum*.

It is familiar that one of the ways in which numismatics contributes to historical knowledge is through the examination of hoards of ancient money discovered by chance. A systematic attempt to elicit information of this sort in France, derived from the critical study of 880 hoards enumerated, is made by M. Adrien Blanchet, *Les Trésors de Monnaies Romaines et les Invasions Germaniques en Gaule* (Paris, E. Leroux, pp. 332).

An excellent and critical study of the sources for the biography of St. Bruno, of his life and of his writings, is comprised in Dr. Hermann Löbbel's *Der Stifter des Carthäuser-Ordens; Der Heilige Bruno aus Köln* (Münster, Schöningh, pp. 246).

Mr. John Murray is about to publish *The Dawn of Modern Geography: A History of Exploration and Geographical Science from the Opening of the Tenth to the Middle of the Thirteenth Century*, by Mr. C. Raymond Beazley, a continuation of the learned work in which he traced the evolution of geography down to A. D. 900.

In the *Quellen und Untersuchungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* M. Eugène Déprez begins a systematic publication of original papal bulls found in various Italian libraries and archives, many of which are not to be found in the papal registers themselves. His first series (in *Quellen*, II. 1.) consists of 66 bulls preserved in the communal archives of Perugia, ranging from 1308 to 1325.

The Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres has proposed, as the subject of the Prix Bordin (3000 fr.) to be awarded in 1902, a critical examination of the last three books of the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais, with especial reference to its sources.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: F. Rachfahl, *Zur Geschichte des Grundeigentums* (Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie, December, January); P. Viollet, *Les Justices, les Finances et les Milices des Communes au Moyen Age* (Comptes-rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions, January, February); B. Hilliger, *Studien zu mittelalterlichen Massen und Gewichten* (Historische Vierteljahrschrift, III. 2); J. Zettinger, *Die Berichte über Rompilger aus dem Frankenreiche bis zum Jahre 800* (Römische Quartalschrift, 1900, Suppl. 1); S. Minocchi, *La "Legenda Trium Sociorum"* (Archivio Storico Italiano, XXIV. 4); P. Fournier, *Joachim de Flore, ses Doctrines, son Influence* (Revue des Questions Historiques, April); N. Paulus, *Der Ablass für die Verstorbenen am Ausgange des Mittelalters* (Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 1900, 1 and 2).

MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY.

In the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Vienna Academy, CXI.I. 4, Hofrath von Sickel, in the third of a series of articles long interrupted, studies the correspondence of the Council of Trent and especially the "Proposita," with a view to an edition of the correspondence which the papal court carried on with its representatives in the last years of the council. An appendix presents the facts which illustrate the postal relations between Rome and Trent.

The critical edition of the *Œuvres de S. François de Sales, Evêque et Prince de Genève et Docteur de l'Eglise* (Annecy, J. Niérat), which the nuns of the Visitation at Annecy have been publishing under the editorial care of Dom B. Mackey, has reached, with its tenth volume, the conclusion of his "works" ordinarily so-called, the last four volumes consisting of the sermons of the saint. With the eleventh volume will begin the interesting publication of his letters.

MM. Lavisce and Parmentier have brought out the third volume, relating to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of their *Album Historique*. Like the two which have preceded, it contains more than 1500 pictures derived from contemporary documents.

A good deal of valuable information respecting the Luxemburg question of 1866 and 1867 will be found, in an unlooked-for connection, in Vol. CIV. of the *Travaux de l'Académie Nationale de Reims*, in which M. Alfred Lefort prints a body of *Notes d'Histoire sur les Français à Luxembourg*, the fruit of patient study. They also contain documents relating to Luxemburg in the times of Louvois and Vauban, etc.

Mr. Budgett Meakin, late editor of the *Times of Morocco*, has written, as the first volume of a series of books on that country, *The Moorish Empire; An Historical Epitome* (London, Sonnenschein), described by competent authority as the best and completest general book on the subject of Moorish history.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: E. Guglia, *Studien zur Geschichte des V. Lateranconcils, 1512-1517* (Sitzungsberichte der k. Akademie zu

Wien, CXL.); O. Nachod, *Ein unentdecktes Goldgebiet; zur Entdeckungsgeschichte des Nord-Pacifischen Oceans* (Mittheilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ost-Asiens, VII. 2); E. Driault, *Les Anglais devant Constantinople et Alexandrie en 1807* (Revue Historique, May); G. de Nouvion, *Talleyrand Prince de Bénévent*, I. (Revue Historique, May); C. Waas, *Napoleon I. und die Feldzugspläne der Verbündeten von 1813* (Historische Vierteljahrschrift, III. 2); G. Schmoller, *Die Wandlungen der europäischen Handelspolitik im 19. Jahrhundert* (Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung, XXIV. 1); C. Day, *Experience of the Dutch with Tropical Labor*, II. *Abolition of the Culture System and Transition to Free Labor* (Yale Review, May).

GREAT BRITAIN.

The British government has published reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission on the manuscripts of J. M. Heathcote, Esq., of Conington Castle, Hants; of the corporations of Shrewsbury and Coventry, the Earl of Radnor, Sir Walter Corbet, Bart., and others; and of F. W. Leyborne-Popham, Esq., of Littlecote, Wilts. The calendars of the manuscripts of the House of Lords now become a new and independent series, of which the first volume relates to the years 1693-1695. The government has also brought out Part II. of the *Year-Book of 16 Edward III.*, edited by Mr. Luke Owen Pike; the second volume of the *Accounts of the Lord High Treasurer of Scotland* (1500-1504) edited by Sir James Balfour Paul, Lord Lyon King of Arms; Vol. II. (1563-1569) of the *Calendar of the State Papers relating to Scotland and Mary Queen of Scots*, edited by Mr. Joseph Bain; and Vol. 87 (1894-1895) of the *British and Foreign State Papers*.

The volume of the *Dictionary of National Biography* which will bring that great literary enterprise to the end of the alphabet has been announced for June 26. At the end of the present year and of the century Messrs. Smith Elder and Co. will immediately begin, and will carry through as speedily as possible, the publication of those supplementary volumes which have become necessary by the lapse of time since the issuing of the first volumes.

Mr. H. A. Grueber, assistant keeper of coins in the British Museum, is the author of a *Handbook of the Coins of Great Britain and Ireland in the British Museum*, published by the Clarendon Press, and having sixty-four plates with illustrations of 732 coins.

The *English Historical Review* for April contains a useful list of churchwardens' accounts which have been printed, in whole or in extracts. The list, furnished with dates and with the proper references, has been prepared by Miss Elsbeth Philipps.

The City of London has published, in its serial *Calendar of Letter Books preserved among the Archives of the Corporation of the City of London at the Guildhall* (London, E. Francis) Letter Book A., or "The

Lesser Black Book" (1275-1298) edited by Dr. Reginald R. Sharpe, Records Clerk; it contains a great amount of detailed information relating to the history of the trade of London in the thirteenth century.

The Wiclif Society has published the second book of the treatise *De Civili Dominio*, ed. Loserth. Eleven more volumes remain to be published by the society before we shall have before us Wiclif's work in its completeness.

Messrs. Goupil and Co. have announced as nearly ready for publication a finely illustrated book on *Prince Charles Edward*, by Mr. Andrew Lang, uniform with Sir John Skelton's *Mary Stuart* and *Charles I.*, Bishop Creighton's *Queen Elizabeth*, Dr. S. R. Gardiner's *Oliver Cromwell* and Mr. R. R. Holmes's *Queen Victoria*, hitherto published by them in sumptuous editions. It is also announced that a volume on Charles II. is in preparation by Dr. Osmund Airy. Dr. Creighton's *Queen Elizabeth*, noticed at length in our pages (II. 346) has been reprinted without the illustrations (Longmans, pp. 307) and in a form which brings it within the reach of all.

The Clarendon Press has published the second volume of Mr. Osmund Airy's edition of Burnet's *History of My Own Time*, bringing the narrative down to the end of the reign of Charles II. It is announced that no more can be expected at present, by reason of official engagements entered into by Mr. Airy.

The Cambridge University Press has published, in two volumes, *The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty, together with the Observations upon the Bills of Mortality more probably by Captain John Graunt*, carefully edited by Professor Charles H. Hull of Cornell University. Its introduction contains a biography, a bibliography and a general estimate.

Mr. Thomas Mackay, author of *The English Poor*, has written a third volume (1854-1900), intended as a continuation of Sir George Nicholls's famous *History of the English Poor-Law*. It is published in this country by Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

The latest addition to the series of "Builders of Greater Britain" is a book on *Rajah Brooke: The Englishman as Ruler of an Eastern State*, by Sir Spenser St. John, formerly British minister in Hayti, and author of a well-known book on that country.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: K. Mamroth, *Die Agrarische Entwicklung Englands* (Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie, 1899, 6); R. S. Rait, *The Scottish Parliament before the Union of the Crowns*, I. (English Historical Review, April); T. Bateson, *The Relations of Desoe and Harley* (*ibid.*); B. Williams, *The Foreign Policy of England under Walpole*, I. (*ibid.*).

FRANCE.

After a nine years' interruption, the *Bibliographie des Travaux Historiques et Archéologiques publiés par les Sociétés Savantes de la France*,

edited by M. Robert de Lasteyrie, has been resumed, by the issue of the second *fascicule* of Vol. III., which continues the material for the department of the Seine, and lists the historical publications of the French Academy and of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres.

Three additions have been made to the "Collection de Textes pour servir," etc.: *La Vie de St. Didier, Evêque de Cahors*, 630-655, edited by M. René Poupardin; *La Vie de St. Louis par Guillaume de St. Pathus*, edited by M. H. F. Delaborde; and the third volume of M. Henri Vast's *Grands Traités du Règne de Louis XIV.* (1713-1714).

The second volume of Abbé Duchesne's *Fastes Episcopaux de l'ancienne Gaule* (Paris, Fontemoing) includes Aquitania and the four Lugdunensian provinces. The lists are subjected to searching criticism and the volume makes a large contribution to the early civil as well as ecclesiastical history of Gaul, throwing fresh light on a great variety of topics.

In the series of *Annales Critiques de l'Histoire de France* projected by the late Professor Arthur Giry, and in which M. Lot's volume on the last Carolingians and M. Favre's on King Eudes have already appeared, M. Auguste Eckel has just brought out, in the *Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études*, fasc. 124, a volume, marked by the most thorough scholarship, on the reign of Charles the Simple. M. Lauer's section, on Louis d'Outremer, and that of M. Poupardin on the Burgundian kings, are in the press. There is reason to hope that the long portion of the task which M. Giry reserved for himself, that on the reign of Charles the Bald, which would connect the series with the *Jahrbücher* of Abel and Simson, may yet be completed and published; it was well advanced toward completion.

M. Michel Gavrilovitch's *Étude sur le Traité de Paris de 1259* (*Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études*, fasc. 125) is a study not only of that treaty and of the circumstances under which it was concluded, but also of the manner in which it was executed by the two parties and of the consequences which flowed from it in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

An interesting contribution to the history of Mediterranean commerce in the Middle Ages has been effected by M. A. Blanc in publishing *Le Livre de Comptes de Jaume Olivier, Bourgeois Narbonnais du XIV^e Siècle* (Paris, Picard). The accounts are those of a merchant and banker, whose dealings extended as far as the Levant, and they run from 1381 to 1391. An appendix contains many documents from the archives of Narbonne, relating to commercial treaties, piracy, commercial regulations, etc. The present volume consists of texts; the editor proposes to follow it with a volume of introduction.

Abbé Fèret, having completed his history of the Parisian faculty of theology during the Middle Ages, has now published (Paris, Picard) the first volume of a work continuing its history into the modern period.

This present volume is devoted to the sixteenth century, and is of course important for the history of the religious and civil difficulties caused by the Reformation.

The fourteenth volume of M. de Boislisle's edition of the *Mémoires de Saint-Simon* (Paris, Hachette, pp. 701) contains the original memoirs from the end of 1706 to May 1707, with the usual affluence of annotation and with several appendices.

The economic situation of the French peasants before and after 1789 is the subject of a thorough examination by Professor N. Kareiev of the University of St. Petersburg, in a book which has been translated into French under the title *Les Paysans et la Question Paysanne en France dans le dernier quart du XVIII^e Siècle* (Paris, Giard et Brière, 1899, pp. xxvii, 637).

The trustees of the British Museum have published a *List of the Contents of the three Collections of Books, Pamphlets and Journals in the British Museum relating to the French Revolution* (pp. 48), edited by Mr. G. K. Fortescue. The three collections, mainly due to J. Wilson Croker, embrace nearly fifty thousand titles.

In the Macmillan Co.'s handsome and remarkably cheap "Library of English Classics" the May issue is a good two-volume edition of Carlyle's *French Revolution*. The print is large; the books are light to hold. Mr. A. W. Pollard, of the British Museum, the editor of the series, prefixes a brief note on the history of the book's composition. The text followed is that of the edition of 1857.

M. Aulard's *Histoire Politique de la Révolution Française* is announced for publication in parts by MM. Armand Colin. It will form but one volume, based on articles which have been noticed in these pages from time to time. Its scope is indicated by the subdivisions: *Les Origines de la Démocratie et de la République, 1789-1792*; *La République Démocratique, 1792-1795*; *La République Bourgeoise, 1795-1799*; *La République Plebiscitaire, 1799-1804*.

The life of a useful though not great member of the Committee of Public Safety has been carefully studied by M. Armand Montier in his *Robert Lindet, Député à l'Assemblée Législative et à la Convention* (Paris, Alcan, 1899, pp. 444).

The historical section of the French general staff has begun the publication of two valuable documentary series, of each of which the first volume has been published during the past year: *L'Expédition d'Égypte*, edited by M. C. de la Jonquière (Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle, pp. 673) and *La Campagne de 1809 en Allemagne et en Autriche*, edited by Commandant Saski (Paris, Berger-Levrault, pp. 586). Both are based mainly on the documents possessed by the archives of the war department, and both are prepared in a rigidly scientific spirit. Both are voluminous collections of material; the former volume extends only to the capture of La Valetta inclusive, the other only from December, 1808, to March 28,

1809, being concerned thus far with the preparations for the war merely. Other Napoleonic books worthy of mention are the *Mémoires Militaires du Maréchal Jourdan (Guerre d'Espagne)*, edited by Vicomte de Grouchy (Flammarion, pp. 494), Professor J. Dontenville's *Le Général Moreau* (Delagrave, pp. 211), and M. Louis Tuetey's *Un Général de l'Armée d'Italie, Serurier (1742-1819)*, whose author is also connected with the historical section of the war department (Berger-Levrault, pp. 380).

In Zeller and Vast's *Bibliothèque Historique Illustrée* the latest issue is an illustrated *La France sous le Consulat* (Paris, H. May, pp. 297) by F. Corréard, illustrated with portraits, caricatures and other cuts.

An exact and detailed notion of the workings of the administrative machinery of France under Napoleon, in one department, may be obtained from the book of MM. Georges St.-Yves and Joseph Fournier on the *Département des Bouches-du-Rhône de 1800 à 1810* (Paris, Champion, pp. 416). This careful and methodical study is based entirely on archive material; it has been "crowned" by the Academy of the Moral and Political Sciences.

Under the title *Cinquante Ans d'Amitié, Michelet, Quinet, 1825-1875* (Paris, Colin) Mme. Edgar Quinet has followed the history of a memorable and fruitful friendship, printing many portions of the correspondence which passed between the two men of letters.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: H. Sée, *Les Idées Politiques du Duc de Saint-Simon* (Revue Historique, May); Comte d'Haussonville, *La Duchesse de Bourgogne et l'Alliance Savoyarde sous Louis XIV.*, IV. (Revue des Deux Mondes, March 15); F. A. Aulard, *Le Gouvernement Révolutionnaire* (La Révolution Française, December 14); id., *Le Régime Politique après le 9 Thermidor* (ibid., January); F. Rousseau, *Les Successeurs de Bonaparte en Égypte: Kléber et Menou* (Revue des Questions Historiques, April).

ITALY.

Antonio Agostini, *Pietro Carnesecchi e il Movimento Valdesiano* (Florence, Seeber, pp. 354) is occupied largely with the trial of the Florentine reformer whose name it bears,—a follower of Juan Valdes. The trial, by the Inquisition, took place in 1567.

A large part of the *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, n. s., XXIV. 1, 2, is given up to an article on the revolution at Messina in 1674-1678, by Sig. A. Chiaramonte, accompanied with nearly a hundred documents.

The Neapolitan revolution of 1799 has been commemorated by the publication of a remarkable album, prepared by Signori Croce, Ceci, d'Ayala and di Giacomo, containing 174 well-chosen illustrations bearing on all aspects of the episode, *La Rivoluzione Napoletana del 1799 illustrata con Ritratti, Vedute, Autografi ed altri documenti figurativi e grafici de tempo* (Naples, A. Morano e figlio). A special phase of the history of the same period, yet one having much importance in respect to its results, has been studied by Dr. G. Gauci in his treatise *Della Presa di*

Malta dalla Repubblica Francese e della susseguente Ribellione dei Contadini (Malta, Bussutil). In the same connection belongs M. A. Dufourcq's *Le Régime Jacobin en Italie; Étude sur la République Romaine, 1798-1799* (Paris, Perrin, pp. 576).

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND.

The *Neues Archiv*, XXV. 2, is a *Festschrift* in honor of the seventieth birthday of Dr. Ernst Dümmler, prepared by his present and former associates in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*. Among the contents we notice an essay by Karl Zeumer on the text and history of the *Lex Burgundionum*, one by Dr. Mommsen on interpolations in the breviary of Theodosius, one by A. V. Müller on the relations of Pope Nicholas I. to the Pseudo-Isidorian forgeries, one by Professor Harry Bresslau on the Continuator Reginonis and one by O. Holder-Egger on the *Annales Cremonenses*.

Harnack's *Geschichte der kgl. preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, undertaken under the auspices of the academy and in commemoration of its two-hundredth anniversary, has now been published, in three volumes (Berlin, Reimer). Professor Paulsen discourses upon it in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for March.

In Vol. CXLI. of the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Vienna Academy Professor Duncker elaborates from new materials the story of the visit of the Duke of Lorraine to Berlin and the betrothal of the Crown-Prince Frederick in 1732.

An episode of German history which has also its relations with the history of the United States, especially of Georgia, is treated by Dr. C. Fr. Arnold in his *Die Vertreibung der salzburger Protestanten und ihre Aufnahme bei den Glaubensgenossen* (Leipzig, E. Diederichs, pp. 246).

The Viennese Dr. Heinrich Friedjung's brilliant work, *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland, 1859-1866*, though published only three years ago, has already reached a fourth edition (Stuttgart, Cotta, two vols., pp. 476, 618).

In the February number of the *Deutsche Rundschau* General von Verdy du Vernois completed his reminiscences from the headquarters of the Army of Silesia in 1866.

Professor Aloys Schulte of Breslau has in preparation an important work on the history of the medieval trade between western Germany and Italy (Venice excepted), to be published by the Historical Commission of Baden. The Commission intends also to bring out before long the fifth volume of the correspondence of the margrave Karl Friedrich, and has undertaken a historical map of Baden after the plan proposed by Dr. Thudichum.

The *Archiv für Oesterreichische Geschichte*, LXXXVI. 1, contains a diary kept by Count Ferdinand Bonaventura Harrach during the siege of Vienna in 1683, accounts and an itinerary of the Emperor Maximilian II.'s

journey into Spain in 1548, an article by J. Hirn on the attempts of Rudolf II. to acquire sole possession of the Tyrol in 1603-1606, and one by Professor A. Beer on Austrian commercial policy under Maria Theresa and Joseph II.

Vol. LXXXVIII. 1, of the *Archiv für Oesterreichische Geschichte* contains a fragmentary biography of Kaunitz by the late Ritter von Arneth, extending to 1750.

The Royal Academy of Prague has undertaken the preparation of a monumental bibliography of Czech history, *Bibliographie Ceské Historie*, and has enlisted the co-operation of many scholars. The enterprise has been placed under the editorial care of Dr. Cenek Zibrt, docent in the Bohemian University. The first volume (pp. xv, 673) has now appeared. It includes general bibliography, literary history and biography, and the auxiliary sciences, and embraces 23,594 articles. Genealogy alone occupies 350 pages. Two other volumes are to be expected, one devoted to historical sources, the other to secondary historical writings.

M. Félix Alcan has just published the first volume (1430-1559) of a *Histoire de la Représentation Diplomatique de la France auprès des Cantons Suisses, de leurs Alliés et de leurs Confédérés*, prepared at the instance of the Swiss government by M. Edouard Rott.

In the *Bulletin* of the Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Genève, II. 3, the principal article is one by M. H.-V. Aubert, in which he narrates, with extensive citation of documents, the story of the relations of Nicolas Colladon with the Company of Pastors and Professors, and of their efforts, after a quarrel with him, to recover from his custody their archives and papers.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: A. Stern, *Gneisenau's Reise nach London im Jahre 1809 und ihre Vorgeschichte* (*Historische Zeitschrift*, LXXXV. 1); R. Fester, *Ueber den historiographischen Charakter der Gedanken und Erinnerungen des Fürsten Otto von Bismarck* (*Historische Zeitschrift*, LXXXV. 1); H. Oncken, *Ludwig Bamberger* (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, C. 1).

NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM.

The interregnum in Dutch history during the absence of Leicester, November, 1586-July, 1587, has been carefully treated in a Utrecht dissertation by Mr. Broersma, *Het Tusschenbestuur in het Leycestersche Tijdvak*.

The third volume of Mr. Colenbrander's *De Patriottentijd*, of which work we have heretofore spoken, brings the narrative down to the Prussian intervention in Holland in 1787 and the formation of the Triple Alliance of that year. The work is thus completed. Mr. Colenbrander has also printed, in the *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen* of the Utrecht Historical Society, a series of documents relating to the meetings of the leaders of the anti-Orange, or democratic, party between 1783 and 1787.

M. Henri Pirenne's *Geschichte Belgiens* in the Heeren and Ukert series, reviewed on a previous page (p. 109), has now been translated into French (by the author, we presume), *Histoire de Belgique: des Origines au Commencement du XIV^e Siècle* (Brussels, H. Lamartine, pp. 432).

NORTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE.

The Historical Memoirs of the Emperor Alexander I. and the Court of Russia, by the Countess of Choiseul-Gouffier, have been translated into English, and the translation is published by Messrs. A. C. McClurg, of Chicago.

MM. Plon, Nourrit and Co., of Paris, announce another of M. Waliszewski's vivid and striking books of modern Russian history, *L'Héritage de Pierre le Grand: Règne des Femmes, Gouvernement des Favoris*, in which he deals with the period from 1725 to 1741.

Moritz Brosch, *Geschichten aus dem Leben dreier Grosswesire* (Gotha, Perthes, pp. 191), is an interesting study, based chiefly on Venetian archives, of the life and activity of Muhammad Sokolli, grand vizier from 1565 to 1579, Muhammad Köprili, 1656-1661, and his son, Achmet Köprili, 1661-1676, and a valuable contribution to Turkish history.

The important part played by the Genevese banker Eynard in aiding the Greek revolutionary movement has been so little known that it is a pleasure to call attention to the monograph on him which Dr. Emil Rothpletz has prepared from abundant family papers, *Der Genfer Jean Gabriel Eynard als Philhellene, 1821-1829* (Zurich, F. Schulthess, pp. 95).

M. Félix Alcan has announced for publication a considerable volume by M. Fr. Damé on the *Histoire de la Roumanie Contemporaine, 1822-1900*.

AMERICA.

The Public Archives Commission established at Christmas by the American Historical Association, under the chairmanship of Professor William MacDonald of Bowdoin College, has already made gratifying progress in its work of obtaining systematic information respecting the archives of the United States and of the several states and large cities. The preliminary organization, involving the appointment of an adjunct member, carefully selected, in each state, is nearly completed, and a well-devised circular intended for their guidance has been drawn up and issued. The inquest is intended to be a very thorough one. During the past session of Congress Mr. J. William Stokes, of South Carolina, introduced in the House of Representatives two bills (H. R. 10999, H. R. 11429) appropriating five thousand dollars to defray the expenses of such an investigation by the American Historical Association. The bill was referred to the Committee on the Library, whose report is No. 1767 in

the House Reports of the session. A bill practically identical passed the Senate; but failed to pass the House before the session closed.

The *Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, edited by Representative J. D. Richardson, and the methods by which it has been brought before the public, were during the last session of Congress the subject of investigation by the Senate Committee on Printing. The report of the committee (Senate Report No. 1473) and the testimony taken by them have been printed. If no more be said of the matter (and perhaps it is not our province to say more), it has at least been made clear that whenever Congress wishes to compensate the editor of a governmental historical work it should pay him in a lump sum what it deems proper, rather than to give him permission to have duplicate plates made and to print and sell an edition for his private benefit. The committee declared that the law denied copyright to such an edition. Congress provided for the printing of 16,000 more sets, 6000 of which are to be at the disposal of members of Congress, while the remaining 10,000 are to be sold by the Superintendent of Documents at the actual cost of printing, which is estimated at seven dollars a set.

The British government has published a new volume of the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies*, extending from February 1685 to the end of 1688, with some two hundred items of earlier date now found and included. It is needless to say that the volume casts numberless rays of light on a very important period of our history. Benefits by no means small will result from the suggestive mixture of West Indian items in these volumes with items concerning the continental colonies, too often regarded as in isolation. If the editor's preface shows learning and fairness equal to his sprightliness, we are much mistaken; but we must all be grateful for his work.

Mr. Albert Matthews is collecting material bearing on the terms Yankee and Yankee Doodle. He will gratefully acknowledge the receipt of any example of the word Yankee, or of any allusion to Yankee Doodle, previous to April 19, 1775. His address is 145 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

We understand that Miss Agnes Doyle, of the Boston Public Library, is engaged in preparing a bibliography of the American navy.

The late Henry Stevens, of Vermont and London, at the time of his death in 1886, had finished a work on Thomas Hariot; the first volume a biography, *Thomas Hariot, the Mathematician, the Philosopher and the Scholar*, based on original materials, the second a verbatim reprint of Hariot's *Briefe and True Reporte of the New Found Land of Virginia*. This work is now ready for publication by Mr. Henry N. Stevens of 39 Great Russell Street, London, to whom subscriptions may be sent. The edition, handsomely made, is limited in number.

Professor H. C. Rogge of Amsterdam has an article on the Brownists at Leyden in the *Archief voor Nederlandsche Kerkgeschiedenis*, VII. 4.

Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons announce a *History of Political Parties in the United States*, by Hon. James H. Hopkins, and, in the "Story of the Nations Series," a volume on the *Thirteen Colonies* by Helen Ainslie Smith, to be followed by two volumes on the history of the United States from 1783 to 1900 by Professor Andrew C. McLaughlin of the University of Michigan.

State Documents on Federal Relations; The States and the United States, edited by Dr. Herman V. Ames, is published by the historical department of the University of Pennsylvania. The first number, a pamphlet of 44 pages, contains a score of documents of the years 1789-1809.

Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons have in preparation the first volume of a work on the *Scotch-Irish Families in America*, by Mr. Charles A. Hanna, which will trace the history of these families in the north of Ireland, their voyages to America and their careers here down to the Revolution. A second volume will deal with their history from the Revolution to the present time.

The Johns Hopkins University has published a volume by Dr. J. H. Latané, professor at Randolph-Macon, on *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America* (pp. 294) the first series of the Albert Shaw Lectures in Diplomatic History; and a monograph on the Colonial Executive prior to the Restoration, by Dr. Percy L. Kaye.

Mr. William Abbatt of 281 Fourth Avenue is about to republish the *Memoirs of Major-General Heath*, which have not been reprinted since their first issue in 1798. Some additional accounts of the battle of Bunker Hill will be added.

Professor Ira N. Hollis of Harvard University, formerly an officer of the United States navy, and Lieutenant F. M. Bennett, U. S. N., have united in the production of a history of the American navy in two books, the first, by Professor Hollis, entitled *The "Constitution" and the Navy under Sail*, the other, by Lieut. Bennett, *The "Monitor" and the Navy under Steam*.

Colonel Thomas L. Livermore, a prominent member of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, is about to bring out (Boston, Houghton) *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America*, a statistical manual of much utility, in which will be stated with care the numbers of infantry, artillery, cavalry, marines, etc., from each state, and the number of losses incurred.

The government's *Compilation of Treaties in Force*, prepared under the act of July 7, 1898, by Henry L. Bryan (pp. xviii, 779) supplements in a valuable extent the historical material presented in the volume of *Treaties and Conventions* from 1776 to 1889, published in the latter year. Beside containing such treaties and conventions then published as have not become obsolete, the present book contains practically all the treaties of the decennium 1889-1898, ending with the treaty of peace with Spain ratified April 11, 1899.

The *Proceedings* of the American Antiquarian Society at its meeting of October 21, 1899, contain a valuable paper by Judge Simeon E. Baldwin of New Haven on the American Jurisdiction of the Bishop of London in Colonial Times, and a sprightly essay on the Forest of Dean by Mr. John Bellows of Gloucester, England. Mr. Robert N. Toppan prints, from the original manuscripts in the possession of the Society, the records of the meetings of Governor Andros's council from December 20, 1686, to April 25, 1687. It is deemed probable that the records of the council under Dudley, in the period immediately preceding, will be published by the Massachusetts Historical Society, from transcripts obtained from England by the state. Those of the meetings held under Andros after April 25, 1687, so far as preserved, may follow.

Mr. John Noble, clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, Massachusetts, has in preparation a volume intended to contain all the records of the Court of Assistants of the colony, 1630 to 1692, so far as they have been recovered or can be reproduced.

The Acorn Club of Hartford, a new organization, issues as its first publication a fac-simile reprint of Samuel Stone's *Catechism*, from the rare original of 1684.

The New York Public Library has recently acquired by bequest the important collection of historical autographs possessed by the late Colonel Theodorus Bailey Myers Mason. An account of the collection is printed in the *Bulletin* of the Library for April. The numbers for March and April contain texts of letters addressed to Captain John Bowie during the Revolution by various people in South Carolina and Georgia. Mr. Philip Schuyler has presented a volume of the manuscripts of the first Senator James A. Bayard, containing documents and correspondence of much interest for the years 1800-1814. The May number of the *Bulletin* contains a series of letters of Andrew Jackson, dated from 1813 to 1820, addressed to Wm. B. Lewis and others. The earlier ones are strikingly incoherent and ungrammatical; all show much violence of personal feeling.

The *Publications of the Southern History Association* now appear once in two months. The March number contains contributions by several gentlemen on the question why the Confederacy had no Supreme Court; and an article entitled The Texas Frontier, 1820-1825, by Dr. Lester G. Bugbee of the University of Texas, in which he discusses some of the first causes of friction between the "Americans" in Texas and the government of Mexico.

A volume on the *Historic Towns of the Southern States*, including Baltimore, Annapolis, Frederick, Washington, Richmond, Williamsburg, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah and St. Augustine, will be brought out by Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons, in continuation of the series edited by Mr. L. P. Powell. An introduction by Professor W. P. Trent will be prefixed.

The Garden Library of Southern History, formed several years ago by Southerners in New York, has been deposited in the library building of Columbia University.

In the course of the dispute between Virginia and North Carolina over the boundary line, 1707-1711, many depositions were taken which have preserved the recollections of settlers, particularly their recollections respecting the Indian tribes, covering the last half of the seventeenth century. A number of these are printed in the April issue of the *Virginia Magazine of History*. It also contains extracts from an interesting series of letters exhibiting Richmond in the time of the War of 1812, a pleasing evidence of interest in times later than those which at first engrossed exclusively this magazine. The seventeenth-century materials are, however, continued by further instalments of the Sainsbury-McDonald documents from the times of Governor Pott and Governor Harvey, 1629-1630, and of the papers relating to the administration of Governor Nicholson and the founding of the College of William and Mary.

It is understood that Dr. Lyon G. Tyler, president of the College of William and Mary, is seeing through the press a history of the James River settlements.

The *Lower Norfolk County Virginia Antiquary*, Vol. III., Part 2, contains continuations of its former contents, and in particular of its lists of property owners in Norfolk County in 1860 and in Princess Anne County in 1775.

Mr. William Sidney Drewry, in a small book called *The Southampton Insurrection* (Washington, Neale Co., pp. 201) endeavors to trace the causes of Nat Turner's rebellion and to separate truth from fiction in the story of the episode.

The late Col. James E. Saunders of Lawrence County, Alabama, who had resided in that county for sixty years, in 1880 commenced in a local newspaper a series of graphic and carefully prepared articles on his recollections of northern Alabama. His granddaughter, Mrs. Elizabeth S. B. Stubbs of New Orleans, has reprinted these, with other historical matter left by him in manuscript and with many genealogies prepared by herself, in a useful volume of 530 pages published at New Orleans under the title *Early Settlers of Alabama*.

The Rev. Arthur Howard Noll, in his *History of the Church in the Diocese of Tennessee* (New York, James Pott and Co.), includes, besides the history of the Protestant Episcopal body, such portions of the civil history and of the history of the other religious denominations in the state as seem to be requisite toward a satisfactory understanding of his main subject.

During a long and varied life, marked by much public service, Governor Lubbock of Texas was brought into contact with all the prominent men of the state and with all phases of its political and economic devel-

opment. Accordingly his memoirs, edited by Judge C. W. Raines, *Six Decades in Texas, or Memoirs of Francis Richard Lubbock, Governor of Texas in War-Time, 1861-1863: A Personal Experience in Business, War and Politics* (Austin, Ben C. Jones and Co., pp. 685), contributes much that is interesting and valuable toward a comprehension of Texas history.

In the *Quarterly* of the Texas State Historical Association Judge Bethel Coopwood continues his minute investigation of the route of Cabeza de Vaca, Mr. H. F. Estill discourses of the history of Huntsville, and Judge John H. Reagan gives an interesting account of an interview with Houston in February, 1861, during the sessions of the secession convention of Texas.

The April number of the *Annals of Iowa* is mainly devoted to a long but interesting account of the History of Steamboating on the Des Moines River from 1837 to 1862, by Mr. Tacitus Hussey, an Iowa pioneer. It is a branch of industry now extinct, largely by reason of the diminished volume of the river.

The *Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin at its Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting* (December 14, 1899) and of the State Historical Convention held at Green Bay in the preceding September are united in one pamphlet of 221 pages. The most important papers printed in the book are one by Miss Deborah Beaumont Martin on the Fox River valley in the days of the fur-trade, one by William L. Evans on the military history of Green Bay, and one by Mr. John N. Davidson on the coming of the New York Indians to Wisconsin.

The Oregon Historical Society has successfully begun the publication of a *Quarterly*, edited by the secretary of the Society, Professor F. G. Young of Eugene. The first number, that for March, 1900, is a well-printed book of 109 pages. The main elements in its contents are two: a paper on the Genesis of Political Authority and of a Commonwealth Government in Oregon, by Hon. James R. Robertson, and a body of entertaining reminiscences of early days in Oregon, by F. X. Matthieu, a Canadian who participated in Papineau's rebellion, went to Oregon in 1842, and took part in the movement for the Oregon provisional government of May, 1843.

Messrs. Sampson Low, Marston and Co. have nearly ready for publication *The Remarkable History of the Hudson's Bay Company, including that of the French Traders of Northwestern Canada and of the Northwest, XY and Astor Fur Companies*, by Dr. George Bryce, professor in Manitoba College at Winnipeg.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: K. Haebler, *Quelques Incunables Espagnols relatifs à Christophe Colomb* (*Le Bibliographe Moderne*, November); *The Alaska Boundary* (*Edinburgh Review*, April).

